SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 6D2025-0818 Lower Tribunal No. 2024MM000077 _____________________________
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM FULLER,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee. _____________________________
Appeal from the County Court for Osceola County. Stefania C. Jancewicz, Judge.
July 17, 2026
PRATT, J.
A jury convicted Appellant of sexual cyberharassment pursuant to section
784.049(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2023). On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial
court’s denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal. He asserts that the trial court
should have granted his motions because venue was established in Orange County
where the sexually-explicit videos of the victim were received by the victim’s
significant other pursuant to section 910.15(1), Florida Statutes (2023). He further
asserts that the trial court should have granted his motions because venue was allegedly improper in Osceola County on the ground that section 910.15(2) should
have never come into play since venue was already established in Orange County
pursuant to section 910.15(1).
Appellant’s argument misapprehends the venue provisions of section 910.15. 1
Section 910.15 provides in full:
910.15 Crimes facilitated by communication systems.— (1) A person charged with committing a crime facilitated by communication through use of the mail, telephone, or newspaper or by radio, television, Internet, or another means of electronic data communication may be tried in the county in which the dissemination originated, in which the dissemination was made, or in which any act necessary to consummate the offense occurred. (2) For purposes of this section, if a communication is made by or made available through the use of the Internet, the communication was made in every county within the state.
§ 910.15(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. Section 910.15(1) works in tandem with section 910.15(2).
Section 910.15(1) provides that a defendant “may” be tried in any one of three
potentially overlapping venues: “the county in which the dissemination [of the
communication] originated,” “the county . . . in which the dissemination [of the
communication] was made,” or “the county . . . in which any act necessary to
consummate the offense occurred.” Section 910.15(2) expands one of the venue
provisions of section 910.15(1)—i.e., the second venue provision pertaining to “the
1 Section 910.15 is a venue statute because it concerns where a person may be tried for a crime. See Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2006) (“Venue concerns ‘the privilege of being accountable to a Court in a particular location.’” (citation omitted)). No other venue statutes are at issue in this appeal. 2 county . . . in which the dissemination [of the communication] was made”—to
“every county within the state” under circumstances in which “a communication is
made by or made available through the use of the Internet.” To put a finer point on
it, section 910.15(1) plainly provides that if “[a] person [is] charged with committing
a crime facilitated by communication through use of the mail, telephone, or
newspaper or by radio, television, Internet, or another means of electronic data
communication [he or she] may be tried in the county . . . in which the dissemination
[of the communication] was made.” And section 910.15(2) plainly expands the “in
the county . . . in which the dissemination [of the communication] was made” venue
provision of section 910.15(1) by providing that, “[f]or purposes of . . . section
[910.15], if a communication is made by or made available through the use of the
Internet, the communication was made in every county within the state.” Simply put,
if the Internet-related venue expansion provision of section 910.15(2) applies to a
given case, then the “in the county . . . in which the dissemination [of the
communication] was made” venue provision of section 910.15(1) must be read to
allow venue in every county within the state as authorized by section 910.15(2).
In this case, the State “charged [Appellant] with committing a crime facilitated
by communication through use of” one of the enumerated means in section
910.15(1). Because competent substantial evidence was presented at trial that
Appellant facilitated his crime via an email communication that was “made by or
3 made available through the use of the Internet” under section 910.15(2), a jury could
have reasonably inferred from the evidence that venue was proper “in every county
within the state” because the “dissemination” of the email communication was
“made” in every county for purposes of section 910.15(1)-(2). See § 910.15(1)-(2),
Fla. Stat. (“A person charged with committing a crime facilitated by communication
through use of the mail, telephone, or newspaper or by radio, television, Internet, or
another means of electronic data communication may be tried in the county . . . in
which the dissemination [of the communication] was made . . . . For purposes of . .
. section [910.15], if a communication is made by or made available through the use
of the Internet, the communication was made in every county within the state.”). See
generally, e.g., Wolf v. State, 416 So. 3d 1117, 1126 (Fla. 2025) (“This Court reviews
the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, upholding the conviction
where supported by competent, substantial evidence. Venue need not be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Venue is sufficiently proven if the jury can reasonably
infer from the evidence that the crime occurred in the county where the trial occurs.”
(citations, internal quotation marks, and internal brackets omitted)); Gordon v. State,
350 So. 3d 25, 35 (Fla. 2022) (“Evidence is competent if it is sufficiently relevant
and material; evidence is substantial if there is enough that a reasonable mind would
accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.” (citations, internal
quotation marks, and internal brackets omitted)); Vana v. State, 419 So. 3d 1172,
4 1173 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (explaining that when a defendant moves for a “judgment
of acquittal,” he or she admits “all the facts in evidence, as well as every reasonable
inference that the jury could draw from those facts” (citations omitted)). 2 Every
county includes Osceola County where the victim and her significant other reported
Appellant’s crime to law enforcement and where the State charged Appellant with
sexual cyberharassment. As such, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motions
for judgment of acquittal.
True, had the State sought to charge Appellant in the venue of Orange County,
it could have done so pursuant to section 910.15(1) without needing to invoke
section 910.15(2). That is because, at the very least, the “dissemination” of the email
communication was “made” in Orange County where the sexually-explicit videos of
the victim were received by the victim’s significant other. See § 910.15(1), Fla. Stat.;
see also Debose v. State, 408 So. 3d 33, 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (“[W]e find that
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 6D2025-0818 Lower Tribunal No. 2024MM000077 _____________________________
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM FULLER,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee. _____________________________
Appeal from the County Court for Osceola County. Stefania C. Jancewicz, Judge.
July 17, 2026
PRATT, J.
A jury convicted Appellant of sexual cyberharassment pursuant to section
784.049(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2023). On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial
court’s denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal. He asserts that the trial court
should have granted his motions because venue was established in Orange County
where the sexually-explicit videos of the victim were received by the victim’s
significant other pursuant to section 910.15(1), Florida Statutes (2023). He further
asserts that the trial court should have granted his motions because venue was allegedly improper in Osceola County on the ground that section 910.15(2) should
have never come into play since venue was already established in Orange County
pursuant to section 910.15(1).
Appellant’s argument misapprehends the venue provisions of section 910.15. 1
Section 910.15 provides in full:
910.15 Crimes facilitated by communication systems.— (1) A person charged with committing a crime facilitated by communication through use of the mail, telephone, or newspaper or by radio, television, Internet, or another means of electronic data communication may be tried in the county in which the dissemination originated, in which the dissemination was made, or in which any act necessary to consummate the offense occurred. (2) For purposes of this section, if a communication is made by or made available through the use of the Internet, the communication was made in every county within the state.
§ 910.15(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. Section 910.15(1) works in tandem with section 910.15(2).
Section 910.15(1) provides that a defendant “may” be tried in any one of three
potentially overlapping venues: “the county in which the dissemination [of the
communication] originated,” “the county . . . in which the dissemination [of the
communication] was made,” or “the county . . . in which any act necessary to
consummate the offense occurred.” Section 910.15(2) expands one of the venue
provisions of section 910.15(1)—i.e., the second venue provision pertaining to “the
1 Section 910.15 is a venue statute because it concerns where a person may be tried for a crime. See Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2006) (“Venue concerns ‘the privilege of being accountable to a Court in a particular location.’” (citation omitted)). No other venue statutes are at issue in this appeal. 2 county . . . in which the dissemination [of the communication] was made”—to
“every county within the state” under circumstances in which “a communication is
made by or made available through the use of the Internet.” To put a finer point on
it, section 910.15(1) plainly provides that if “[a] person [is] charged with committing
a crime facilitated by communication through use of the mail, telephone, or
newspaper or by radio, television, Internet, or another means of electronic data
communication [he or she] may be tried in the county . . . in which the dissemination
[of the communication] was made.” And section 910.15(2) plainly expands the “in
the county . . . in which the dissemination [of the communication] was made” venue
provision of section 910.15(1) by providing that, “[f]or purposes of . . . section
[910.15], if a communication is made by or made available through the use of the
Internet, the communication was made in every county within the state.” Simply put,
if the Internet-related venue expansion provision of section 910.15(2) applies to a
given case, then the “in the county . . . in which the dissemination [of the
communication] was made” venue provision of section 910.15(1) must be read to
allow venue in every county within the state as authorized by section 910.15(2).
In this case, the State “charged [Appellant] with committing a crime facilitated
by communication through use of” one of the enumerated means in section
910.15(1). Because competent substantial evidence was presented at trial that
Appellant facilitated his crime via an email communication that was “made by or
3 made available through the use of the Internet” under section 910.15(2), a jury could
have reasonably inferred from the evidence that venue was proper “in every county
within the state” because the “dissemination” of the email communication was
“made” in every county for purposes of section 910.15(1)-(2). See § 910.15(1)-(2),
Fla. Stat. (“A person charged with committing a crime facilitated by communication
through use of the mail, telephone, or newspaper or by radio, television, Internet, or
another means of electronic data communication may be tried in the county . . . in
which the dissemination [of the communication] was made . . . . For purposes of . .
. section [910.15], if a communication is made by or made available through the use
of the Internet, the communication was made in every county within the state.”). See
generally, e.g., Wolf v. State, 416 So. 3d 1117, 1126 (Fla. 2025) (“This Court reviews
the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, upholding the conviction
where supported by competent, substantial evidence. Venue need not be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Venue is sufficiently proven if the jury can reasonably
infer from the evidence that the crime occurred in the county where the trial occurs.”
(citations, internal quotation marks, and internal brackets omitted)); Gordon v. State,
350 So. 3d 25, 35 (Fla. 2022) (“Evidence is competent if it is sufficiently relevant
and material; evidence is substantial if there is enough that a reasonable mind would
accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.” (citations, internal
quotation marks, and internal brackets omitted)); Vana v. State, 419 So. 3d 1172,
4 1173 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (explaining that when a defendant moves for a “judgment
of acquittal,” he or she admits “all the facts in evidence, as well as every reasonable
inference that the jury could draw from those facts” (citations omitted)). 2 Every
county includes Osceola County where the victim and her significant other reported
Appellant’s crime to law enforcement and where the State charged Appellant with
sexual cyberharassment. As such, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motions
for judgment of acquittal.
True, had the State sought to charge Appellant in the venue of Orange County,
it could have done so pursuant to section 910.15(1) without needing to invoke
section 910.15(2). That is because, at the very least, the “dissemination” of the email
communication was “made” in Orange County where the sexually-explicit videos of
the victim were received by the victim’s significant other. See § 910.15(1), Fla. Stat.;
see also Debose v. State, 408 So. 3d 33, 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (“[W]e find that
2 Appellant neither disputed below nor on appeal that the “email” communication containing the sexually explicit videos of the victim was made by or made available through the use of the “Internet.” Regardless, competent substantial evidence was presented at trial that the “email” communication sent from one gmail.com email address to another gmail.com email address was made by or made available through the use of the “Internet” as those terms are commonly understood. See generally, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (explaining that “[a]nyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of communication and information retrieval methods,” including “electronic mail (e-mail)”); Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1210 (Fla. 2010) (“The Internet is the world’s largest computer network. There are multiple ways to transmit and receive information across the Internet, including e-mails . . . .” (citations omitted)). 5 [the issue of venue] is resolved by section 910.15(1) . . . . Regardless of [the
defendant’s] location when he texted the victim, the evidence showed that the victim
was in Alachua County when she received the communications from [the defendant].
Because the ‘dissemination’ of the communication ‘was made’ in Alachua County,
venue was proper there under section 910.15(1), and the court did not err in denying
the motion for judgment of acquittal.”). 3 But contrary to Appellant’s argument, just
because the State could have prosecuted Appellant in Orange County pursuant to
section 910.15(1) does not mean that the State was precluded from prosecuting
Appellant in Osceola County pursuant to section 910.15(2). Cf. Stewart v. Carr, 218
So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (“[I]f a suit is brought under a specific State
statute and that statute provides its own individual venue, then such specifically
prescribed venue governs. In other words, where the legislature provides
affirmatively that an action may be brought in a certain county or choice of counties,
a Court may not impose its will as to venue in order to force the plaintiff to accept
another forum.” (citation omitted)). To accept Appellant’s cramped reading of
section 910.15(1) would unnecessarily render section 910.15(2) ineffectual and
superfluous, contrary to section 910.15’s plain meaning and context. See generally,
3 Because the First District found that section 910.15(1) resolved the venue issue presented in Debose, the First District had no need to address the interplay between section 910.15(1) and section 910.15(2). See generally Debose, 408 So. 3d at 35-36 & n.1. 6 e.g., State v. Washington, 403 So. 3d 465, 470 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (“Florida courts
follow the supremacy-of-text principle—namely, the principle that the words of a
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is
what the text means. Thus, we interpret Florida’s constitution and statutes according
to the plain meaning of their text, looking to all the textual and structural clues that
bear on the meaning of a disputed text and using the traditional interpretive canons
for guidance where helpful.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). We
decline to ascribe a meaning to section 910.15 that neither text nor context can
reasonably bear.
AFFIRMED.
TRAVER, C.J., and GANNAM, J., concur.
Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Clark E. Green, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J. Bradford, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED