RENDERED: MARCH 21, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0026-MR
CHRISTOPHER MAJOR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CR-00618-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KAREM, JUDGE: Christopher Major (“Major”) entered a conditional guilty plea
to the charges of theft by unlawful taking over $10,000, three counts of theft by
unlawful taking under $1,000, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender.
Christopher was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, reserving his right to appeal
the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In its order denying Major’s motion to suppress, the circuit court
stated the relevant facts as follows:
On March 27, 2019, Lexington Police were called to the Days Motor Lodge (Lodge) located on Versailles Road. Lexington Police Detectives had been to the Lodge the day before, investigating a nearby stolen car. [Major] was seen on the Lodge’s security system running through the parking lot but then was unable to be located. A detective left his card with a Lodge employee. The Detectives were then called to the Lodge on March 27, 2019, because a Lodge employee called and reported that the suspect the detectives were investigating was seen entering a room at the Lodge. The Lodge also complained that the suspect was not the registered occupant of the room and was a trespasser. Thus, the current occupant violated the Lodge policies. The Detectives, as well as uniformed officers, approached the room and attempted to gain entry. When the suspects would not open the door, the police had an employee of the Lodge open the door so the police could enter.
The police did not have a warrant. When the police entered the room, they found three people, one being [Major]. The other two individuals in the room surrendered to the officers. [Major] was found in the bathroom of the room smoking what appeared to be crack. The police then informed [Major] that he was being arrested for trespassing. He was then transported to the police station, read his Miranda[1] rights, and questioned by the police. During this questioning, [Major] made incriminating statements regarding various crimes he committed.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
-2- Major moved to suppress his statement, claiming that the police unlawfully entered
the motel room. Thus, Major alleged that his arrest was illegal and that his
statement should be suppressed. The circuit court conducted a suppression hearing
on July 11, 2022.
At the evidentiary hearing, the Court was told by [Lexington Police detective David Collins] that the Lodge maintains a policy that only those who pay to stay in the room may be in the room. Motel renters are not allowed to have guests. If they do, their guests would be considered trespassers, regardless of whether the registered person invited them. During his arrest, [Major] state[d] he was there to “visit” a friend. No one from the Lodge testified at the hearing. [Major] did not testify, nor did he submit any evidence to refute the Commonwealth’s evidence establishing he was present at the hotel for the purpose of smoking crack cocaine.
On May 13, 2019, [Major] was indicted on one (1) count of Theft by Unlawful Taking greater than $10,000 but under $1,000,000, three (3) counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking greater than $500 but under $10,000, and Persistent Felony Offender First Degree.
The circuit court ultimately denied Major’s suppression motion,
concluding that Major had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room
because he was trespassing. The circuit court also determined that “when the
police are called to a location and are told people are trespassing, it would be
reasonable for the officer to think that the Lodge employee had the authority to
allow the officers into the room to remove the trespassers.” Thus, the circuit court
-3- found that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered
the motel room and subsequently placed Major under arrest.
Major entered a conditional guilty plea to the amended charges of
theft by unlawful taking under $10,000, three (3) counts of theft by unlawful taking
under $1,000, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The circuit court
sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
We will discuss further facts as they become relevant.
ANALYSIS
1. Standard of Review
When reviewing a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, an appellate court “review[s] the trial court’s factual findings for clear
error, and deem[s] conclusive [such findings] if supported by substantial
evidence.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011) (internal
footnote citations omitted). Additionally, we review “[t]he trial court’s application
of the law to the facts” de novo. Id. (internal footnote citation omitted).
2. Discussion
On appeal, Major alleges that the circuit court’s finding that he did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room was clearly erroneous
and not supported by the evidence. As with all suppression issues, we begin our
analysis by noting that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
-4- prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.
Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (internal footnote citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, provide
safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Bolin v. Commonwealth,
592 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Ky. App. 2019) (internal footnote omitted).
However, Fourth Amendment protections apply only to areas
searched wherein the defendant holds a “legitimate expectation of privacy.”
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633
(1980). In analyzing the scope of the constitutional protections, the United States
Supreme Court has explained that:
[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373
(1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, an
individual’s subjective expectation must also be “one that society is prepared to
-5- recognize as reasonable.” Smith v.
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RENDERED: MARCH 21, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0026-MR
CHRISTOPHER MAJOR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CR-00618-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KAREM, JUDGE: Christopher Major (“Major”) entered a conditional guilty plea
to the charges of theft by unlawful taking over $10,000, three counts of theft by
unlawful taking under $1,000, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender.
Christopher was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, reserving his right to appeal
the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In its order denying Major’s motion to suppress, the circuit court
stated the relevant facts as follows:
On March 27, 2019, Lexington Police were called to the Days Motor Lodge (Lodge) located on Versailles Road. Lexington Police Detectives had been to the Lodge the day before, investigating a nearby stolen car. [Major] was seen on the Lodge’s security system running through the parking lot but then was unable to be located. A detective left his card with a Lodge employee. The Detectives were then called to the Lodge on March 27, 2019, because a Lodge employee called and reported that the suspect the detectives were investigating was seen entering a room at the Lodge. The Lodge also complained that the suspect was not the registered occupant of the room and was a trespasser. Thus, the current occupant violated the Lodge policies. The Detectives, as well as uniformed officers, approached the room and attempted to gain entry. When the suspects would not open the door, the police had an employee of the Lodge open the door so the police could enter.
The police did not have a warrant. When the police entered the room, they found three people, one being [Major]. The other two individuals in the room surrendered to the officers. [Major] was found in the bathroom of the room smoking what appeared to be crack. The police then informed [Major] that he was being arrested for trespassing. He was then transported to the police station, read his Miranda[1] rights, and questioned by the police. During this questioning, [Major] made incriminating statements regarding various crimes he committed.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
-2- Major moved to suppress his statement, claiming that the police unlawfully entered
the motel room. Thus, Major alleged that his arrest was illegal and that his
statement should be suppressed. The circuit court conducted a suppression hearing
on July 11, 2022.
At the evidentiary hearing, the Court was told by [Lexington Police detective David Collins] that the Lodge maintains a policy that only those who pay to stay in the room may be in the room. Motel renters are not allowed to have guests. If they do, their guests would be considered trespassers, regardless of whether the registered person invited them. During his arrest, [Major] state[d] he was there to “visit” a friend. No one from the Lodge testified at the hearing. [Major] did not testify, nor did he submit any evidence to refute the Commonwealth’s evidence establishing he was present at the hotel for the purpose of smoking crack cocaine.
On May 13, 2019, [Major] was indicted on one (1) count of Theft by Unlawful Taking greater than $10,000 but under $1,000,000, three (3) counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking greater than $500 but under $10,000, and Persistent Felony Offender First Degree.
The circuit court ultimately denied Major’s suppression motion,
concluding that Major had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room
because he was trespassing. The circuit court also determined that “when the
police are called to a location and are told people are trespassing, it would be
reasonable for the officer to think that the Lodge employee had the authority to
allow the officers into the room to remove the trespassers.” Thus, the circuit court
-3- found that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered
the motel room and subsequently placed Major under arrest.
Major entered a conditional guilty plea to the amended charges of
theft by unlawful taking under $10,000, three (3) counts of theft by unlawful taking
under $1,000, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The circuit court
sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
We will discuss further facts as they become relevant.
ANALYSIS
1. Standard of Review
When reviewing a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, an appellate court “review[s] the trial court’s factual findings for clear
error, and deem[s] conclusive [such findings] if supported by substantial
evidence.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011) (internal
footnote citations omitted). Additionally, we review “[t]he trial court’s application
of the law to the facts” de novo. Id. (internal footnote citation omitted).
2. Discussion
On appeal, Major alleges that the circuit court’s finding that he did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room was clearly erroneous
and not supported by the evidence. As with all suppression issues, we begin our
analysis by noting that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
-4- prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.
Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (internal footnote citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, provide
safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Bolin v. Commonwealth,
592 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Ky. App. 2019) (internal footnote omitted).
However, Fourth Amendment protections apply only to areas
searched wherein the defendant holds a “legitimate expectation of privacy.”
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633
(1980). In analyzing the scope of the constitutional protections, the United States
Supreme Court has explained that:
[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373
(1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, an
individual’s subjective expectation must also be “one that society is prepared to
-5- recognize as reasonable.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577,
2580, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has determined that guests enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy in hotel rooms. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1964) (“[A] guest in a hotel room is
entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
Nevertheless, “once a hotel guest’s rental period has expired or been lawfully
terminated, the guest does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel
room or in any article therein of which the hotel lawfully takes possession.”
Blades v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Ky. 2011) (quoting United States
v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted)).
In this case, the evidence of record indicates that a hotel employee
called the police and asked them to remove Major, which ended any legitimate or
reasonable privacy interest that Major may have had while in the hotel room.
Detective Arnold testified at the suppression hearing that he received a call from an
employee requesting assistance at the motel because Major was in a room not
registered to him and was trespassing. The body camera footage confirms that a
hotel employee had made a call requesting assistance from the police for a
trespasser, as Major was in the room in violation of the motel policy. Major’s
-6- name was not on the hotel room’s registration, and he admitted to the police that he
had not rented the motel room.
Moreover, Major provided no evidence that he was an overnight
guest. Rather, the evidence showed Major was in the room to smoke crack
cocaine, as that was what he was doing in the bathroom when he encountered the
police. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing indicated that Major
was a non-registered, non-paying individual in a motel room violating a motel
policy. A hotel employee had taken affirmative steps to remove Major from the
hotel room by calling the police and requesting assistance, terminating Major’s
right to be there. Once Major’s right to be in the room was terminated, any alleged
expectation of privacy ended under Blades. Id. at 453. The circuit court correctly
concluded that Major did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to contest
the officers’ entry into the room. Thus, his subsequent confessions were untainted
by any Fourth Amendment violations.
Because we have determined that Major had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the motel room, we decline to address Major’s remaining arguments
on appeal, as our analysis renders them moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s order.
-7- ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy Alyette Durham II Russell Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-