Christopher Underwood v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 23, 2015
• Docket: 10A05-1405-CR-234
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 23 2015, 9:06 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Bart M. Betteau Gregory F. Zoeller Betteau Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana New Albany, Indiana Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher Underwood, April 23, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 10A04-1405-CR-234 v. Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court

The Honorable Joseph P. Weber, State of Indiana, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff Case No. 10C03-1402-FD-248

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary [1] Christopher Underwood appeals his conviction for class D felony sexual

battery, following a jury trial. We restate and address three issues on appeal:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 1 of 11 (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused Underwood’s

proffered jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence; (2) whether

the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination;

and, (3) whether the State presented sufficient evidence of forceful compulsion

to support a sexual battery conviction. Finding no abuse of discretion but that

the evidence was insufficient, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History [2] The facts favorable to the verdict indicate that on January 30, 2014,

Underwood and L.S., a female, were both inmates of the Clark County Jail.

Underwood, another male inmate, and L.S. were being transported from the

courtroom back to the jail by one guard. All three inmates’ wrists and feet

were shackled. L.S. alleged that first, when the inmates were on the elevator,

Underwood was standing behind her and touched her buttocks. L.S. alleged

that subsequently, when the inmates were walking down the hallway,

Underwood again touched her buttocks. L.S. alleged that then, when the

inmates were in the courthouse garage area and the guard had his back turned,

Underwood touched her buttocks a third time. She alleged that he grabbed

underneath her buttocks quite hard. L.S. complained to the transport officer

that Underwood had touched her. Video surveillance of the garage area shows

Underwood approaching L.S. from behind with his hands down by her

buttocks and then L.S. quickly jerking away from him after apparently being

touched.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 2 of 11 [3] The State charged Underwood with three counts of class D felony sexual

battery based upon the three separate incidents alleged by L.S. Each count

alleged that Underwood, with the intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual

desires, touched L.S. when she was compelled to submit to the touching by

force or the imminent threat of force. A jury trial was held on April 24, 2014.

At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, Underwood moved for a directed

verdict arguing that the State had presented no evidence that L.S. had been

compelled to submit to any of the alleged touchings by force or the imminent

threat of force as required by Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-8(a)(1)(A). The

trial court denied the motion and Underwood proceeded to present evidence.

At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the

elements of sexual battery as well as the elements of the lesser-included offense

of battery. The jury found Underwood not guilty of sexual battery or battery

regarding the first two counts, but guilty of one count of class D felony sexual

battery regarding the incident in the garage area. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The jury was adequately instructed regarding the presumption of innocence. [4] We first address Underwood’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion

when it refused his proffered jury instruction regarding the presumption of

innocence. The trial court has broad discretion in instructing the jury, and we

review that discretion only for abuse. Kane v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1228, 1231

(Ind. 2012). To determine whether the court properly refused a proffered

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 3 of 11 instruction, we consider: (1) whether the proffered instruction correctly states

the law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to support giving the

instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction was covered by

other instructions that were given. Id. (citing Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390,

394 (Ind. 2001)). “We consider the instructions ‘as a whole and in reference to

each other’ and do not reverse the trial court ‘for an abuse of discretion unless

the instructions as a whole mislead the jury as to the law in the case.’” Helsley v.

State, 809 N.E.2d 292, 303 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377,

382 (Ind. 2002)).

[5] Underwood relied on Robey v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind. 1983), and Lee v.

State, 964 N.E.2d 859, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2012) as authority

for his proposed instruction that included language stating that the presumption

of innocence “continues in favor of the accused throughout the trial” and that

the jury “should attempt to fit the evidence to the presumption that the

[a]ccused is innocent.” Appellant’s App. at 111. In McCowan v. State, No.

64S03-1408-CR-516 (Ind. Mar. 25, 2015), our supreme court recently noted that

Robey (and the precedent that followed) enunciated a seemingly bright line rule

requiring, upon request, a jury instruction with the abovementioned language,

but then applied a flexible standard merely requiring the jury instructions as a

whole to discuss the same principles. Slip op. at 7-8, 11. The McCowan court

unequivocally and prospectively resolved this conflicting ruling in Robey and

held that “it is the absolute right of every criminal defendant to receive the

following jury instruction upon request: ‘The presumption of innocence

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 4 of 11 continues in favor of the defendant throughout the trial. You should fit the

evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you can

reasonably do so.’” Id. at 1-2.1

[6] Because this unequivocal rule is to be applied prospectively, and given the

ambiguity in the law at the time of Underwood’s trial, we review the trial

court’s refusal of his requested instruction pursuant to the more general

standard enunciated in Robey and consider whether, taken as a whole, “[the jury

instructions] ‘adequately directed the jury to receive and evaluate the trial

evidence while in the posture of presuming the defendant innocent and

demanding of the State that it produce strong and persuasive evidence of guilt

wholly at odds with innocence.’” Id. at 11 (quoting Robey, 454 N.E.2d at 1222).

Our review of the jury instructions here reveals that the jury was adequately

instructed regarding these principles. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial

court abused its discretion when it refused Underwood’s proffered instruction.

Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination. [7] Next, we briefly address Underwood’s contention that the trial court abused its

discretion in limiting his cross-examination of L.S. Specifically, Underwood

asserts that he was prevented from sufficiently cross-examining L.S. regarding

1 The McCowan court stated, “If the defendant adds to or varies this language in his request, inclusion of that variation remains within the discretion of the trial court, under the traditional three-prong analysis established by our jurisprudence.” Id. at 9 (footnote and citation omitted).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 5 of 11 her pending criminal charges or her alleged bias caused by her financial status.

The scope and extent of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial

court, and we will reverse only upon a finding of an abuse of discretion. Manuel

v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “Trial judges retain wide

latitude to impose reasonable limits on the right to cross-examination based on

concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the

issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally

relevant.” Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans.

denied.

[8] Despite his assertions to the contrary, our review of the record indicates that

Underwood was sufficiently permitted to attack L.S.’s credibility with evidence

of her pending charges as well as explore relevant aspects of L.S.’s alleged bias

such that his opportunity for effective cross-examination was not infringed

upon. See id. (we will reverse trial court’s decision to limit scope of cross-

examination only when court’s restriction substantially affects defendant’s

rights). Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.

Moreover, we conclude that if error did occur, any such error was harmless.

See Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind. 2010) (violation of right to

cross-examination does not require reversal if State can show beyond a

reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to verdict). In light of the video

evidence viewed by the jury (and by this Court) which corroborates L.S.’s

testimony that Underwood touched her, and the extent of cross-examination

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 6 of 11 that was permitted, we can say with confidence that the trial court’s limitation

on cross-examination did not contribute to the verdict.

Section 3 – The State did not prove forceful compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt. [9] Underwood challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

Specifically, he contends that the State did not prove that L.S. was compelled to

submit to his touching by force or the imminent threat of force as required for

sexual battery.2 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction, we examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences

that support the verdict. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 573 (Ind. 2014). We

do not assess witness credibility or reweigh evidence. Id. Rather, we consider

only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and will affirm the conviction

unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146

(Ind. 2007). The evidence will be deemed sufficient if an inference may

reasonably be drawn from it to support the conviction. Id.

2 Underwood also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. However, Underwood called witnesses and presented evidence after the denial of his motion, and “‘one who elects to present evidence after a denial of his motion for directed verdict made at the end of the State’s case waives appellate review of the denial of that motion.”’ Cox v. State, 19 N.E.3d 287, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Snow v. State, 560 N.E.2d 69, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 7 of 11 [10] To prove that Underwood committed class D felony sexual battery, the State

was required to prove that Underwood, acting with intent to arouse or satisfy

his own sexual desires, touched L.S. when she was compelled to submit to the

touching by force or the imminent threat of force. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-

8(a)(1)(A). Evidence that a victim did not voluntarily consent to a touching

does not, in itself, support the conclusion that the defendant compelled the

victim to submit to the touching by force or threat of force. Frazier v. State, 988

N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “In fact, not all touchings intended to

arouse or satisfy sexual desires constitute sexual battery; rather, only those in

which the person touched is compelled to submit by force or the imminent

threat of force violate Indiana Code § 35-42-4-8.” Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d

728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The force need not be physical or

violent, but “may be implied from the circumstances.” Chatham v. State, 845

N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The presence or absence of forceful

compulsion is to be viewed from the victim’s perspective, not the assailant’s.

Frazier, 988 N.E.2d at 1261. Our supreme court has explained that this is a

subjective test and the issue is “whether the victim perceived the aggressor’s

force or imminent threat of force as compelling her compliance.” Tobias v.

State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996).

[11] Underwood contends that the State did not prove forceful compulsion beyond a

reasonable doubt. We agree. The evidence most favorable to the veridict

indicates that, while L.S. and Underwood were in the garage area of the

courthouse, Underwood approached L.S. from behind and touched her

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 8 of 11 buttocks. There is insufficient evidence, however, that in doing so, Underwood

committed any act of force or threat of force to compel L.S. to submit to the

touching. Although L.S. testified that she was scared of Underwood because he

had already touched her twice earlier,3 there is no evidence that L.S. was even

aware that Underwood was approaching her from behind before this touching

occurred, let alone that she was somehow compelled by force or the imminent

threat of force by him to submit to the touching. Indeed, L.S. admitted on

cross-examination that Underwood did not use any force to compel her to

submit to the touching and that the touch was a “surprise” to her. Tr. at 330.

The evidence establishes that the touch was rude and unwanted, yes, but

compelled by force, no.

[12] We are unpersuaded by the State’s argument that the jury could reasonably

infer that L.S. was compelled to submit to the touching, not based upon any act

of force or threat of force by Underwood, but due to the force imposed by the

“broader circumstances” of her incarceration and the fact that she was

restrained by shackles and unable to avoid the touch. Appellee’s Br. at 11. As

our supreme court has specifically stated, it is the “aggressor’s force or

imminent threat of force” that must compel the victim to submit to a touching,

not some extraneous force that is wholly outside the control of the aggressor as

3 The only evidence that Underwood had earlier touched L.S. came from L.S.’s testimony. Two defense witnesses who watched surveillance video of L.S. and Underwood in the elevator and the hallway testified that Underwood did not touch L.S. on either of those occasions. The jury found Underwood not guilty of sexual battery or the lesser-included offense of battery relating to those two alleged incidents.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 9 of 11 argued by the State here. Tobias, 666 N.E.2d at 72. Based upon the evidence

presented, we conclude that no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of

sexual battery proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reverse

Underwood’s sexual battery conviction.

[13] “When a conviction is reversed because of insufficient evidence, we may

remand to the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction upon a lesser-

included offense if the evidence is sufficient to support the lesser offense.”

Chatham, 845 N.E.2d at 208. A lesser-included offense is factually included in

the charged crime if the charging instrument alleged that the means used to

commit the crime included all the elements of the alleged lesser-included

offense. Id.

[14] A person commits class B misdemeanor battery if he knowingly or intentionally

touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Ind. Code § 35-

42-2-1(b)(1). The amended charging information provided that on January 30,

2014, Underwood “did, with intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires,

touch L.S. when she was compelled to submit to the touching by force or the

imminent threat of force, to wit: in the garage at the jail book-in door of the

Clark County Courthouse while being transported to the jail after a court

hearing.” Appellant’s App. at 29. The means used to commit sexual battery as

alleged in the charging instrument included all the elements of class B

misdemeanor battery. There was sufficient evidence to establish that

Underwood knowingly or intentionally touched L.S.’s buttocks in a rude,

insolent, or angry manner. Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions for

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 10 of 11 the trial court to enter judgment of conviction for class B misdemeanor battery

and to resentence Underwood accordingly.

[15] Reversed and remanded.

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1405-CR-234 | April 23, 2015 Page 11 of 11