IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CP-00377-COA
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE KEEL A/K/A APPELLANT CHRISTOPHER W. KEEL
v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/09/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KENT E. SMITH COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CALHOUN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHRISTOPHER WAYNE KEEL (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 09/08/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND WEDDLE, JJ.
LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Christopher W. Keel has appealed an order that dismissed his petition for post- conviction relief and argued that the circuit court erred by denying his request for a “recorded/exposed” parole eligibility date. The circuit court dismissed Keel’s petition for his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-5-803(2) (Rev. 2023). After review, this Court finds that the circuit court erred, and the case is remanded for a review of the merits.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On March 18, 2020, Keel entered a guilty plea under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 2017) for two counts of first-degree murder for shooting and
2
killing Kendrick Armstrong and Sherri Turner. Keel’s guilty plea included a bargained sentence of “life with possibility of parole.” Keel’s plea was accepted by the Calhoun County Circuit Court and a “Judgment of Sentence of Plea of Guilty” was entered on March 18, 2020. Keel was sentenced to “life imprisonment with possibility of parole on each count to run concurrent with the other count[.]”
¶3. On December 6, 2024, Keel filed a “Petition for Recorded/Exposed Parole Eligibility Date” in the Calhoun County Circuit Court. Keel requested the circuit court to order the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) to record his parole eligibility date “on his inmate time sheet as mandated by Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3, as amended and Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-2, as amended.” Keel argued that his parole eligibility date should be February 20, 2029, and that without a notation on his inmate time sheet, he was prevented “from enrolling in specific educational and vocational programs.”
¶4. On December 9, 2024, the circuit court dismissed Keel’s petition, finding that the court was “without jurisdiction to direct MDOC to modify Mr. Keel’s inmate time sheet.” The circuit court opined “that this matter should be addressed by the MDOC Administrative Remedy Program.” On January 15, 2025, Keel filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that he had filed “multiple ARP’s seeking a parole case plan accompanied by an exposed parole eligibility date, to no avail – being denied at every turn (e.g., SMCI-22-0813; and SMCI-24-0528).” Keel contended that the “SMCI ARP process was not needed in this cause
3
of action.”1 The motion for reconsideration was denied on March 4, 2025. Keel’s notice of appeal was filed on April 1, 2025.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. We review a circuit court’s ruling on issues of law de novo. Vasques v. State, 427 So. 3d 914, 919 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Boyett v. Cain, 397 So. 3d 481, 483 (¶5) (Miss. 2024)). “The question of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional question” of law. Walker v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 399 So. 3d 949, 951-52 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Robinson v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 359 So. 3d 237, 239 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)).
ANALYSIS
¶6. Keel argued that the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition for lack of jurisdiction. Keel contended that the circuit court had jurisdiction to review his claim and that the ARP is not relevant to this issue.
¶7. First, although Keel styled his filing as a “Petition for Recorded/Exposed Parole Eligibility Date,” this filing was actually a petition for post-conviction collateral relief. See Keys v. State, 67 So. 3d 758, 759 (¶4) (Miss. 2011) (treating Keys’s motion to mandate parole eligibility as a petition for PCR); Vasques, 427 So. 3d at 921-22 (¶¶23-25).
¶8. Keel urges this Court to follow its precedent in Lattimore v. Sparkman, 858 So. 2d 936 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), where this Court reviewed a petition for PCR that requested a
1 Keel did not include in the record before the courts any of the administrative proceeding records.
4
change in Lattimore’s parole eligibility date. This Court found that in addition to pursuing an administrative remedy, an inmate could request a review of parole eligibility “as an original action in circuit court.” Id. at 938 (¶7).
¶9. This finding was affirmed by the supreme court in Keys v. State, 67 So. 3d 758 (Miss. 2011). This Court had originally found that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Keys’s motion” because Keys had failed to “exhaust his administrative remedies.” Id. at 759
(¶6). On writ of certiorari, the supreme court reversed the decision and directed this Court to follow its own caselaw in Lattimore. The supreme court ordered the Forrest County Circuit Court to exercise jurisdiction over Keys’s petition for PCR that challenged parole eligibility. Id. at 761 (¶13).
¶10. Accordingly, this Court follows “the rule that inmates may—but are not required to—use the administrative-review procedure as a way of challenging parole eligibility.” Brown v. State, 230 So. 3d 1069, 1070 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Lattimore, 858 So. 2d at 938 (¶7)). However, “the exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the merits of [Keel’s] post-conviction-relief petition remained with the circuit court,” and it would be “improper for the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of [Keel’s] motion without the circuit court doing so first[.]” Graham v. State, 85 So. 3d 847, 850-51 (¶¶6-7) (Miss. 2012); see Keys, 67 So. 3d at 760 (¶7). The decision of the circuit court to summarily dismiss Keel’s petition without a review of the merits was erroneous. Keel seeks a review of his parole eligibility as an initial action in circuit court, which is allowable, and the circuit court
5
has jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
¶11. The circuit court had jurisdiction to review Keel’s petition for relief. The order dismissing it is reversed, and the case is remanded for a review of the merits.2
¶12. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.; WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ., JOIN IN PART. EMFINGER, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
WILSON, P.J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶13. I concur that the circuit court erred by ruling that it lacked “jurisdiction” to address Keel’s challenge to MDOC’s determination that he is ineligible for parole. The circuit court stated that it lacked jurisdiction because “this matter should be addressed by the MDOC Administrative Remedy Program” (ARP). However, as the majority explains, the Supreme Court has held that an inmate may challenge a parole-eligibility determination in an original action in the circuit court without first exhausting his remedies under the ARP. Keys v. State, 67 So. 3d 758, 759-60 (¶¶6-9) (Miss. 2011). Therefore, the circuit court’s decision dismissing for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous and must be reversed.
¶14. The dissent would affirm the circuit court on the alternative ground “that the
2 Since supreme court precedent requires us to remand this case, the issue raised by the dissent can be handled on remand if raised by the parties.
6
sentencing court did not have authority to grant Keel parole eligibility,” and, therefore, “the portion of the sentencing order that purports to grant Keel parole eligibility is void, surplusage, and not binding on MDOC as it administers its statutory duties.” The dissent’s position conflicts with this Court’s decision in Brownlee v. State, 424 So. 3d 342 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), which addressed essentially the same issue just last year.
¶15. Like Keel, Brownlee pled guilty to first-degree murder, and the circuit court sentenced her to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole. Id. at 344-45 (¶¶3-4). However, MDOC subsequently refused to provide Brownlee with a parole-eligibility date and ultimately denied her ARP request for a parole-eligibility date on the ground that a sentence for first-degree murder is statutorily ineligible for parole. Id. at 345 (¶5). Brownlee then filed a petition for judicial review, but the circuit court affirmed MDOC’s ARP decision. Id. at (¶6).
¶16. On appeal, this Court reversed. Id. at 344 (¶2). Based on the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Epps, 150 So. 3d 702 (Miss. 2014) (“Conley III”), we held that “MDOC lacked the authority” to unilaterally determine for itself that the judgment and sentencing order in Brownlee’s criminal case were “illegal.” Brownlee, 424 So. 3d at 348-49
(¶17). We further stated that MDOC could not simply “disregard[] the clear terms of the judgment and sentencing order entered by the sentencing court in Brownlee’s criminal case.” Id. Rather, “per the holding of Conley III, MDOC [was] bound to follow the sentencing order.” Id. at 350 (¶20). In conclusion, we stated:
Neither Brownlee nor the State has ever filed any motion to vacate, modify, or correct the final judgment or sentence in her separate criminal case. Nor has
7
Brownlee ever filed a PCR motion challenging her conviction or sentence.
The final judgment in Brownlee’s criminal case remains undisturbed. This case involves only a request for judicial review of an ARP decision. Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Conley III, this case is not an opportunity to review the correctness of the judgment in Brownlee’s separate criminal case.
Id. at (¶21). Accordingly, we reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case to MDOC to grant Brownlee’s request for a parole-eligibility date. Id. at (¶22).
¶17. I can see only two differences between this case and Brownlee. One is that Brownlee exhausted her administrative remedies and then petitioned for judicial review, whereas Keel filed an original action in circuit court. However, this is a distinction without a difference, as these are simply alternative procedures for seeking the same relief, either of which is permissible. Brown v. State, 230 So. 3d 1069, 1070 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“An inmate may contest the computation of a parole-eligibility date as an original action in circuit court without first exhausting administrative remedies. . . . [I]nmates may—but are not required to—use the administrative-review procedure as a way of challenging parole eligibility.”).
¶18. The only other difference between the two cases is that the State argued throughout Brownlee’s case that her sentence was illegal. Here, in contrast, the dissent has raised the issue sua sponte. But see Winston v. State, 754 So. 2d 1154, 1155-57 (¶¶1, 4, 8-10) (Miss. 1999) (holding that this Court erred by “sua sponte” reviewing and vacating the defendant’s illegally lenient sentence); Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (“In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation. The parties frame the issues for decision, while the court serves as neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” (citation
8
and quotation marks omitted)).
¶19. I understand that the dissent disagrees with this Court’s decision in Brownlee and the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley III. See Brownlee, 424 So. 3d at 350-57 (¶¶24-37) (Emfinger, J., dissenting). But “like cases ought to be decided alike,” State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 634 (Miss. 1991), “and this Court cannot overrule Supreme Court precedent.” Thompson v. State, 230 So. 3d 1044, 1055 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). We are bound to follow Conley III and, by extension, Brownlee3 until the Supreme Court overrules them. Accordingly, we cannot affirm the circuit court’s decision in this case on the alternative ground the dissent raises sua sponte.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION. WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.
EMFINGER, J., DISSENTING:
¶20. Keel filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Mississippi, seeking to force the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) to give him a parole date. The circuit court denied Keel’s request for relief, finding that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The majority concludes that the court erred in that regard and
3 Since we addressed this same issue just last year in Brownlee, I will not rehash here why Brownlee was a straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s holding in Conley III. As in Brownlee, the dissent here maintains that critical paragraphs of the Conley III opinion are just “dicta.” We explained in Brownlee that this is incorrect and that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Conley III specifically to announce the holding that the dissent would dismiss as mere “dicta.” Brownlee, 424 So. 3d at 349 (¶19). If we were mistaken in Brownlee, the Supreme Court will have to tell us.
9
remands the case to the circuit court for consideration of Keel’s petition on the merits. Because I would find that no matter what Keel’s petition is called, he is trying to enforce an illegal sentence and is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of his claim for relief on that basis. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶21. As noted by the majority, Keel pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder. As set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-21(1)(a) (Rev. 2020), the only statutorily authorized sentence for convictions of first-degree murder is imprisonment for life in the custody of the MDOC. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(d) (Supp. 2026), no person sentenced for first-degree murder, whose crime was committed on or after June 30, 1995, shall be eligible for parole.4 Neither the circuit court, the parole board, nor MDOC have statutory authority to grant Keel parole eligibility.
¶22. This is not a situation where the trial court conducted a proportionality analysis under Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and determined that life without parole would be grossly disproportionate to the crimes Keel committed. This was also not a case invoking Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), where Keel was under eighteen years of age at the time of the crime. The cases are legion that state that parole eligibility is a matter of legislative grace. It is clear that the legislature, not the judiciary, determines the offenses for which a defendant may be eligible for parole. See Blankenship v. State, 308 So. 3d 883, 884- 85 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).
4 Section 47-7-3 has been amended sixteen times since June 30, 1995. Id.
10
¶23. We have a long line of cases dealing with sentences imposed by a circuit court that are not authorized by law. For example, there was a time when circuit courts did not have the authority to suspend a portion of the sentence they imposed. Concerning the portion of the sentencing order that purported to suspend a part of the sentence, the supreme court stated in Steadman v. State, 204 Miss. 322, 327-28, 37 So. 2d 357, 359 (1948):
The suspension was void, and he could have been arrested immediately, or later, by the sheriff without any order of the court and compelled to serve the suspended sentence.
(Emphasis added). A more recent case, In re Moore, 722 So. 2d 465 (Miss. 1998), cited Steadman as authority. In Moore, the State sought extraordinary relief from the supreme court to vacate a circuit court’s order that released an inmate from MDOC’s custody more than a year after the sentencing order was entered. Id. at 466 (¶5). After considering the inmate’s due process claims, the supreme court ruled that the order was not supported by legal authority and was void:
This Court concludes that Judge Frank Russell released Robert Daniel Parham without any legal authority to do so. As such the orders of the Monroe County Circuit Court of July 19, 1994, and August 5, 1994, which ordered Parham’s release, are declared void and are hereby vacated by this Court.
This Court further orders that Robert Daniel Parham be immediately returned to the custody of the MDOC.
Id. at 472 (¶28) (emphasis added). And in Robinson v. State, 585 So. 2d 757, 759 (Miss. 1991), where the circuit court had sentenced a defendant who had a prior felony conviction to a suspended sentence and probation, the supreme court stated:
There was no misleading Judge Gardner in this case. He knew that Robinson
11
had been convicted of a felony prior to his suspending the sentence and placing Robinson on probation—an act of judicial nullification. The sentence was, therefore, clearly erroneous. See Denton v. Maples, 394 So. 2d 895, 897 (Miss.
1981); Royalty v. McAdory, 278 So. 2d 464, 467 (Miss. 1973); Freeman v.
State, 220 Miss. 777, 72 So. 2d 139 (1954); Steadman v. State, 204 Miss. 322, 37 So. 2d 357 (1948); Fuller v. State, 100 Miss. 811, 57 So. 806 (1912).
Clearly, § 47-7-33 does not permit suspension of sentence and probation to a defendant with a prior felony conviction. Robinson's suspended sentence and probation was without authority and, therefore, invalid.
(Emphasis added).
¶24. As noted above, the legislature determines what offenses are parole eligible and which are not parole eligible. The supreme court explained in Mitchell v. State, 561 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Miss. 1990):
The fact that Mitchell pled guilty to armed robbery in exchange for a seven year sentence with the Mississippi Department of Corrections did not broaden the circuit court’s sentencing authority. It is still statutorily limited. Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-15-25(1) (1972), as Amended, provides that “[u]pon the entering of such plea of guilty, the judge shall have the power and authority to impose any lawful and proper sentence upon the defendant in vacation just as though the plea was entered and the sentence imposed during a regular term of the court.” And eligibility for parole is solely a matter under the jurisdiction of the state probation and parole board, which must follow the dictates of § 47-7-3. In the case at bar, the applicable parole statute did not restrict Mitchell’s parole rights. Therefore, assuming a portion of the sentence mandated “without parole,” it lacks any legal effect and is deleted by this Court. Ard v. State, 403 So. 2d 875 (Miss. 1981); Hill v. State, 388 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 1980).
(Emphasis added). And in Hinton v. State, 947 So. 2d 979, 981 (¶¶6-7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), this Court noted:
Hinton is correct that Section 47-7-3 gives the parole board exclusive responsibility to grant or deny parole, and parole is not part of the court’s
12
sentencing power. Mitchell v. State, 561 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Miss. 1990). Any such language included in a sentencing order is mere surplusage and will not render the sentence illegal. Gardner v. State, 514 So. 2d 292, 294 (Miss.
1987); Norwood v. State, 846 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
....
It is not the trial judge’s sentence which prohibits the parole board from considering Hinton for parole. It is the legislature, who acted within their constitutional power.
(Emphasis added). Also in Norwood, 846 So. 2d at 1053 (¶¶15-16), this Court ruled:
[W]e address Norwood’s contention that the trial court was without authority to include the “without hope of parole or probation” provision in the sentencing order.
We agree with Norwood that the trial court should not have included the restrictive language in the sentencing order since the statute which prohibits the grant of parole to persons convicted of a crime after June 30, 1995, (Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(1)(g) (Rev. 2000)) is a mandate to the parole board and not to the courts. Gardner v. State, 514 So. 2d 292, 294 (Miss. 1987). Inclusion of such restrictive language in the sentencing order is unnecessary and surplusage. Id.
(Emphasis added).
¶25. The specially concurring opinion suggests that I am not following “precedent,” but I am. I love precedent. I search for it. I read it. I digest it. I test it. I see if it has been followed by other cases with similar facts. I poke at it to see how strong it is, and I apply it when convinced that I know what it means and that it applies to the facts of the case under review. However, the real issue in the present case, as was addressed in my Brownlee dissent,5 is which precedent do we follow?
5 Brownlee v. State, 424 So. 3d 342 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025).
13
¶26. As noted above, I have followed precedent that says it is the legislature, not the courts, that determines which offenses are eligible for parole. See Blankenship, 308 So. 3d at 884-85
(¶5). I followed precedent where the supreme court described a sentence imposed in violation of a statute as an act of judicial nullification and invalid. See Robinson, 585 So. 2d at 759. I followed precedent that says a judge only has authority to impose any sentence that is lawful and proper and any portion of a sentence that fails to comply with law lacks any legal effect and was deleted by the supreme court. See Mitchell, 561 So. 2d at 1039. I followed precedent that says that it is not a trial court’s order that grants or prohibits parole eligibility; it is the legislature. See Hinton, 947 So. 2d at 981 (¶¶6-7). And, finally, I followed the precedent in Norwood, 846 So. 2d at 1053 (¶¶15-16), which clearly states that the prohibition of parole eligibility found in section 47-7-3 is a mandate to the parole board, not the courts. Importantly, none of these cases have been overruled.
¶27. The Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections has both the power and duty to implement and administer laws and policy relating to corrections. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-28 (Rev. 2023). Pursuant to section 47-7-3(1)(d), persons convicted of first- degree murder are not eligible for parole. (In fact, as noted above, persons convicted of murder have not been eligible for parole since 1995.) Pursuant to section 47-5-103, MDOC’s classification hearing officer is responsible for assigning a classification for each inmate within forty days of his commitment to MDOC custody and to provide a copy of the classification of each offender who is parole eligible and to the parole board. Miss. Code
14
Ann. § 47-5-103 (Rev. 2023). Then, MDOC must provide all parole eligible inmates a case plan that includes MDOC’s calculation of their parole eligibility date within ninety days of their admission into custody, with a copy to be sent to the parole board for its approval. See Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3.1(4) (Supp. 2024). The parole board must set a tentative parole hearing date for each parole eligible offender within ninety days of the date he is taken into custody. Id. § 47-7-3(2). The parole board then has the exclusive authority to determine whether an inmate should be granted parole. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-5(3) (Supp. 2024).
¶28. The entire system is designed so that parole eligibility is not determined by a court’s sentencing order but, instead, is governed by statutes enacted by the legislature, which MDOC and the parole board then have the responsibility to implement and administer. The cases relied upon in this opinion have described a sentencing court’s infringement upon the legislature’s exclusive authority to determine what offenses are parole eligible as void, without legal authority, an act of judicial nullification, invalid, lacking in legal effect, mere surplusage, unnecessary, and illegal. Accordingly, when MDOC did not set a parole eligibility date for Keel, it was not declaring the sentencing order void; rather, MDOC was simply following the statutes that, by law, MDOC was required to follow.6 The question, as I see it, is whether the courts should require MDOC to violate the parole statutes by following a sentencing order that we all know to be unlawful.
6 Without a statute telling MDOC when a person convicted of first-degree murder is eligible for parole, how does MDOC set a date? The order does not give direction as to the date. Without a statute setting a date or the order setting a date, MDOC could just as well set the parole date for the year 2525.
15
¶29. The special concurrence, as did the majority in Brownlee, relies exclusively on language from Conley III that I maintain is dicta. Conley was charged with capital murder for the drowning death of a three-year-old child during the commission of a kidnapping. Conley v. State (“Conley I”), 790 So. 2d 773, 781 (¶13) (Miss. 2001). The crime occurred in May 1994. At the time of the crime, there were two possible punishments for a conviction of capital murder under section 99-19-101: death and life in prison. Under the version of section 47-7-3 in effect at the time, a life sentence was eligible for parole after serving ten years of the sentence. Conley was tried and convicted of capital murder in June/July of 1998. At the time of trial and sentencing, the applicable statutes had been amended, and a third option was contained in the sentencing statute for capital murder: life without parole. When the jury could not reach a verdict, the trial court sentenced Conley to life without parole. Id. at (¶14).
¶30. In Conley I, on direct appeal, Conley challenged his conviction and his sentence. As to his sentence, Conley claimed an ex post facto clause violation. He argued that at the time of his crime the only possible sentences were death and life with parole eligibility after serving ten years. In affirming both his conviction and sentence, the supreme court found that the sentence was lawful because Conley himself had asked the jury to return a sentence of life without parole to avoid the death penalty. Id. at 804 (¶¶121-22).
¶31. Years later, Conley asked MDOC for a parole-eligibility date. After that request was denied, Conley filed a request through MDOC’s Administrative Remedy Program. When that
16
request was also denied, Conley appealed to circuit court. In November 2012, the circuit court dismissed his appeal. His appeal from the circuit court then came before this Court. This Court held that because the Mississippi Supreme Court had already reviewed and affirmed his sentence, the issue was barred from further litigation by the doctrine of res judicata. See Conley v. Epps (“Conley II”), 150 So. 3d 715, 716 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
¶32. On writ of certiorari, the Mississippi Supreme Court once again considered Conley’s sentence. At this point, the supreme court had already affirmed Conley’s sentence of life without parole on direct appeal in Conley I. The Supreme Court clearly stated that it would not reconsider the legality of Conley’s sentence. The court concluded:
The Court of Appeals erred by addressing Conley’s claim as an ex post facto claim. However, the Court of Appeals reached the right result in affirming the dismissal of Conley’s claim because the parole board did not have the authority to grant the relief Conley requested.
Conley v. Epps (“Conley III”), 150 So. 3d 702, 704-05 (¶8) (Miss. 2014). The majority in Brownlee and the special concurrence here rely on the following portion of that opinion:
In other words, the Court does not empower the parole board to determine whether the trial judge had the lawful authority to revoke parole eligibility, but, when a court determines the trial judge’s parole limitation is illegal, the parole board may then strike the parole limitation language as mere surplusage.
Id. at (¶7) (emphasis added). In effect, the supreme court said they have already ruled on this issue; therefore, the issue is decided, and neither MDOC, the parole board, the circuit court, nor this Court has the authority to reconsider or overrule the supreme court’s decision on the legality of Conley’s sentence. In my view, everything else is dicta. See C.W. v. Lamar
17
County, 250 So. 3d 1248, 1254 (¶19) (Miss. 2018). Dictum has no precedential value. See Collins ex rel. Smith v. McMurry, 539 So. 2d 127, 131 (Miss. 1989).
¶33. In any event, Keel pled guilty and was sentenced. There was no direct appeal, and Keel’s pleading in circuit court was the first time he had presented this claim for parole eligibility to a court. In Conley III, the Mississippi Supreme Court had already found the sentence to be legal, and this clearly distinguishes Keel from Conley III. Again, in effect, Keel wanted the circuit court to force MDOC to give him a parole-eligibility date. The circuit court declined to do so. Keel appealed, and I submit that pursuant to the part of Conley III that is precedent, this Court has the authority to address the legality of the sentence.
¶34. I would find that the sentencing court did not have authority to grant Keel parole eligibility, as that is solely within the province of the legislature. I would further find that the portion of the sentencing order that purports to grant Keel parole eligibility is void, surplusage, and not binding on MDOC as it administers its statutory duties. Based upon the above analysis, I would affirm the circuit court’s denial of Keel’s petition to require MDOC to set him a parole-eligibility date.