Christopher Rogalski v. Laureate Education Inc

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 30, 2026
• Docket: 25-1441
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

DLD-115 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-1441 ___________

CHRISTOPHER A. ROGALSKI, Appellant

v.

LAUREATE EDUCATION, INC.; LAUREATE ONLINE EDUCATION BV; THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-11747) District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel ____________________________________

Submitted on Laureate Education, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 16, 2026

Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 30, 2026)

_________

OPINION* _________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Christopher Rogalski appeals pro se from two post-judgment decisions entered by

the District Court in this diversity action that he brought against Laureate Education, Inc.

(“LEI”), Laureate Online Education BV, and the University of Liverpool (hereinafter

collectively referred to as “Defendants”). LEI has moved to summarily affirm. We grant

that motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s two post-judgment decisions.

I.

In 2020, Rogalski sued Defendants in New Jersey state court, raising claims for,

inter alia, breach of contract and fraud related to his participation in an online LL.M.

program. LEI, the only served defendant, removed the case to federal court, invoking the

District Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). LEI then moved to

dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing as

follows: (1) a forum-selection clause (“FSC”) in an annex to a student-agreement form

required that the case be litigated in the Netherlands; and (2) in the alternative, Rogalski’s

claims were untimely under New Jersey’s six-year statute of limitations. On September

30, 2022, the District Court granted LEI’s motion, agreeing with LEI’s first argument

(the District Court did not reach the second argument).

Rogalski appealed from the District Court’s September 30, 2022 judgment. In

April 2023, we affirmed that judgment, albeit on a different basis than that relied on by

the District Court.1 We did not decide whether the FSC warranted dismissing Rogalski’s

1 We may affirm a district court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 2 complaint; instead, we concluded that “LEI’s statute-of-limitations argument in the

District Court, which it maintain[ed] on appeal, is sound and on its own required

dismissal of [the] complaint.” Rogalski v. Laureate Educ., Inc., No. 22-3004, 2023 WL

2882702, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2023) [hereinafter Rogalski I] (per curiam) (citation

omitted).2 We also concluded that, to the extent an “aspect of his complaint may . . . be

timely,” that part of the complaint was “nevertheless moot.” Id. at *4. We subsequently

denied his petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, as well as his motion to certify

certain issues to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Thereafter, the United States Supreme

Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari and his related petition for rehearing.

Next, in March 2024, Rogalski returned to the District Court and filed a motion for

relief under subsections (b)(1), (b)(4), and (b)(6) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.

That motion, in effect, attacked the District Court’s September 30, 2022 decision and our

judgment in Rogalski I. On October 16, 2024, the District Court denied the motion,

stating that “[t]his Court is without jurisdiction to grant any such relief [requested in the

motion].” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 27, at 6; see id. at 7 (“While Rogalski may feel aggrieved by

the resolution of this matter . . ., this litigation is over.”).

On March 11, 2025, the District Court received the following from Rogalski: (1) a

notice of appeal challenging the District Court’s October 16, 2024 decision; (2) a motion

to reopen the time to file that appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

2 We agreed with LEI that Rogalski’s claims were untimely under New Jersey’s six-year limitations period, see Rogalski I, 2023 WL 2882702, at *3, and we noted that applying a shorter limitations period under Dutch law “would not change the outcome,” id. at *3 n.5. 3 4(a)(6); (3) a motion to reconsider the October 16, 2024 decision; (4) a brief in support of

his Rule 60(b) motion, which the District Court appeared to construe as a second Rule

60(b) motion; and (5) a motion to recuse the district judge who had originally presided

over this case (even though the case had since been reassigned to another district judge3).

On March 18, 2025, the District Court entered a text-only order that granted Rogalski’s

Rule 4(a)(6) motion and denied his other motions.4 On March 25, 2025, Rogalski timely

amended his notice of appeal to include challenges to the parts of the District Court’s

March 18, 2025 decision that denied his second Rule 60(b) motion and his motion to

reconsider the District Court’s October 16, 2024 decision.

3 The case was reassigned before the District Court entered its October 16, 2024 decision. 4 In light of the District Court’s grant of Rogalski’s Rule 4(a)(6) motion, his appeal from the District Court’s October 16, 2024 decision is timely. 4 II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Ohntrup

v. Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam). “Generally, we

review a district court’s orders denying motions for reconsideration and for relief under

Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion . . . .” Herrera v. Agents of Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,

132 F.4th 248, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025). However, “we review legal determinations de

novo and factual determinations for clear error,” id., and we exercise plenary review over

a district court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(4), see Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White,

536 F.3d 244, 251 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).

We see no reason to disturb either the District Court’s October 16, 2024 decision

or its March 18, 2025 decision. To the extent that Rogalski’s Rule 60(b) motions asked

the District Court to vacate its September 30, 2022 decision, we cannot conclude that the

District Court erred in denying those motions. “[A] Rule 60(b) motion may not be used

as a substitute for an appeal.” United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Rogalski previously took advantage of his

opportunity to appeal from the District Court’s September 30, 2022 decision, and we

resolved that appeal in Rogalski I on a different basis than that relied on by the District

Court. Rogalski has failed to establish that, notwithstanding our affirming in that

manner, vacatur of the District Court’s September 30, 2022 decision is warranted.

Furthermore, to the extent that his Rule 60(b) motions asked the District Court to

overturn aspects of our judgment in Rogalski I, the District Court correctly indicated that

it lacked the authority to do so. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 336, 337

5 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (recognizing that a district court is “without jurisdiction to

alter the mandate of this [C]ourt on the basis of matters included or includable in [the

appellant’s] prior appeal”).

Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily

affirm the District Court’s post-judgment decisions. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. To the

extent that Rogalski seeks any other relief from us, that relief is denied.