In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE
CHRISTOPHER R. SOKOLIC, JR., ) No. ED112533 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Jefferson County v. ) Cause No. 22JE-CC00244 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Honorable Joseph A. Rathert ) Respondent. ) Filed: April 8, 2025
Introduction
Christopher R. Sokolic, Jr. (Movant) appeals from the motion court’s judgment
denying his motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15 1 after an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
A jury convicted Movant of one count of the class A felony of first-degree murder,
and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At trial,
the State presented facts establishing that the victim (Victim) was driving with Movant and
a third person (Witness) to Movant’s grandfather’s house, when Movant asked Victim to
pull the vehicle behind a barn so Movant could get something out of the trunk. As the
vehicle pulled behind the barn, Movant reached over from the front passenger side and
1 All rule references are to Mo. R. Crim. P. 2022, unless otherwise indicated. stabbed Victim multiple times. Movant then exited the vehicle and walked around to
driver’s side, where he resumed stabbing Victim, for a total of 27 times. The State also
established that, earlier in the day, Movant had made statements to Witness that he was
going to be on the six o’clock news that night, he would not be available after that day, and
he was enjoying activities “one last” time. This Court affirmed Movant’s conviction and
sentence on appeal. State v. Sokolic, 660 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).
Movant filed a timely Rule 29.15 motion. The motion court appointed counsel,
who filed a timely amended motion. In the amended motion, Movant asserted that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the defense of imperfect self-defense.
The motion court granted an evidentiary hearing, at which Movant testified to the
following. At the time of the murder, he had recently ingested methamphetamines, which
made him paranoid and delusional. When he asked Victim to pull over so he could get
something out of the trunk, Victim stated “you won’t need anything out of the trunk” and
made a sudden movement with his hand. Movant believed he saw a knife in Victim’s hand,
causing Movant to fear for his life, and this belief is what caused Movant to attack Victim,
grabbing a knife from the cupholder and stabbing Victim to death. Movant testified he told
his trial counsel he believed both that he saw Victim holding a knife and that Victim was
about to stab him. Nevertheless, Movant’s trial counsel did not inform Movant about the
defense of imperfect self-defense and did not advise Movant that, in order to claim
imperfect self-defense, he would have to testify at trial. Instead, trial counsel advised
Movant not to testify.
On cross-examination, Movant agreed that Victim did not threaten him or brandish
a knife at him before Movant stabbed him. Movant clarified that after he got out of the
2 vehicle and walked around it, the driver’s side door opened and he heard Victim threaten
to kill him, so he stabbed Victim again. However, Movant agreed that Witness had testified
at trial that, by the time Movant exited the vehicle, Victim was already slumped over the
steering wheel with stab wounds in his neck.
Trial counsel also testified at the hearing to the following. The theory of defense
at trial was that the murder was not premeditated and thus was not first-degree murder.
Trial counsel advised Movant not to testify at trial because the prosecutor would subject
him to a damaging cross-examination, and another witness had already stated what they
needed for the lack-of-premeditation defense. Trial counsel stated, however, he always
told clients it was their choice whether or not to testify. While they were preparing for
trial, Movant did not inform trial counsel he thought he saw Victim holding a knife, and
Movant did not assert to trial counsel he had acted in self-defense.
On cross-examination, trial counsel testified he did not believe a defense of self-
defense would have been successful because the facts of the case did not indicate self-
defense, in that Victim was unarmed, and Witness, who was also in the vehicle, did not
testify to any provocation or aggression by Victim. Further, trial counsel believed that
Movant’s text message to Witness earlier stating he would be on the six o’clock news was
not consistent with self-defense.
The motion court denied Movant’s request for relief under Rule 29.15. The motion
court found trial counsel’s testimony that Movant did not report he saw Victim holding a
knife was more credible than Movant’s contrary testimony.
Standard of Review
3 Appellate review of the denial of a post-conviction motion is limited to a
determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the motion court are clearly
erroneous. Rule 29.15(k). The motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are
clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court, having examined the entire record, is left
with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. McNeal v. State, 500
S.W.3d 841, 844 (Mo. banc 2016).
For post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice as a result
of that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
McFadden v. State, 619 S.W.3d 434, 445 (Mo. banc 2020). Deficient performance is
measured in terms of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688. We presume that counsel acted professionally and that any challenged action
was part of counsel’s reasonable trial strategy, and a movant must prove otherwise by a
preponderance of the evidence. Joyner v. State, 421 S.W.3d 580, 581 (Mo. App. E.D.
2014). To meet the prejudice prong, the movant must establish there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In reviewing a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, appellate courts are not required to examine both prongs: if a movant
fails to satisfy the prejudice prong, we need not consider the performance prong, and vice
versa. Sanders-Ford v. State, 597 S.W.3d 816, 819 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020).
Discussion
Movant raises two points on appeal. In his first point, he argues the motion court
erred in denying the claim raised in his Rule 29.15 motion that trial counsel provided
4 ineffective assistance by failing to argue the defense of imperfect self-defense, resulting in
prejudice, because, if he had argued this defense, there was a reasonable probability
Movant would have been convicted of a lesser offense. In his second point, he similarly
argues the motion court erred in denying the claim in his Rule 29.15 motion that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him he would have to testify in order to raise
the defense of imperfect self-defense. Our decision on Point I is dispositive.
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE
CHRISTOPHER R. SOKOLIC, JR., ) No. ED112533 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Jefferson County v. ) Cause No. 22JE-CC00244 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Honorable Joseph A. Rathert ) Respondent. ) Filed: April 8, 2025
Introduction
Christopher R. Sokolic, Jr. (Movant) appeals from the motion court’s judgment
denying his motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15 1 after an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
A jury convicted Movant of one count of the class A felony of first-degree murder,
and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At trial,
the State presented facts establishing that the victim (Victim) was driving with Movant and
a third person (Witness) to Movant’s grandfather’s house, when Movant asked Victim to
pull the vehicle behind a barn so Movant could get something out of the trunk. As the
vehicle pulled behind the barn, Movant reached over from the front passenger side and
1 All rule references are to Mo. R. Crim. P. 2022, unless otherwise indicated. stabbed Victim multiple times. Movant then exited the vehicle and walked around to
driver’s side, where he resumed stabbing Victim, for a total of 27 times. The State also
established that, earlier in the day, Movant had made statements to Witness that he was
going to be on the six o’clock news that night, he would not be available after that day, and
he was enjoying activities “one last” time. This Court affirmed Movant’s conviction and
sentence on appeal. State v. Sokolic, 660 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).
Movant filed a timely Rule 29.15 motion. The motion court appointed counsel,
who filed a timely amended motion. In the amended motion, Movant asserted that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the defense of imperfect self-defense.
The motion court granted an evidentiary hearing, at which Movant testified to the
following. At the time of the murder, he had recently ingested methamphetamines, which
made him paranoid and delusional. When he asked Victim to pull over so he could get
something out of the trunk, Victim stated “you won’t need anything out of the trunk” and
made a sudden movement with his hand. Movant believed he saw a knife in Victim’s hand,
causing Movant to fear for his life, and this belief is what caused Movant to attack Victim,
grabbing a knife from the cupholder and stabbing Victim to death. Movant testified he told
his trial counsel he believed both that he saw Victim holding a knife and that Victim was
about to stab him. Nevertheless, Movant’s trial counsel did not inform Movant about the
defense of imperfect self-defense and did not advise Movant that, in order to claim
imperfect self-defense, he would have to testify at trial. Instead, trial counsel advised
Movant not to testify.
On cross-examination, Movant agreed that Victim did not threaten him or brandish
a knife at him before Movant stabbed him. Movant clarified that after he got out of the
2 vehicle and walked around it, the driver’s side door opened and he heard Victim threaten
to kill him, so he stabbed Victim again. However, Movant agreed that Witness had testified
at trial that, by the time Movant exited the vehicle, Victim was already slumped over the
steering wheel with stab wounds in his neck.
Trial counsel also testified at the hearing to the following. The theory of defense
at trial was that the murder was not premeditated and thus was not first-degree murder.
Trial counsel advised Movant not to testify at trial because the prosecutor would subject
him to a damaging cross-examination, and another witness had already stated what they
needed for the lack-of-premeditation defense. Trial counsel stated, however, he always
told clients it was their choice whether or not to testify. While they were preparing for
trial, Movant did not inform trial counsel he thought he saw Victim holding a knife, and
Movant did not assert to trial counsel he had acted in self-defense.
On cross-examination, trial counsel testified he did not believe a defense of self-
defense would have been successful because the facts of the case did not indicate self-
defense, in that Victim was unarmed, and Witness, who was also in the vehicle, did not
testify to any provocation or aggression by Victim. Further, trial counsel believed that
Movant’s text message to Witness earlier stating he would be on the six o’clock news was
not consistent with self-defense.
The motion court denied Movant’s request for relief under Rule 29.15. The motion
court found trial counsel’s testimony that Movant did not report he saw Victim holding a
knife was more credible than Movant’s contrary testimony.
Standard of Review
3 Appellate review of the denial of a post-conviction motion is limited to a
determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the motion court are clearly
erroneous. Rule 29.15(k). The motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are
clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court, having examined the entire record, is left
with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. McNeal v. State, 500
S.W.3d 841, 844 (Mo. banc 2016).
For post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice as a result
of that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
McFadden v. State, 619 S.W.3d 434, 445 (Mo. banc 2020). Deficient performance is
measured in terms of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688. We presume that counsel acted professionally and that any challenged action
was part of counsel’s reasonable trial strategy, and a movant must prove otherwise by a
preponderance of the evidence. Joyner v. State, 421 S.W.3d 580, 581 (Mo. App. E.D.
2014). To meet the prejudice prong, the movant must establish there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In reviewing a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, appellate courts are not required to examine both prongs: if a movant
fails to satisfy the prejudice prong, we need not consider the performance prong, and vice
versa. Sanders-Ford v. State, 597 S.W.3d 816, 819 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020).
Discussion
Movant raises two points on appeal. In his first point, he argues the motion court
erred in denying the claim raised in his Rule 29.15 motion that trial counsel provided
4 ineffective assistance by failing to argue the defense of imperfect self-defense, resulting in
prejudice, because, if he had argued this defense, there was a reasonable probability
Movant would have been convicted of a lesser offense. In his second point, he similarly
argues the motion court erred in denying the claim in his Rule 29.15 motion that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him he would have to testify in order to raise
the defense of imperfect self-defense. Our decision on Point I is dispositive.
The defense of imperfect self-defense applies when a defendant intentionally uses
deadly force on the genuine belief that he or she is in imminent danger, but that belief,
though honest, is unreasonable under the circumstances. See Middleton v. McNeal, 541
U.S. 433, 434 (2004); State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Mo. banc 2000). This defense,
while not a complete defense, allows a defendant in a homicide trial to submit an instruction
for the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. See Middleton, 541 U.S. at
434; Beeler, 12 S.W.3d at 300.
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that the defense strategy was to
acknowledge Movant committed the offense but to argue the murder was second-degree,
rather than first-degree, because it was not premeditated. Trial counsel agreed he did not
pursue a defense of imperfect self-defense in part because Movant did not assert prior to
trial that he acted in self-defense or that he thought he saw Victim holding a knife.
Although Movant testified to the contrary that he did inform trial counsel about his belief
that he saw Victim holding a knife and his subsequent fear for his life, the motion court
weighed Movant’s and trial counsel’s contradictory testimony and found trial counsel’s to
be more credible. On appeal, we defer to the motion court’s determinations regarding
witness credibility. Voss v. State, 570 S.W.3d 184, 196-97 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (motion
5 court is in better position to judge credibility of witnesses and is free to believe or disbelieve
testimony of any witness given at evidentiary hearing, including movant’s).
In determining whether a trial counsel’s performance was deficient, we view the
reasonableness of counsel’s actions from counsel’s perspective at the time and not with the
benefit of hindsight. Gray v. State, 108 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). What
defenses or claims counsel raises at trial necessarily depends on what information the
defendant has supplied his or her lawyer. See id. at 88-89.
Here, Movant did not inform counsel before trial of the facts he now asserts support
a claim of imperfect self-defense: namely, that, due to a methamphetamine-induced
hallucination, he thought he saw Victim holding a knife, and he genuinely feared for his
life, causing him to defend himself with deadly force. Other than Movant’s assertions,
nothing in the record independently suggests self-defense, such that trial counsel should
have known to raise this defense. Rather, the evidence showed that Victim was unarmed;
Witness did not testify that Victim was aggressive towards Movant; and Movant paused
his attack to exit the vehicle and walk around to the driver’s side where he resumed stabbing
Victim, although Witness testified that, at this point, Victim was already slumped over the
steering wheel.
Under these circumstances, trial counsel’s decision not to pursue a defense of
imperfect self-defense was reasonable. See Gray, 108 S.W.3d at 88-89 (counsel was not
ineffective for failing to investigate claim of self-defense when defendant did not allege he
was acting in self-defense and record did not indicate such). Instead, trial counsel pursued
a trial strategy of challenging the element of premeditation, and, as a general rule, trial
counsel is not ineffective for pursuing one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of
6 another. See Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 896 (Mo. banc 2019). Trial counsel here
was not ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of imperfect self-defense.
Because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue this defense, there
was likewise no error in trial counsel’s failure to advise Movant that he would have to
testify in order to inject this defense. The motion court did not clearly err in denying
Movant’s amended motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15.
Points I and II are denied.
Conclusion
The judgment of the motion court is affirmed.
Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J.
Philip M. Hess, P.J., and Michael S. Wright, J., concur.