Christopher S. Averett v. State of Oregon Department of Revenue

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05362
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT TACOMA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER S. AVERETT, an CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05362-TL individual, 12 ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 STATE OF OREGON DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 12. Having 19 considered the motion, Plaintiff’s response (Dkt. No. 20), Defendant’s reply (Dkt. No. 23), 20 Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1), and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS the motion and 21 DISMISSES this action with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. 22 // 23 // 24 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Christopher S. Averett, proceeding pro se, brings this action for injunctive relief, 3 alleging that he is immune from Oregon state taxation and seeking to stop Defendant State of 4 Oregon Department of Revenue (“ODOR”) from continuing income tax collection efforts against

5 him. See Dkt. No. 1 (complaint) at 6. 6 The following factual background is drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1); from 7 the attachments thereto (Dkt. No. 1-4), which are incorporated by reference; and from documents 8 filed or issued in previous administrative and court proceedings brough by Plaintiff against 9 ODOR, of which the Court takes judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See infra 10 Section II. 11 Plaintiff is a civilian1 employee of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Portland, 12 Oregon and lives in Vancouver, Washington. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Between 2017 and at least as 13 recently as 2023, Plaintiff’s employer withheld Oregon income tax from Plaintiff’s paychecks 14 and paid it to ODOR. Id. Notices from ODOR attached by Plaintiff to his complaint indicate—

15 and Plaintiff does not dispute—that for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022, Plaintiff filed amended 16 non-resident Oregon tax returns, listed his Oregon-source income as $0, and received a refund of 17 the Oregon withholding. Dkt. No. 1-4 at 25, 32, 39. However, ODOR rejected an amended return 18 Plaintiff filed for 2019, leading Plaintiff to appeal the decision to an ODOR conference officer, 19 who denied the appeal. Dkt. No. 14 (Request for Judicial Notice) at 12 (Notice of Refund 20 Denial). After this denial, Plaintiff filed an action in the Magistrate Division of the Oregon Tax 21 Court on November 13, 2023. See Dkt. No. 14 at 4–15 (Tax Court Magistrate Division 22 1 While Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify that he was a civilian employee, he does not dispute Defendant’s 23 characterization of his income as “nonresident civilian income.” Dkt. No. 12 at 17; see generally Dkt. No. 20. Additionally, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff was so classified by his employer based on the 24 “Civilian Leave and Earning Statements” Plaintiff presents as an exhibit to his opposition brief. See Dkt. No. 20 at 132–38. 1 Complaint). In the Tax Court action, Plaintiff sought an award equal to the Oregon taxes 2 withheld from his paycheck in 2017, 2018, and 2019, in addition to the expected refund for 2022, 3 which “ha[d] not been returned to the Plaintiff” at that point. Id. at 8 ¶ 13; Dkt. No. 14 at 20 ¶ 13 4 (Tax Court Magistrate Division Amended Complaint). Plaintiff alleged that he was exempt from

5 Oregon taxation for several reasons, including “that compensation as a civilian federal employee 6 is military pay,” and thus exempt from Oregon taxation (Dkt. No. 14 at 19–20 ¶ 8), and that 7 Plaintiff’s workplace, as federal property, is not an “Oregon source” of income (id. at 20 ¶ 11). 8 Plaintiff alleged “serious harm to his Constitution Rights under Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1, 9 The 5th Amendment, The 13th Amendment, and the 14th Amendment.” Id. ¶ 12. 10 On September 10, 2024, the Oregon Tax Court Magistrate Division rejected Plaintiff’s 11 arguments, ruled that Plaintiff’s income was taxable in Oregon, and granted summary judgment 12 for Defendant as to Plaintiff’s 2019 taxes. Dkt. No. 14 at 27–32 (Decision, Oregon Tax Court 13 Magistrate Division). 14 On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff appealed the Oregon Tax Court Magistrate Division’s

15 decision to the Oregon Tax Court Regular Division. Id. at 33–63 (Tax Court Regular Division 16 Complaint). Plaintiff’s Appeal Complaint further outlined his theory that he was exempt from 17 Oregon income tax, asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiff holds “federal immunity” from taxation 18 under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and that ODOR’s taxation of him violates his 19 Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Id. at 35 ¶ 1, 36 ¶ 5. 20 On December 11, 2024, while Plaintiff’s appeal was pending, ODOR sent Plaintiff 21 notices informing him that ODOR had reviewed his amended tax returns for 2020, 2021, and 22 2022, and determined that Plaintiff owed back taxes, interest, and penalties for substantial 23 understatement and frivolous returns. Dkt. No. 1-4 at 15–16 (Statement of Account), 18–21

24 (Notice of Deficiency), 22–26 (Notice of Deficiency: 2020), 30–35 (Notice of Deficiency: 2021), 1 37–42 (Notice of Deficiency: 2022). The reviews of each individual year relied on the Tax 2 Court’s decision, reading: “The Magistrate Court has determined that your income is not military 3 pay nor are you excluded from filing, reporting and paying tax on this income to the State of 4 Oregon.” Id. at 25, 32, 39.

5 On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of his Tax Court 6 Appeal, which was granted by the Tax Court Regular Division, leaving the Tax Court Magistrate 7 Division’s decision undisturbed. See Dkt. No. 14 at 64–67 (Oregon Tax Court Judgment of 8 Voluntary Dismissal). 9 On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant in this District, 10 which was assigned to the Honorable David G. Estudillo, Chief United States District Judge. See 11 Complaint, Averett v. Or. Dep’t of Rev., No. C25-5166 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2025); Dkt. No. 14 12 at 68–142 (same). The complaint in that action (hereinafter the “Estudillo case” or “C25-5166”) 13 sought injunctive relief (1) preventing ODOR from continuing its collection efforts and 14 (2) “overturning . . . the Magistrate Division Oregon Tax Court ruling . . . .” Dkt. No. 14 at 74.

15 On March 24, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 16 and 12(b)(6). See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, No. C25-5166 (Mar. 24, 2025); Dkt. No. 14 at 17 143–167 (same). On April 7, 2025, while the motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed a 18 notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of 19 Action Without Prejudice, No. C25-5166 (Apr. 7, 2025). Chief Judge Estudillo entered an order 20 that acknowledged dismissal of the action “without prejudice” and denied the pending motion to 21 dismiss as moot. See Order on Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, No. C25-5166 (Apr. 18, 2025); 22 Dkt. No. 14 at 171. 23 On April 28, 2025, just three weeks after dismissing the Estudillo case, Plaintiff filed the

24 action that is now before this Court. See Dkt. No. 1. The instant complaint is in many respects 1 identical to the complaint in the Estudillo case. Compare Dkt. No. 1 at 6, with Complaint, 2 C25-5166, Dkt. No. 1. While the instant complaint again seeks to enjoin ODOR from continuing 3 its collection efforts against Plaintiff, it forgoes an explicit request that this Court overturn the 4 Oregon Tax Court decision and adds information about distraint warrants sent in April 2025.

5 Dkt. No. 1 at 5–7. 6 In the instant action, Plaintiff alleges that ODOR’s collection of income taxes from 7 Plaintiff and its collection efforts (specifically the issuance of distraint warrants) constitute 8 violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 38 U.S.C. § 7401, 38 C.F.R. § 17.419, and 9 various constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 1 at 3, 4. Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin ODOR from 10 continuing tax collection efforts against him. Id. at 6.2 Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint 11 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and 12 for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Dkt. 13 No. 12. 14 II. PRELIMINARY MATTER

15 Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice, under Federal Rule of Evidence 16 201, of eight documents filed in the Oregon Tax Court proceedings. Dkt. No. 14. These 17 documents include: 18 • Exhibit 1: Complaint, Averett v. Dept. of Rev., 230441G, (Or. Tax Ct. Mag. Div. Nov. 13, 2023) (Dkt. No. 14 at 4–15); 19 • Exhibit 2: Amended Complaint, Averett, 230441G (Or. Tax Ct. Mag. Div. Nov. 20 20, 2023) (Id. at 16–26); 21 • Exhibit 3: Decision, Averett, 230441G (Or. Tax Ct. Mag. Div. Sept. 10, 2024) (Id. at 27–32); 22

23 2 Plaintiff has filed several motions seeking essentially the same relief that he seeks with his complaint. These include his “Motion of Relief from a Judgment or Order” (Dkt. No. 6), which was denied (Dkt. No. 18), and his 24 “Motion for Protective Order and Request for Sanctions” (Dkt. No. 21), which is pending. 1 • Exhibit 4: Complaint, Averett v. Dept. of Rev., 5475 (Or. Tax Ct. Reg. Div. Oct. 2 29, 2024) (Id. at 33–63); 3 • Exhibit 5: General Judgment of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Averett, 5475 (Or. Tax Ct. Reg. Div., Jan. 10, 2025) (Dkt. No. 14 at 64–67); 4 • Exhibit 6: Complaint, Averett v. Or. Dept. of Rev., C25-5166 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2025) (Id. at 68–142); 5 • Exhibit 7: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Averett, C25-5166, (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6 24, 2025) (Id. at 143–167); and 7 • Exhibit 8: Order on Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Averett, C25-5166, (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2025) (Id. at 171). 8 9 Dkt. No. 14 at 2–3. Plaintiff opposes this request, arguing that that Defendant “improperly seeks 10 to establish as fact contested matters that are central to Plaintiff’s constitutional claims.” Dkt. 11 No. 20 at 7. Plaintiff contends that, while these records “may be public documents, . . . the 12 conclusions drawn from them are actively disputed and form the basis of this litigation.” Id. at 8. 13 Judicial notice is appropriate for facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute,” 14 meaning they are either “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can 15 be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 16 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Facts capable of accurate and ready determination include 17 documents filed in federal or state courts. Su v. U.S. Postal Serv., 730 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1127 (D. 18 Or. 2024) (citing Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2002)). Although a court 19 may take judicial notice of documents filed in another court, “‘it may do so not for the truth of 20 the facts recited therein,’ but simply for the fact that the documents exist and were filed, which 21 ‘is not subject to reasonable dispute.’” Id. (quoting Briseno v. Bonta, 621 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1069 22 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2022)). 23 Given that Defendant has raised jurisdictional concerns based on the procedural history 24 of Plaintiff’s past legal actions against ODOR, it is relevant that certain proceedings occurred 1 and that certain documents were filed in those proceedings. Therefore, the Court will take 2 judicial notice of the documents presented by Defendant, as well as other legal filings cited in 3 this order, for the fact that these documents exist and were filed. Because the Court does not take 4 notice of these documents for the truth of their contents, Plaintiff’s objections are unfounded.

5 III. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A motion to dismiss may be brought where subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. See 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Court must dismiss a case if it determines that it lacks subject- 8 matter jurisdiction “at any time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed 9 together with other Rule 12 motions, the Court must generally resolve the question of subject 10 matter jurisdiction before reaching other threshold issues or proceeding to the merits. See Potter 11 v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051, 1056 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l 12 Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007)); Li v. Chertoff, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175–76 (S.D. Cal. 13 2007) (“When a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is filed in conjunction 14 with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion first.” (citing

15 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001))). 16 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be either a facial attack 17 (challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings) or a factual attack (presenting evidence contesting 18 the truth of the allegations in the pleadings). See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 19 2004), overruled on other grounds by Munoz v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 91 F.4th 977 (9th Cir. 20 2024). When a movant does not offer affidavits or other evidence challenging the truth of the 21 allegations in the complaint, the court construes the motion as a facial attack on subject matter 22 jurisdiction, which attacks the sufficiency of the pleadings on their face. Atkinson v. Aaron’s 23 LLC, 733 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1063 (W.D. Wash. 2024). When considering “a facial attack on the

24 subject matter jurisdiction of the district court under Rule 12(b)(1),” courts “assume [a] 1 plaintiff’s factual allegations to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Doe v. 2 Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). “We do not, however, accept 3 the ‘truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.’” 4 Id. (quoting Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003)).

5 IV. DISCUSSION 6 A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(1) 7 Because the parties do not contest the facts of the case, the Court construes the motion to 8 dismiss as a facial attack on the sufficiency of the pleadings. 9 Ninth Circuit courts have emphasized that subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue 10 that must be resolved before considering other grounds for dismissal. See, e.g., Pac. Surgical 11 Inst. of Pain Mgmt., Inc. v. Kennedy, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“If, upon 12 analysis of the Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 13 action or a claim pressed therein, it need not address the merits issues raised in the collateral 14 Rule 12(b)(6) motion”); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Modual A/C Sys., Inc., 54

15 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that “a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge should be decided 16 before other grounds for dismissal, because they will become moot if dismissal is granted” 17 (citing Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 160 (9th Cir. 1975))). 18 Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction for four reasons. First, 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B) (the “two-dismissal rule”) bars Plaintiff’s claim, 20 because Plaintiff “has voluntarily dismissed two actions based on or including the same claim.” 21 Dkt. No. 12 at 4. Second, jurisdiction is denied to this Court by the Eleventh Amendment to the 22 United States Constitution, which bars claims against states and their agencies without consent. 23 Id. Third, the Tax Injunction Act “bars Plaintiff’s requested injunction against the assessment

24 1 and collection of a state tax.” Id. And fourth, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claim, 2 as “it amounts to a request for this Court to overrule a state tax court decision.” Id. 3 Although all four of these issues are threshold matters impacting the Court’s ability to 4 hear this case, they are not all jurisdictional matters appropriate for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Rule

5 41(a)(1)(B), by identifying certain circumstances under which “a notice of dismissal operates as 6 an adjudication on the merits,” is a rule of claim preclusion. See Ferretti v. Beach Club Maui, 7 Inc., No. C18-12, 2018 WL 3078742, at *1 (D. Haw. June 21, 2018). “Preclusion is not a 8 jurisdictional matter.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 282, (2005) 9 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c)). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit “ha[s] stated that Eleventh 10 Amendment immunity ‘does not implicate a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction in any 11 ordinary sense’ and that it ‘should be treated as an affirmative defense.’” Tritchler v. Cnty. of 12 Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting ITSI TV Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Ass’ns, 3 13 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993). At the pleadings stage, Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1), is the 14 appropriate vehicle for a motion to dismiss based on either claim preclusions, see Ferretti, 2018

15 WL 3078742, at *1, or Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Steshenko v. Gayrard, 44 F. Supp. 16 3d 941, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court considers Defendant’s 17 arguments regarding the two-dismissal rule and Eleventh Amendment immunity to be arguments 18 for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), to be addressed, if necessary, after the jurisdictional 19 arguments. 20 1. The Tax Injunction Act 21 The Tax Injunction Act (the “Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, limits federal court jurisdiction 22 over state tax matters. Under the Act, federal district courts “shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain 23 the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient

24 remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 1 The Ninth Circuit has defined a “plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” under the Act as a 2 state court remedy that provides taxpayers with a full hearing and judicial determination where 3 they can raise all objections to the tax as well as a scheme that allows taxpayers to pay the tax 4 under protest and then appeal to the state for a refund. See Online Merchs. Guild v. Maduros, 52

5 F.4th 1048, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 2022). 6 Here, Plaintiff seems to suggest that the Tax Injunction Act does not bear on the present 7 case because “the Act does not apply where the underlying state action is void ab initio for lack 8 of jurisdiction” over the taxpayer. Dkt. No. 20 at 9. But Plaintiff cites no authority for this 9 assertion, and the Supreme Court has held that the Act bars district court jurisdiction over 10 constitutional objections to taxation if the state remedy or remedies allow plaintiffs to raise their 11 constitutional claims. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411–12 (1982) (citing 12 Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981)). 13 In considering Oregon’s tax remedies, courts in this Circuit regularly describe them as 14 “plain, speedy, and efficient” or otherwise find them sufficient to foreclose any exception to the

15 Tax Injunction Act. See, e.g., Darby v. Hicks, No. C24-923, 2024 WL 4453649, at *3 (D. Or. 16 Sept. 17, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 24 WL 4453576 (Oct. 9, 2024), 17 reconsideration denied, 2024 WL 4574366 (Oct. 24, 2024); Donaldson v. Williams, No. C12-80, 18 2012 WL 5398307, at *8 (D. Or. Sept. 6, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 19 5398217; Riddle v. I.R.S., No. C04-415, 2004 WL 1919991, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 26, 2004); see 20 also Brown v. Graham, 169 F. Supp. 397, 401–02 (D. Or. 1959) (in action by federal employees 21 whose work straddled the Oregon–Washington border, court found “the statutes and 22 administrative acts of the State of Oregon . . . provide for an opportunity . . . to be heard by the 23 State Tax Commission, administratively, and by the Courts of the State of Oregon, judicially,”

24 and suggested question of whether Oregon provided “plain, speedy, and efficient” remedy would 1 not be ripe until state remedies were exhausted). Oregon provides a procedure for claiming 2 refund of excess taxes paid, Or. Rev. Stat. § 305.270, an administrative appeal process, id., and a 3 dedicated tax court for judicial appeals, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 305.404–305.575. 4 Indeed, Plaintiff availed himself of both his administrative and judicial remedies by

5 speaking with an ODOR Conference Officer, appealing that officer’s decision to the Magistrate 6 Division of the Oregon Tax Court, and then appealing that court’s decision to the Regular 7 Division of the Oregon Tax Court, raising constitutional objections along the way. If Plaintiff is 8 “unhappy with actions taken by the ODOR and the Oregon Tax Court, he has (or had) an 9 adequate remedy available through review by the Oregon Supreme Court.” Riddle, 2004 WL 10 1919991, at *3. However, “to the extent [Plaintiff] challenges the assessment or collection of a 11 tax by ODOR, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.” Id. 12 Therefore, the Tax Injunction Act applies, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to order the 13 injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks—either is his complaint or in his pending Motion for Protective 14 Order and Request for Sanctions, which also asks the Court to enjoin (and sanction) Defendant’s

15 tax-collection efforts. See Dkt. No. 21. 16 2. The Rooker–Feldman Doctrine 17 The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from hearing cases that 18 seek to appeal or overturn state court decisions. Garduno v. Autovest LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 923, 19 925–926 (D. Ariz. 2015). Plaintiff appears to suggest that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not 20 apply here because the “case does not seek review or reversal of any state court decision. Rather, 21 it challenges new constitutional violations.” Dkt. No. 20 at 10. However, the Ninth Circuit has 22 recognized that “[t]he doctrine also precludes a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction 23 over general constitutional challenges that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with claims asserted in

24 state court.” Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002). “A 1 claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if ‘the federal claim succeeds only 2 to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’” Id. (quoting Pennzoil Co. 3 v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 4 With the instant complaint, Plaintiff seeks a ruling that Oregon lacks jurisdiction to tax

5 his income earned in Oregon. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6. All his claims are dependent on such a 6 finding, which would necessarily contradict the Magistrate Division of the Oregon Tax Court’s 7 ruling that “[b]ecause Plaintiff’s income was earned in Oregon and was not compensation for 8 service in the U.S. Armed Forces, it is subject to tax . . . .” Dkt. No. 14 at 31. As such, 9 overturning a state court decision would be the de facto result should this Court rule in Plaintiff’s 10 favor on any of Plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents this Court 11 from exercising jurisdiction over this case. 12 * * * 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 14 this action and GRANTS Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion on that basis. Because jurisdiction is

15 lacking, the Court declines to address Defendant’s arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), 16 including those regarding the two-dismissal rule and Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 17 B. Whether Amendment is Futile 18 While courts typically allow plaintiffs proceeding pro se to cure deficiencies before 19 dismissing their claims outright, that is not the case where “it is absolutely clear that the 20 deficiencies . . . could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 21 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988)). Here, the 22 Court has no jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiff asserts, and the legal questions at issue have 23 already been resolved. These deficiencies cannot be cured by allowing Plaintiff to amend his

24 complaint. 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 12) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's 3 claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and Request for 4 Sanctions (Dkt. No. 21) is DENIED AS MOOT.

5 Dated this 18th day of December, 2025. 6 A 7 Tana Lin United States District Judge 8

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