Christopher Maier v. Tyler Keggan

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 6, 2024
• Docket: A-1191-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1191-22

CHRISTOPHER MAIER and LAND OF MAKE BELIEVE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TYLER KEGGAN,

Defendant-Respondent. _________________________

Submitted February 26, 2024 – Decided March 6, 2024

Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Warren County, Docket No. L-0211-22.

Norris McLaughlin, PA, attorneys for appellants (David C. Roberts and Mina Miawad, on the briefs).

McDonnell Artigliere, attorneys for respondent Tyler Keggan (John F. McDonnell, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Plaintiffs Christopher Maier and Land of Make Believe (LOMB) appeal

from a November 4, 2022 order dismissing their complaint for malicious

prosecution against defendant Tyler Keggan for failure to state a claim. We

affirm.

Maier is the owner and operator of LOMB, an amusement and water park

located in Hope Township. On January 4, 2021, defendant, a former employee

of LOMB, filed a complaint, alleging his former LOMB supervisor subjected

him to sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. He alleged LOMB

and Maier were legally responsible for the harassment and wrongful conduct

under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -

49.

Following defendant's deposition, he agreed to voluntarily dismiss the

complaint. On July 13, 2022, the parties signed a stipulation of dismissal,

stating "that any and all claims identified in [the c]omplaint and between the

parties are hereby dismissed with prejudice."

Approximately one month later, plaintiffs sued defendant for malicious

prosecution. They alleged defendant's LAD claim "had no reasonable ground

of suspicion supported by any facts or circumstances," evidenced by the fact he

dismissed his lawsuit after he was cross-examined on his "lies." The complaint

A-1191-22 2 alleged plaintiffs suffered "special grievances . . . including, but not limited to

counsel fees and costs incurred." Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive

damages, including attorneys' fees.

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). He argued a claim for malicious prosecution

"requires proof, among other elements, that the plaintiff suffered a 'special

grievance' in the form of a loss of property or liberty" and the complaint only

alleged plaintiffs incurred counsel fees and costs, which was not a special

grievance.

The trial court granted defendant's motion, finding the complaint failed to

allege a special grievance as required by law. The court found New Jersey courts

"have never regarded the mere cost of defending against litigation to suffice, but

have equated this essential proof requirement with the 'interference with one's

liberty or property.'" LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 95 (2009) (quoting

Penwag Prop. Co. v. Landau, 76 N.J. 595, 598 (1978)). Plaintiffs failed to

"allege[] any interference with liberty or property to indicate that [they] have

suffered a special grievance." The court concluded this was fatal to plaintiffs'

claim and dismissed the complaint.

A-1191-22 3 I.

"Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted are reviewed de novo." Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son,

LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin,

Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, PC, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). In reviewing a

Rule 4:6-2(e) ruling, we "must examine 'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged

on the face of the complaint,' giving the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable

inference of fact.'" Ibid. (quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 108). The test

for determining the adequacy of a pleading is "whether a cause of action is

'suggested' by the facts." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116

N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189,

192 (1988)).

On appeal, plaintiffs argue the court erred because it failed to read the

complaint liberally and incorrectly found they failed to plead a special

grievance. They point to our decision in Geyer v. Faiella, 279 N.J. Super. 386

(App. Div. 1995), and argue the lack of a special grievance is not fatal to a

malicious prosecution claim. Plaintiffs assert their complaint set forth the

elements for a cause of action for malicious prosecution.

We have stated:

A-1191-22 4 To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution of a civil suit, the plaintiff must establish that the original suit (1) was instituted without reasonable or probable cause; (2) was motivated by malice; (3) terminated favorably to the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution action; and (4) resulted in a "special grievance" to the plaintiff. The absence of any one of these elements is fatal.

[Giri v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 273 N.J. Super. 340, 347 (App. Div. 1994) (citation omitted).]

A civil cause of action for malicious prosecution must allege the plaintiff

suffered a special grievance, because "the special grievance is designed to take

the place of the injurious effects, including arrest, restraint, or the attendant

humiliation of being held on bail, finger-printed, and photographed, that

ordinarily flow from a wrongfully instituted criminal charge." LoBiondo, 199

N.J. at 90.

Litigation expenses, "mental anguish, emotional distress, or loss of

reputation" do not constitute "special injuries." Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super.

186, 205 (App. Div. 2003). "Counsel fees and costs in defending the action

maliciously brought may be an element of damage in a successful malicious

prosecution, but do not in themselves constitute a special grievance necessary

to make out the cause of action." Penwag, 76 N.J. at 598.

A-1191-22 5 In Geyer, the plaintiff alleged the defendant defamed him and engaged in

malicious prosecution by telling the U.S. Attorney's Office the plaintiff had

threatened his life, inducing the government to prosecute the plaintiff. 279 N.J.

Super. at 388. The Federal grand jury did not return an indictment and the

government subsequently terminated the prosecution. Ibid. The plaintiff sued,

alleging: he suffered emotional distress; the defendant attempted to destroy the

plaintiff's reputation and business; and attempted to extort the plaintiff. Id. at

388-89. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's civil action for failure to state a

claim, finding "no special damage because there's no arrest, no liberty was[] in

any way compromised, we don't know precisely what happened but the [g]rand

[j]ury didn't return an indictment." Id. at 393.

We reversed and held "if absence of damage allegations alone was

intended to be the basis for dismissal, it would have been improper at this stage

of the proceedings, under the strict [Rule] 4:6-2(e) standards . . . because some

damages were alleged." Id. at 394. We also concluded the plaintiff did not need

to allege a special grievance because of the underlying criminal case.

Unlike Geyer, here there was no underlying criminal case, and the plaintiff

did not allege the emotional distress and other economic damages the plaintiff

A-1191-22 6 asserted in Geyer. Simply put, plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege a special

grievance because it only alleged damages of counsel fees and costs.

Affirmed.

A-1191-22 7