Christopher Scott v. Barbara June Scott

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 29, 2022
Docket14-21-00077-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Christopher Scott v. Barbara June Scott (Christopher Scott v. Barbara June Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christopher Scott v. Barbara June Scott, (Tex. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed September 29, 2022.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00077-CV

CHRISTOPHER SCOTT, Appellant

V. BARBARA JUNE SCOTT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 507th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2019-44176

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Christopher Scott (“Father”) appeals from a final divorce decree following a bench trial. In two issues, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion by (1) granting Appellee Barbara June Scott (“Mother”) the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of their two children contrary to the recommendation of the child custody evaluator; and (2) failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm. BACKGROUND

Mother and Father married in February 2012. They are the parents of minor children Cameron and Donald.1 In June 2019, Father filed his original petition for divorce asserting the marriage had become insupportable. In July 2019, Mother filed an answer and her original petition for divorce asserting the marriage had become insupportable. In October 2019, a trial judge signed temporary orders ordering that Father, “as a parent temporary joint managing conservator, shall have . . . the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children.” Mother and Father attended a mediation and entered into a mediated settlement agreement (“MSA”) on October 16, 2020. They agreed on numerous issues, including child support payments, division of property, and division of debts. However, they did “not agree on which one of them shall be awarded the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children.” In that regard, the MSA states:

Matters Not Resolved: The parties stipulate that a Child Custody Evaluation is being prepared by the Domestic Relations Office, and that said evaluation may contain recommendations that are not addressed in this MSA, but that the parties wish to incorporate into the Final Decree of Divorce. Therefore, the parties hereby reserve the right to amend this MSA to incorporate any recommendation from the Child Custody Evaluation that they mutually agree upon. In the event that the parties disagree on whether one or more recommendations from the Child Custody Evaluation should be incorporated into the Final Decree of Divorce, the matter shall be decided by the Court at Trial. The parties did not amend the MSA after the child custody evaluator, Rebecca R. Briggs, submitted her child custody evaluation report on October 19, 2020.

On October 22, 2020, a two-day bench trial was held to determine which

1 In this opinion, we use pseudonyms for the names of the parties’ minor children to protect their privacy.

2 parent should have the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children. After hearing testimony from Father, Mother, and Briggs as well as considering the admitted exhibits, the trial court granted both (1) the “divorce as per the terms and conditions of the mediated settlement agreement”; and (2) the “suit affecting the parent-child relationship portion of the divorce as per the terms and conditions of the mediated settlement agreement and appoint[ed] the mother as the joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the children within Harris and contiguous counties.” The trial court also issued several injunctions regarding the possession of firearms, drug testing, and registration for substance abuse evaluation.

The trial court signed a final decree of divorce incorporating, among other things, its pronouncements and the parties’ MSA on January 29, 2021. Father filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 8, 2021. That same day, he filed a notice of appeal. Father filed a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 8, 2021.

ANALYSIS

Father challenges the trial court’s divorce decree in two issues arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) appointing Mother to be the parent with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of eight-year old Cameron and six-year old Donald contrary to the recommendation of the child custody evaluator; and (2) failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. We will address each issue in turn.

I. Exclusive Right to Designate Residence

Father contends in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the best interest of the children is served by Mother’s

3 designation as joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to designate the children’s residence because “there was nothing to justify the trial court’s deviation” from the child custody evaluator’s recommendation.

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

Trial courts have wide discretion with respect to custody, control, possession, support, and visitation matters. In re M.S.G., No. 14-16-00236-CV, 2017 WL 3611907, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Therefore, we review managing conservatorship determinations for abuse of discretion. In re M.S.G., 2017 WL 3611907, at *8; In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d at 426. A trial court abuses its discretion by acting arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In re Marriage of Butts, 444 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The failure to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). The fact that a trial court may decide a matter within its discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate court in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Id. at 214. A trial court does not abuse its discretion as long as some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision. Id.; Allen v. Allen, 475 S.W.3d 453, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

Custody disputes are inherently fact-intensive. In re M.S.G., 2017 WL 3611907, at *8; Van Heerden v. Van Heerden, 321 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). We also are mindful that the trial court is “best able to observe and assess the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility, and to sense the ‘forces, powers, and influences’ that may not be apparent from merely

4 reading the record on appeal.” In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (quoting Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)). Therefore, we defer to the trial court’s resolution of underlying facts and to credibility determinations that may have affected its determination, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id.

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Christopher Scott v. Barbara June Scott, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christopher-scott-v-barbara-june-scott-texapp-2022.