MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Jun 15 2016, 6:31 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), CLERK Indiana Supreme Court this Memorandum Decision shall not be Court of Appeals and Tax Court regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Paul J. Podlejski Gregory F. Zoeller Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Richard C. Webster Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher Shane Melton, June 15, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1508-CR-1204 v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. David A. Happe, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C04-1202-FC-230
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 1 of 6 [1] Christopher Shane Melton (“Melton”) appeals the revocation of his probation
contending that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the
previously suspended sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In July 2013, Melton pleaded guilty to one count of dissemination of material
harmful to minors as a Class D felony. He was sentenced to three years in the
Department of Correction (“DOC”), with six months executed and thirty
months suspended to supervised probation.
[4] On June 10, 2015, the State filed a Notice of Violation of Probation (“the
Notice”), alleging that Melton had not complied with the following conditions
of his probation:
a) Failure to obtain GED and provide written verification to Probation Department;
b) Failure to participate in sex offender treatment through facility/program approved by Probation Department, comply with all treatment recommendations, and provide written verification of successful completion to the Probation Department;
c) Failure to pay court costs in the amount of $168.00;
d) Failure to pay restitution in the amount of $10.00;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 2 of 6 e) Failure to pay probation fees; and
f) Failure to abstain from the use of alcohol/illicit drug during the period of probation.
Amended Appellant’s App. at 112.
[5] During the revocation hearing, the State introduced evidence that Melton failed
a drug screen by testing positive for benzodiazepine (“Xanax”) in March 2015
and gave his parole officers Steven Christman (“Christman”) and Lauren
Roberts (“Roberts”) conflicting accounts regarding the cause for the positive
drug screen. Melton told Christman that his ex-wife drugged him, and he told
Roberts the Xanax was administered to him through an IV while hospitalized
for hernia procedures on two different occasions.1 Tr. at 51, 108. Melton
admitted to Roberts that he did use Xanax without a valid prescription. Id. at
73. There was no evidence to show that Melton was treated with Xanax while
in the hospital or via a valid prescription.
[6] Kari Byrd (“Byrd”), a counselor for sex offender therapy provider, New Life,
testified that Melton was discharged from treatment in June of 2015 without
success because he refused to take full responsibility for having committed the
offense, which she stated was the foundation of treatment. Id. at 35, 93.
1 The record contains conflicting evidence regarding whether the hernia procedure was before or after the failed drug test. Christman testified the hernia procedure took place in April, and Melton testified that it occurred in March. Tr. 73-75, 86, 91-92.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 3 of 6 Christman testified that Melton occasionally accepted minimal responsibility,
but only when confronted with the threat of being removed from the sex
offender treatment program for lack of taking responsibility for his charge. Id.
at 57. Byrd also cited Melton’s failed drug screen as a reason for his removal.
Id. at 35.
[7] Melton admitted that he did not have his GED at the time of the hearing, but
thought he would be able to submit the verification closer to the end of his
probation period. Melton also admitted that he owed the outstanding balances
for the court costs and restitution, and the parties agreed that the probation fee
was paid. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the allegations
in the Notice of Violation to be true. Melton’s probation was revoked, and he
was ordered to serve the previously suspended thirty-month potion of his
sentence. Melton now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [8] Melton argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his
suspended thirty-month sentence and ordered him to serve it in the DOC. He
contends that not enough weight was given to the fact that this was his first
violation. Melton argues that an appropriate sanction is based upon the
severity of the violation, which would have required a determination of whether
the defendant committed a new criminal offense. Heaton v. State 984 N.E.2d
614 (Ind. 2013). He contends that he had not committed a new criminal
offense; therefore, a full revocation of his previously suspended sentence was
unwarranted, and a more appropriate sanction would have been to extend his Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 4 of 6 probation, place him on in-home detention, or allow him to serve his sanction
in the work release facility. He also asserts that the revocation of his probation
and order to serve the entire sentence was an abuse of discretion because the
evidence in the record reflected that he had remained gainfully employed and
that his employers valued him. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2007).
[9] The decision to revoke probation is within the sole discretion of the trial court.
Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). A trial court’s sentencing
decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion
standard, and under an abuse of discretion standard, the trial court’s decision
can be affirmed if there is any evidence to support the decision. Ault v. State,
705 N.E.2d 1078, (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The trial court has the right to accept
any witness’s account of the facts and disbelieve the account of any other
witness. Menifee v. State, 600 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), clarified on
denial of reh’g, 605 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Hunter v. State, 172
Ind. App. 397, 360 N.E.2d 588, 604 (1977)). An abuse of discretion occurs
where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Guillen v. State, 829 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[10] Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Melton’s
probation and ordered him to serve his suspended sentence in the DOC. The
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MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Jun 15 2016, 6:31 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), CLERK Indiana Supreme Court this Memorandum Decision shall not be Court of Appeals and Tax Court regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Paul J. Podlejski Gregory F. Zoeller Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Richard C. Webster Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher Shane Melton, June 15, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1508-CR-1204 v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. David A. Happe, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C04-1202-FC-230
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 1 of 6 [1] Christopher Shane Melton (“Melton”) appeals the revocation of his probation
contending that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the
previously suspended sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In July 2013, Melton pleaded guilty to one count of dissemination of material
harmful to minors as a Class D felony. He was sentenced to three years in the
Department of Correction (“DOC”), with six months executed and thirty
months suspended to supervised probation.
[4] On June 10, 2015, the State filed a Notice of Violation of Probation (“the
Notice”), alleging that Melton had not complied with the following conditions
of his probation:
a) Failure to obtain GED and provide written verification to Probation Department;
b) Failure to participate in sex offender treatment through facility/program approved by Probation Department, comply with all treatment recommendations, and provide written verification of successful completion to the Probation Department;
c) Failure to pay court costs in the amount of $168.00;
d) Failure to pay restitution in the amount of $10.00;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 2 of 6 e) Failure to pay probation fees; and
f) Failure to abstain from the use of alcohol/illicit drug during the period of probation.
Amended Appellant’s App. at 112.
[5] During the revocation hearing, the State introduced evidence that Melton failed
a drug screen by testing positive for benzodiazepine (“Xanax”) in March 2015
and gave his parole officers Steven Christman (“Christman”) and Lauren
Roberts (“Roberts”) conflicting accounts regarding the cause for the positive
drug screen. Melton told Christman that his ex-wife drugged him, and he told
Roberts the Xanax was administered to him through an IV while hospitalized
for hernia procedures on two different occasions.1 Tr. at 51, 108. Melton
admitted to Roberts that he did use Xanax without a valid prescription. Id. at
73. There was no evidence to show that Melton was treated with Xanax while
in the hospital or via a valid prescription.
[6] Kari Byrd (“Byrd”), a counselor for sex offender therapy provider, New Life,
testified that Melton was discharged from treatment in June of 2015 without
success because he refused to take full responsibility for having committed the
offense, which she stated was the foundation of treatment. Id. at 35, 93.
1 The record contains conflicting evidence regarding whether the hernia procedure was before or after the failed drug test. Christman testified the hernia procedure took place in April, and Melton testified that it occurred in March. Tr. 73-75, 86, 91-92.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 3 of 6 Christman testified that Melton occasionally accepted minimal responsibility,
but only when confronted with the threat of being removed from the sex
offender treatment program for lack of taking responsibility for his charge. Id.
at 57. Byrd also cited Melton’s failed drug screen as a reason for his removal.
Id. at 35.
[7] Melton admitted that he did not have his GED at the time of the hearing, but
thought he would be able to submit the verification closer to the end of his
probation period. Melton also admitted that he owed the outstanding balances
for the court costs and restitution, and the parties agreed that the probation fee
was paid. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the allegations
in the Notice of Violation to be true. Melton’s probation was revoked, and he
was ordered to serve the previously suspended thirty-month potion of his
sentence. Melton now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [8] Melton argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his
suspended thirty-month sentence and ordered him to serve it in the DOC. He
contends that not enough weight was given to the fact that this was his first
violation. Melton argues that an appropriate sanction is based upon the
severity of the violation, which would have required a determination of whether
the defendant committed a new criminal offense. Heaton v. State 984 N.E.2d
614 (Ind. 2013). He contends that he had not committed a new criminal
offense; therefore, a full revocation of his previously suspended sentence was
unwarranted, and a more appropriate sanction would have been to extend his Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 4 of 6 probation, place him on in-home detention, or allow him to serve his sanction
in the work release facility. He also asserts that the revocation of his probation
and order to serve the entire sentence was an abuse of discretion because the
evidence in the record reflected that he had remained gainfully employed and
that his employers valued him. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2007).
[9] The decision to revoke probation is within the sole discretion of the trial court.
Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). A trial court’s sentencing
decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion
standard, and under an abuse of discretion standard, the trial court’s decision
can be affirmed if there is any evidence to support the decision. Ault v. State,
705 N.E.2d 1078, (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The trial court has the right to accept
any witness’s account of the facts and disbelieve the account of any other
witness. Menifee v. State, 600 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), clarified on
denial of reh’g, 605 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Hunter v. State, 172
Ind. App. 397, 360 N.E.2d 588, 604 (1977)). An abuse of discretion occurs
where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Guillen v. State, 829 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[10] Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Melton’s
probation and ordered him to serve his suspended sentence in the DOC. The
trial court was not obligated to balance any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances when imposing a sentence in a probation revocation proceeding.
Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 5 of 6 [11] The violations of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke
probation. Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828,831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The
evidence presented at the hearing established that Melton did not successfully
complete the sex offender treatment, tested positive for Xanax, and failed to pay
all fees ordered. Evidence that Melton had not previously violated his
probation or that he was partially compliant is not dispositive. Restrictions are
designed to ensure that the probation serves as a period of genuine
rehabilitation and that a probationer living within the community does not
harm the public. Bonner v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Here, there was evidence before the trial court that Melton violated his
probation by using Xanax and did not complete sex offender therapy
successfully, raising an issue whether he was trying to achieve genuine
rehabilitation. Revocation of Melton’s previously suspended sentence did not
go against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances surrounding his
violation, and the trial court’s order revoking probation and sentencing him to
the DOC for the suspended thirty-month sentence was not an abuse of
discretion.
[12] Affirmed.
[13] Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1508-CR-1204 | June 15, 2016 Page 6 of 6