Christopher Milton v. Connor Sapphire et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01321
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Christopher Milton, Case No. 2:25-cv-01321-CDS-EJY

5 Plaintiff Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 6 v.

7 Connor Sapphire et al., [ECF No. 5]

8 Defendants

9 10 Plaintiff Christopher Milton initiated this action on July 21, 2025, by filing a complaint 11 but failed to submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) or, in the alternative, pay the 12 civil-case filing fee. ECF No. 1. United States Magistrate Judge Elayna J. Youchah ordered Milton 13 to either file a complete IFP application or pay the $405 filing fee. Order, ECF No. 3. After the 14 September 25, 2025 deadline expired without Milton complying or otherwise responding, Judge 15 Youchah issued a report and recommendation (R&R) that this case be dismissed. R&R, ECF No. 16 5. Milton had until October 13, 2025, to file any specific, written objections to the magistrate 17 judge’s R&R. Id. at 2 (citing Local Rule IB 3-2 (stating that parties wishing to object to the 18 findings and recommendations must file specific written objections within fourteen days)); see also 19 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (same). That deadline has also passed, and Milton has not objected to the 20 dismissal recommendation. The law is clear that “no review is required of a magistrate judge’s 21 report and recommendation unless objections are filed.” Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 22 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 23 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 24 Although de novo review is not required, I nonetheless make an independent review here. 25 Federal law requires a party initiating a civil lawsuit to pay a filing fee and an administrative fee. 26 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), (b). However, if a plaintiff is unable to pay such fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 allows a 1 district court to authorize the commencement of a civil action through an IFP application. 2 Id. at § 1915(a)(1). Indeed, I find that the record demonstrates that, despite an opportunity to do so, 3 Milton did not submit an IFP application or pay the civil filing fee.1 4 I. Discussion 5 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 6 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 7 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 8 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 9 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se 10 plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 11 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an 12 action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious 13 resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 14 defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 15 availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 16 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 17 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 18 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Milton’s claims. The third 19 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 20 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 21 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air W., Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 22 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 23 the factors favoring dismissal. 24 25

26 1 The orders sent to Milton were returned as undeliverable. Milton has therefore also failed to notify the court of his current address, a violation of Local Rule IA 3-1 (“pro se party must immediately file with the court written notification of any change of mailing address”). 1 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 2||correct the party’s failure that brought about the need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. 3 || Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives 4 ||before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 5 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal 6 || before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 7 || Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this court cannot operate without collecting 8 reasonable fees and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff's compliance with court orders, only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But issuing a second order 10 jis futile, and setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. 11|| This litigation cannot move forward without the participation of the plaintiff, and because Milton 12 ||has failed to update his address, issuing another order is not a meaningful alternative in this 13 ||circumstance. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441 (“An order to show cause why dismissal was not warranted 14 |/or an order imposing sanctions would only find itself taking a round trip tour through the United 15 ||States mail.”). There are no alternative sanctions other than dismissal when a court cannot contact 16 || Milton to communicate the alternatives. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly 17 || considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 18 || II. Conclusion 19 It is hereby ordered that the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation [ECF No. 5] is 20 {accepted and adopted in full, therefore Milton’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The 21||Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment recone and to close this case. 22 Dated: October 17, 2025 / /

24 Cristin Silva United States District Judge 25 / 26