IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-KA-00482-COA
CHRISTOPHER WALKER APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/22/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JON MARK WEATHERS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: PATRICIA A. THOMAS BURCHELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/31/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND SMITH, JJ.
LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On April 22, 2022, Christopher Walker was convicted of two counts of touching a
child for lustful purposes (Counts I and II) and one count of exploitation (Count III).1
Walker was sentenced to serve fifteen years in custody for each conviction, and they were
ordered to run consecutively, totaling forty-five years. He was also ordered to pay a $50,000
fine for the conviction of exploitation. Walker now appeals, asserting that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of exploitation and that the trial court erred by giving
1 Counts I and II were in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-23(1) (Rev. 2020). Count III was in violation of sections 97-7-1 (Rev. 2020) and 97-5-33(6) (Rev. 2020). a jury instruction defining “sexual conduct.” Upon review, we find no error and therefore
affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶2. Christopher Walker married Monica Walker in the fall of 2020. Walker had five
children from previous relationships, and Monica had two children. The only children who
were minors at the time of the couple’s marriage were Walker’s daughter D.W. and Monica’s
daughters A.C. and C.T.2 Walker, Monica, D.W., A.C., and C.T. began living together.3
Monica worked as a night-shift cashier at a convenience store. Walker was unemployed and
watched the children when Monica worked.
¶3. On June 5, 2021, D.W., age seventeen, woke up to several messages from Walker.
D.W. showed the messages to her step-sisters A.C. and C.T. The chain of messages, twelve
in total, have been combined here and read as follows:
I want your p*ssy. I think we should f*ck. You think I don’t care but the truth is I want to f*ck you and I know it’s wrong. Please don’t tell anyone. I know I’m weird and shouldn’t think that way but I can’t help it. I want you. If you tell[,] you will destroy me mentally. But I think you are beautiful and I know it’s wrong but I can’t help it[.] I want you[.] That’s why I’m an asshole to you. I am trying to push you away because I know I am wrong but if you said yes[,] I would not be able to hold back. Please don’t tell on me. I just wanted you to know why I’m an asshole to you. Please don’t tell. I’m still drunk but I know what I feel and I know it’s wrong but I still want you. Please don’t tell[.] You should delete these messages. I’m gonna. Please tell me what you are thinking. I’m sorry. I shouldn’t have said anything. Damn it I’m so stupid.
2 The children’s names have been substituted with initials in the interest of privacy. 3 The record suggests that Monica and Walker began living together before the wedding. The children appear to have moved in at another time. D.W.’s brother also appears to have lived in this house, but that fact is not necessary to the determination of the issues presented in this appeal.
2 I’m sorry for saying anything.
¶4. D.W. called Monica and told her what Walker had done. Monica drove to pick up the
three girls, who had stayed with Monica’s mother the night before. Monica and the girls
immediately went to the police station to report Walker’s actions. Walker was arrested for
child exploitation at his residence later that day.
¶5. Mississippi Child Protection Services (CPS) made a referral for twelve-year-old A.C.
and ten-year-old C.T. because they also lived with Walker. Kid’s Hub Child Advocacy
Center conducted forensic interviews with A.C. and C.T. D.W. was interviewed by
Investigator Jennifer Washington because she was close to the majority age of eighteen.
Following the interviews and subsequent investigation, authorities added two counts of
touching a child for lustful purposes as to A.C. and C.T. to the existing count of sexual
exploitation of D.W. Walker was formally indicted on December 1, 2021.
¶6. Walker’s trial began on April 11, 2022. The State first called Monica, who recounted
the events of June 5, 2021, when she received a call from D.W. that morning with A.C. and
C.T. crying in the background. Monica testified that all three girls were “hysterical.”
Monica told Walker she was leaving to check on the girls because they had called her “upset
and crying over some text messages he had sent to [D.W.]” She stated that Walker was
“heavily intoxicated even at that point that early in the morning” and told her that he “didn’t
do nothing . . . . [He] didn’t do anything wrong.” Monica informed him she was still going
to check on them, and Walker “went into throwing a fit, threatening to kill himself.” Monica
left the home, and Walker began sending her text messages, “apologizing [and] saying that
3 he wouldn’t have done it if it wasn’t for the intoxication, that he never meant to hurt any of
the children.” After picking up the children, Monica took them to the sheriff’s department
to report Walker.
¶7. Monica testified that this incident was not the first time she had been made aware of
Walker’s inappropriate behavior. In March 2021, her children told her that Walker had asked
“to touch or see [C.T.’s] vagina.” Monica told the children that she would deal with the
problem in private. She spoke with Walker and told him “what he had said was inappropriate
and wrong” and that “he needed to quit drinking.” Monica testified that she did not report
this incident to the authorities because she believed “it was just the alcohol talking.” Monica
also testified A.C. told her in May 2021 that Walker made the girls feel uncomfortable.
Monica “assumed it was just his drinking that made them uncomfortable.”
¶8. D.W., who was eighteen years old at the time of the trial, was then called as a witness.
She testified that she woke up to her father’s sexual text messages on June 5, 2021, and felt
“[s]hocked kind of . . . kind of grossed out.” D.W. further stated that while the messages
were “shocking to see[,]” “it wasn’t uncharacteristic” of her father. That same day, Walker
also called D.W. and left voicemails. D.W. stated that “[t]he first one he[] ask[ed] [her] for
forgiveness kind of in a way. And then the second one he start[ed] blaming [her] and he says
. . . like why would you do this to me. I changed your diapers, stuff like that.”
¶9. D.W. also testified about Walker’s behavior leading up to the date of his arrest.
Walker “drank a bottle of Bourbon every night pretty much.” Further, Walker “would get
drunk, he would say things and grab us inappropriately and stuff like that and he would say
4 inappropriate things to us.” Walker “would say like do you want to have sex and then say
it was a joke or say like I’m sexy or say stuff like that to [her] little sisters.” She also stated
that Walker played video games in the living room and “would get nude mod[ification]s like
to make his characters naked and sexual mod[ification]s to make them have sex.” “The
whole family kind of walked in and out of the living room” so everyone in the family was
able to view the “animated sexual activity.”
¶10. D.W. witnessed Walker touch her sisters. She testified that Walker “grabbed [C.T.]’s
thigh a few times, grabbed her butt and [A.C.]’s boobs and butt.” Walker would always say
these things were just a joke. D.W. also stated that Walker “would slap [her] butt and grab
[her] butt anytime that [she] bent over to pick something up or get something. He would also
grab [her] boobs and stuff like that.”
¶11. A.C., who was thirteen years old at the time of trial, was the State’s next witness. She
testified that in May 2021, she sat in Walker’s lap like she “usually did,” but this time he was
“touching [her] butt and stuff and [she] was real uncomfortable and [she] told [her] mom.”
In response, Walker told Monica that “[A.C.] shouldn’t be sitting on his lap anymore and if
[she’s] going to say that, then [she] shouldn’t even be around him anymore.” A.C. also
testified that Walker would “make like hand motions and put his fingers up to his mouth and
like flick his tongue between his fingers[,] and he would make sexual jokes like he wanted
to have sex and stuff and nudes and stuff like that.” He would message her to say “that he
wanted [her] to send nudes to him and then he would tell [her] he wanted to have sex and
stuff.” While A.C. lived with Walker, he touched her “on [her] butt, [her] boobs, and [her]
5 thighs.” She also observed Walker “grabbing [C.T.’s] butt[.]”
¶12. C.T., who was eleven years old at the time of trial, then testified. She testified that
Walker “would act weird around [the girls,]” and “sometimes he would pull [them] onto his
lap and then once [they] got up, he would slap [their] butts.” During spring break in 2021,
Walker was drinking and “asked if he could see [C.T.’s] . . . vagina.”4 Walker also “asked
if he could touch it” but warned, “[D]on’t tell nobody.” C.T. told one of her sisters and her
mother, Monica, about Walker’s comment. When Walker discovered that C.T. had told
them, “[h]e walked up to [her] and said, ‘I thought I told you not to tell nobody.’” She stated
that it was not unusual for him to make sexual jokes when he was drinking. When asked
where Walker would touch her, C.T. testified, “He would touch my butt, my thigh, and there
was one time when he patted down there.”
¶13. The State also called Riley Herrin, a trained forensic interviewer with Kid’s Hub. She
was tendered and accepted as an expert in the field of child forensic interviewing. On June
10, 2021, Herrin interviewed both A.C. and C.T. after receiving a referral arising from
Walker’s case. Due to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, A.C.’s interview was not discussed
at trial; a discussion of C.T.’s interview was permitted due to the tender-years exception.5
4 C.T. clarified that Walker used “another word” for vagina that she was uncomfortable saying aloud. 5 The tender-years exception, listed as Rule 803(25) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, states:
A statement by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact with or by another is admissible if: (A) the court—after a hearing outside the jury's presence—determines that the statement’s time, content, and circumstances provide
6 The video recording of C.T.’s interview with Herrin was played for the jury.6 Herrin noted
the “minimizing language” used by C.T. in the video suggesting Walker’s actions were not
“intentional or purposeful because he [said] it was a joke.” Herrin noted that C.T. “was
consistent with other children” who had experienced sexual abuse at home and had made a
disclosure. The interview’s summary was then sent to law enforcement.
¶14. The State also called law enforcement officers involved with Walker’s case to testify.
Deputy Scott Lees, who initially arrested Walker at his residence, testified that Walker’s cell
phone was seized at the scene. Without objection, the cell phone was entered into evidence.
Investigator Michael Wahl also testified as a certified operator of Cellebrite, the State’s
system used to perform forensic extractions of cell phones, also known as “phone dumps.”
The phone dump of Walker’s device was entered into evidence without objection.
¶15. Finally, the State called Investigator Jennifer Washington with the Forrest County
Sheriff’s Office, who was assigned the case in June of 2021. Washington developed
probable cause to arrest Walker based on the text messages he had sent to D.W. and issued
a warrant for his arrest. Washington conducted an interview with D.W. and was able to
witness A.C. and C.T.’s forensic interviews at Kid’s Hub. After examining all the evidence,
Washington added the two charges of lustful touching to the existing charge of child
substantial indicia of reliability; and (B) the child either: (i) testifies; or (ii) is unavailable as a witness, and other evidence corroborates the act. 6 The State began the interview at the twenty-six-minute mark because the beginning was primarily about Herrin building a rapport with C.T.
7 exploitation. She testified about the substance of Walker’s “phone dump,” including a
message he sent to A.C. asking her to “send nudes.” Washington testified that Walker left
voice messages for Monica and D.W. on the date of his arrest, generally apologizing and
promising he would never do “it” again. He also left angry voice messages for them,
including one to D.W. stating that he “changed [her] diapers[,] . . . took care of [her for her]
entire life,” and now, he has “f*cked up one time” and she “won’t talk to [him.]” The
pertinent messages, five in total, were played for the jury in their entirety.
¶16. Walker called no witnesses in his defense. After deliberating, the jury found Walker
guilty of all three charged counts. He was sentenced to serve fifteen years for each count,
to be served consecutively, totaling forty-five years in custody. Walker now appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶17. Walker argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of
exploitation, and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “sexual
conduct.”
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶18. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Tubwell v. State, 359 So. 3d 249, 250 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Sims v.
State, 329 So. 3d 528, 534 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)). “We are not required to
decide—and in fact we must refrain from deciding—whether we think the State proved the
[requisite] elements. Rather, we must decide whether a reasonable juror could rationally say
that the State did.” Poole v. State, 46 So. 3d 290, 293-94 (¶20) (Miss. 2010). In so doing,
8 “this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine if any
rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Benthall v. State, 311 So. 3d 697, 703 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Martin
v. State, 214 So. 3d 217, 222 (¶15) (Miss. 2017)). This Court “will reverse and render if the
facts and inferences favor the defendant with such force that reasonable jurors could not find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Melendez v. State, 354 So. 3d 944, 952 (¶30) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Smoots v. State, 310 So. 3d 1184, 1189 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)).
But “if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt[,]” we will affirm. Id.
¶19. Walker contends that the State’s evidence presented in support of a conviction of
exploitation was insufficient. He does not contest his convictions of the two counts of
touching a child with lustful purposes. The jury was instructed that to find Walker guilty of
exploitation, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knowingly and unlawfully persuade[d], seduce[d], or solicit[ed] D.W., who was less than 18 years old, to meet [him] in order to engage in sexual conduct, by messaging D.W. that he wanted to engage in sexual activity with her.
There was sufficient evidence entered into the record through which a rational juror could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker sent text messages in an effort to persuade D.W.
to engage in sexual activity with him. The messages stated, “I want your p*ssy. I think we
should f*ck . . . the truth is I want to f*ck you” along with “but if you said yes[,] I would not
be able to hold back.”
¶20. The jury was able to view the screenshots of these messages. The messages came
9 from a contact named “Daddy” in D.W.’s phone, and D.W. confirmed in her testimony that
the number belonged to Walker. Walker’s argument on appeal rests primarily on the fact that
the messages at issue were not produced in the phone dump. But Walker plainly stated in the
messages to D.W., “You should delete these messages. I’m gonna.” Further, Investigator
Wahl’s testimony explained that the Cellebrite technology used for the phone dump did not
provide him with a report of deleted messages.7 In other words, Wahl “cannot say if
something was or was not deleted.” A reasonable juror could rationally conclude that Walker
deleted the sexual text messages from his phone.
¶21. The jury was also presented with the first-hand testimony of D.W., the message
recipient, as well as the testimonies of A.C. and Monica, who viewed the messages on
D.W.’s phone. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we
do not “assume[] the role of juror on appeal. We do not reweigh evidence. We do not assess
witnesses’ credibility. And we do not resolve conflicts between evidence. Those decisions
belong solely to the jury.” McCarty v. State, 247 So. 3d 260, 269 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App.
2017) (quoting Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 289 (¶1) (Miss. 2017)). It is clear from the
record on appeal that a rational juror could have found Walker guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt on all elements of the crime of exploitation.
II. Jury Instructions
7 Wahl stated in his testimony that a physical extraction dump may recover deleted items on a phone. However, a physical extraction is only available for certain types of phones. In Walker’s case, a physical extraction was not available. Wahl instead performed an “advanced logical” dump, meaning the deleted messages were not recovered.
10 ¶22. Walker additionally argues that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction that
defined “sexual conduct.” The instruction read as follows:
The Court now instructs you that “sexual conduct” means real or pretend (1) oral genital contact, oral anal conduct, or sexual intercourse between people of the same or opposite sex; (2) bestiality; (3) masturbation; (4) sadistic or masochistic abuse; (5) sexually showing the genitals or pubic area of any person; or (6) sexually touching the genitals, pubic area, buttocks, anus, or breast.
Walker first contends that this instruction did not properly track the language of the
corresponding statute. That statute defines “sexually explicit conduct”:
[A]ctual or simulated: (i) Oral genital conduct, oral anal conduct, or sexual intercourse as defined in Section 97-3-65, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) Bestiality; (iii) Masturbation; (iv) Sadistic or masochistic abuse; (v) Lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person; or (vi) Fondling or other erotic touching of the genitals, pubic area, buttocks, anus[,] or breast.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-31(b) (Rev. 2014).
¶23. Notably, Walker did not object to this instruction when given the opportunity at trial.
While the jury instruction conference in this case was held off the record and later recapped
by the judge into the record, Walker did not object to the instruction at either time. This
Court has long held that “[t]o preserve a jury instruction issue on appeal, the defendant must
make a specific objection to the proposed instruction to allow the trial court to consider the
issue.” E.g., Sands v. State, 315 So. 3d 1066, 1070 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting
Harris v. State, 861 So. 2d 1003, 1013 (¶18) (Miss. 2003)); accord Crawford v. State, 787
So. 2d 1236, 1244-45 (¶34) (Miss. 2001).
¶24. The only alternative to this rule is plain-error review, which “is to be ‘used sparingly,
11 solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.’”
Cozart v. State, 226 So. 3d 574, 581 (¶23) (Miss. 2017) (quoting United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). “For the plain-error doctrine to apply, there must have been an error that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Hollingsworth v. State, 269 So. 3d 456, 459 (¶8)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Johnson v. State, 155 So. 3d 733, 738-39 (¶8) (Miss. 2014)).
“The plain error doctrine is employed only in situations when a defendant’s substantive or
fundamental rights are affected.” Green v. State, 183 So. 3d 28, 31 (¶6) (Miss. 2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flora v. State, 925 So. 2d 797, 811 (¶42) (Miss.
2006)). “[T]o determine if plain error has occurred, we must determine if the trial court has
deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear[,] or obvious, and whether the
error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial.” Id. (citing Neal v. State, 15 So. 3d 388, 403
(¶32) (Miss. 2009)). So for this Court to apply the plain-error doctrine, we must first
determine if an error (a deviation from a legal rule) involving the jury instructions occurred
at all.
¶25. “When jury instructions are challenged on appeal, we are mindful that trial courts are
given considerable discretion regarding the instructions’ form and substance.” McNeer v.
State, 307 So. 3d 508, 513-14 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Roberson v. State, 19 So.
3d 95, 99 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). Further, “[i]t is well settled that the standard of
review for the giving or refusing of jury instructions is an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing
Taylor v. State, 109 So. 3d 589, 595 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)). “When reviewing the
12 giving or refusal of jury instructions, we do not view the jury instructions in isolation, but
instead we consider them as a whole.” Taylor, 109 So. 3d at 595 (¶18) (citing Rushing v.
State, 911 So. 2d 526, 537 (¶24) (Miss. 2005)). “[I]f all instructions fairly, but not
necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results.” Cooper v.
State, 230 So. 3d 1071, 1077 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Crook v. State, 105 So. 3d 353, 358 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)).
¶26. Walker’s first contention of error with the definition instruction is that it used the
word “pretend” in place of the word “simulated,” as found in the statutory definition. Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-5-31(b). Mississippi law “does not require jury instructions to be perfectly
worded, so long as the instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury and create no injustice.”
Baxter v. State, 177 So. 3d 394, 401 (¶21) (Miss. 2015) (citing Wilson v. State, 967 So. 2d
32, 36-37 (¶11) (Miss. 2007)). The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “pretend” as
“giv[ing] the appearance of feeling or possessing (an emotion or quality)” or “speak[ing] and
act[ing] so as to make it appear that something is the case when in fact it is not.”8
Conversely, “simulated” is defined as “pretended or feigned.”9 The difference between the
two words is so minute, so insignificant, that this Court cannot find that it would have misled
the jury in reaching a verdict. Again, “jury instructions do not have to be perfect[;] they only
have to fairly announce the applicable rule of law.” Mitchell v. State, 327 So. 3d 142, 155
(¶66) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Brown v. State, 19 So. 3d 85, 92 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App.
8 Pretend, New Oxford American Dictionary 1384 (3d ed. 2010). 9 Simulated, New Oxford American Dictionary 1630 (3d ed. 2010).
13 2008)). The definition instruction used at Walker’s trial sufficiently instructed the jury and,
as a whole, fairly announced the correct statement of the law. This issue is without merit.
¶27. Walker also asserts that the trial court erred by giving the “sexual conduct” definition
instruction without indicating that the definition given applied specifically to the crime of
sexual exploitation. Pointedly, he argues that the inclusion of “real or pretend conduct” in
the definition of sexual conduct “could be interpreted by the jury as allowing them to convict
Walker of touching a child for lustful purposes in Counts I and II if it found that [he]
pretended to touch [C.T.] and [A.C.] in a sexual way.” Walker argues that this given
definition was “especially prejudicial” because of the testimony that “Walker would often
say things and then tell the children he was just joking.”
¶28. The exploitation-elements instruction read:
The Defendant, CHRISTOPHER WALKER, has been charged in Count III with the crime of Child Exploitation. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that:
1. On or about June 5, 2021, in Forrest County, Mississippi; 2. CHRISTOPHER WALKER [did] knowingly and unlawfully persuade, seduce, or solicit D.W., who was less than 18 years old, to meet CHRISTOPHER WALKER in order to engage in sexual conduct, by messaging D.W. that he wanted to engage in sexual activity with her, then you shall find CHRISTOPHER WALKER guilty as charged.
If the State has failed to prove any one or more of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the Defendant not guilty of COUNT III: CHILD EXPLOITATION.
(Emphasis added).
¶29. Our review of Walker’s contention requires that we read all the jury instructions given
as a whole, “with no one instruction to be read alone or taken out of context.” Pulliam v.
14 State, 321 So. 3d 1185, 1193 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Blanden v. State, 276 So.
3d 1204, 1210 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)). The jury instructions were clear in both counts
of “Touching a Child for Lustful Purposes” that actual touch was required. Those
instructions for Counts I and II specifically stated that the jury had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Walker “did unlawfully touch a minor child . . . who was less than 16
years old, by touching her on the buttocks, thighs, or breasts, in order to satisfy his sexual
desires or lust” to render a guilty verdict. (Emphasis added). We “presume[] that jurors
follow the instructions of the court.” Neal, 15 So. 3d at 402 (¶30) (quoting Moore v. State,
787 So. 2d 1282, 1291 (¶30) (Miss. 2001)). Only the exploitation-elements instruction for
Count III contained the term “sexual conduct.” Read as a whole, the jury instructions for
both counts of touching A.C. and C.T. for lustful purposes required the jury’s finding that
Walker “touched” the victims. The only inclusion of the phrase “sexual conduct” was in the
exploitation instruction. We presume that jurors follow the instructions given by the
court—that said, we find that Walker suffered no “manifest injustice” from these
instructions.
¶30. Walker failed to object to this jury instructions at trial and is procedurally barred from
raising the issue on appeal. Under the plain-error doctrine, we find that the trial court did
not violate a known legal rule since the jury instructions, as a whole, announce the applicable
rules of law. Therefore, no error occurred. Additionally, the State’s evidence used to convict
Walker of child exploitation was sufficient. Thus, we affirm each of Walker’s convictions
and sentences.
15 ¶31. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.