Christopher M. Knight v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 31, 2015
• Docket: 02A03-1501-CR-29
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Jul 31 2015, 8:56 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Anthony S. Churchward Gregory F. Zoeller Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Fort Wayne, Indiana Jesse R. Drum Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher M. Knight, July 31, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1501-CR-29 v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff Cause No. 02D04-1404-FD-426

Baker, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 1 of 5 [1] Christopher M. Knight appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he

pleaded guilty to class D felony Domestic Battery.1 Knight argues that the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to find his guilty plea to be a mitigating

factor. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts [2] Knight and Miranda Jones have one child together. They separated in August

2013 and had not spoken to one another until the evening of April 14, 2014.

That evening, Knight was kicked out of a substance abuse rehabilitation center

because he was intoxicated. Jones picked him up; her two minor children were

in the backseat of the vehicle. While Jones was driving her vehicle, Knight

began striking her in the head and face with a closed fist for no apparent reason,

causing pain, redness, and swelling. Jones called 911. Knight continued

striking her during the 911 call, so the battery can be heard on the 911 tape.

Eventually, Jones stopped the car and ordered Knight to get out. He refused

and she attempted to exit the vehicle. He grabbed her by the hair, pulling her

back into the car, and yelled at her. He fled, but was later found and arrested

by law enforcement officers.

[3] On April 18, 2014, the State charged Knight with class D felony domestic

battery. On September 22, 2014, Knight pleaded guilty as charged without a

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2). The Indiana criminal code has been substantially amended as of July 1, 2014, but we refer to and apply the version that was in effect at the time Knight committed the offense herein.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 2 of 5 plea agreement. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on November 10,

2014, and found Knight’s extensive criminal history, the fact that he committed

new offenses while out on bond for the instant offense, the fact that prior

rehabilitation has failed, and the facts and circumstances of the instant case as

aggravating factors. The trial court also stated that “I will note as mitigating

circumstances his plea of guilty; however, I don’t put a lot of stock in that

considering it’s all on tape.” Sent. Tr. p. 15. In the end, the trial court found

that the aggravators outweighed the mitigating circumstance and imposed a

three-year sentence. Knight now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [4] Knight’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to find his guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. Sentencing is a

discretionary function of the trial court, and we afford considerable deference to

the trial court’s judgment. Eiler v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App.

2010). When sentencing a defendant for a felony, the trial court must enter a

sentencing statement “including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances

for imposing a particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490

(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. We no longer review a trial

court’s weighing of mitigators and aggravators. Id. at 490-91.

[5] Initially, we note that during the sentencing hearing, the trial court explicitly

stated that it did find the guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. Sent. Tr.

p. 15. It merely found that the aggravators outweighed it. As noted above, we

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 3 of 5 no longer review the way in which a trial court weighs aggravators and

mitigators, so this argument is unavailing.

[6] We acknowledge, however, that the written sentencing order states that there

were no mitigators. Appellant’s App. p. 38. Solely for argument’s sake, we will

address Knight’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

consider the guilty plea as a mitigator. It is well established that the significance

of a guilty plea is dramatically reduced if substantial admissible evidence exists

against the defendant. Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

In this case, Knight can be heard hitting Jones during the 911 call, and his

battery caused visible injuries to Jones. Given the substantial evidence of his

guilt, Knight’s decision to plead guilty was pragmatic. See Wells v. State, 836

N.E.2d 475, 479-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Consequently, we cannot say that the

trial court abused its discretion in failing to find Knight’s plea as a mitigator.

[7] Even if we were to find that the trial court should have found the guilty plea to

be a mitigator, we would affirm. If we conclude that the trial court has abused

its discretion—by, for example, neglecting to find a mitigator—we will remand

for resentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court

would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that

enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, Knight’s

criminal history included three juvenile adjudications, twenty-six misdemeanor

convictions, five felony convictions, three suspended sentence modifications,

and five suspended sentence revocations. He was charged with two offenses

while on bond for the instant case—public intoxication and invasion of privacy.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 4 of 5 He failed to appear at his first scheduled sentencing hearing in this case. As for

the facts and circumstances of the offense, Knight’s estranged girlfriend agreed

to pick him up because he was too intoxicated to attend substance abuse

treatment. He began hitting her repeatedly, while she was driving, for no

reason, causing her to sustain visible injuries. All of this occurred with two

minor children, one of whom was his child, in the backseat of the car. We are

confident that even if the trial court had found the guilty plea to be a mitigator,

the aggravators would have easily outweighed it, and the same sentence would

have been imposed. In any event, therefore, we affirm.

[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 5 of 5