Christopher Leon Dixon v. Lance J. Hendron, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00312
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 CHRISTOPHER LEON DIXON, Case No. 26-cv-00312-APG-EJY

5 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 6 v.

7 LANCE J. HENDRON, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis and 11 Complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. Plaintiff’s IFP is complete and granted. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 12 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, the Court 13 recommends Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice, but also without leave to amend 14 in this Court. 15 I. Screening Standard 16 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the reviewing Court must identify any cognizable claims and 17 dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 18 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 19 1915(e)(2). 20 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 21 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal court must dismiss a claim if the action “is frivolous or 22 malicious[,] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or seeks monetary relief against 23 a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard for dismissing 24 a complaint for failure to state a claim is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 25 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 26 the complaint with directions to cure its deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint 27 that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 1 the complaint as true, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 2 Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted 4 by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does 5 not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere labels and conclusions. 6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a 7 cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying 8 pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 9 assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can 10 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 11 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 12 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 13 states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 14 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 15 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 16 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 17 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 18 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 19 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); McKeever 20 v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 II. Discussion 22 Plaintiff asserts two claims in his Complaint. These include ineffective assistance of counsel 23 and conspiracy committed by public defender Maria Cleveland, not yet appointed stand-by counsel 24 Lance J. Hendron, and a state court judge not named as a defendant. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. More 25 specifically, Plaintiff alleges the state court judge held a bench conference with Ms. Cleveland and 26 Mr. Hendron, from which Plaintiff was excluded, in which the judge allegedly stated “we want … 27 [Plaintiff, then the criminal defendant] to not say all these things on the record.” Id. at 3. Liberally 1 construing additional allegations, Plaintiff submits the state court judge thereafter discussed a 2 conflict of interest leading public defender Michael Hyte to file a motion to withdraw.1 Id.

3 a. Plaintiff’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Should be Dismissed with Prejudice. 4 5 To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective 6 assistance of counsel, his claim must be brought first through a direct appeal and then through a post- 7 conviction habeas corpus petition, not through a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nelson 8 v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973). For this 9 reason, Plaintiff’s § 1983 ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails as a matter of law and must be 10 dismissed. 11 b. Plaintiff’s Claim of Conspiracy Fails Under Heck v. Humphries. 12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violations of a right under 13 the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by a person acting under color of state law. 14 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Generally, criminal defense counsel, including public 15 defenders, are not state actors capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 16 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 17 banc) (public defender appointed in criminal case was not state actor even though he was “paid by 18 government funds and hired by a government agency”). Moreover, “[j]udges are absolutely immune 19 from damages actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.” Schucker v. 20 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 21 Nonetheless, a public defender may be deemed to have acted under color of state law if he 22 or she conspired with state officials to deprive the client of federal rights. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 23 914, 920, 923 (1984). To state a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege “an agreement or meeting 24 of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th 25 Cir. 2010) (internal quote marks and citation omitted). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are 26 insufficient to state a conspiracy between a private party and a state actor. Simmons v. Sacramento 27 1 Cnty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 708-09 2 (9th Cir. 1991). Instead, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement or meeting of 3 the minds among the alleged conspirators to violate his constitutional rights. Crowe, 608 F.3d at 4 440; Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998). 5 Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim. 6 Plaintiff contends two non-state actors (a public defender and his to-be appointed stand-by counsel) 7 together with a judge (who is not a named defendant) “conspired … to cover up … [a] Sixth 8 Amendment violation,” which appears to arise from a bench conference that Plaintiff did not attend. 9 At that conference, the attorneys and the state court judge expressed concern regarding Plaintiff’s 10 statements on the record that he should not have made, and discussed a conflict of interest leading 11 Mr. Hyte (also not named as a defendant) to file a motion to withdraw. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. It is 12 unclear why Mr. Hyte is named or how his withdrawal was prompted by a conference he is not 13 alleged to have attended. Plaintiff also offers no specific facts demonstrating that any part of the 14 conference between the court and counsel, which is not a per se violation of Plaintiff’s rights, 15 violated Plaintiff’s rights established under the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Washington, 705 16 F.2d 489, 498 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (criminal defendant’s absence from a sidebar does not necessarily 17 violate the Constitution absent evidence of denial of a fair trial); see also Gaiter v. Lord, 917 F.Supp. 18 145, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (claim by defendant that she was improperly denied her right to be present 19 at sidebar voir dire conference did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because the U.S. 20 Constitution does not require a defendant’s presence at sidebar conferences); Nev. R. Prof. Cond. 21 1.16(b)(7) (establishing withdrawal is required when good cause exists); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 22 157, 176 (1986) (a conflict between a defendant and counsel does not implicate Sixth Amendment 23 rights when the conflict is premised upon the defendant's plan to perjure himself). 24 However, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff could amend his Complaint to cure the failure 25 to adequately plead a conspiracy claim, the Court finds his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 26 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In analyzing which types of claims can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 27 the Supreme Court held that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who 1 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490 (1973)). In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Supreme 2 Court clarified that the line of cases addressing the Heck issue, “taken together, indicate that a state 3 prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages 4 or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or 5 internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity 6 of confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82. “It would wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent” 7 to allow plaintiffs to evade the exhaustion requirement of an application for a writ of habeas corpus 8 by labeling their request as a § 1983 claim. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-490. 9 Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction. See 10 Brown v. Spiga, Case No. CV 15-8585-ODW (AGR), 2018 WL 3435414, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 11 2018); McCullom v. O’Malley, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112451, *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) 12 (finding Heck bars alleged conspiracy between public defender, prosecutor and judge). As discussed 13 in Brown, rights pertaining to self-representation arise under the Sixth Amendment and rights 14 challenging “some phase of … [a] prosecution” clearly implicates Heck. Brown, 2018 WL 3435414 15 at *4 citing Pressley v. Pacheco, Case No. 17-1715, 2020 WL 107065, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2020). 16 See also Warren v. Fischl, 674 Fed.Appx. 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The very premise of Appellant’s 17 claims is that the defendants conspired to fabricate evidence and testimony against him and 18 introduced such fabricated evidence and perjury at trial. Such claims, if proved, would demonstrate 19 the invalidity of his conviction.”); Lewis v. Miller, 677 F.3d 324, 333 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). 20 Here, Plaintiff alleges a side-bar discussions between counsel and a state court judge resulted 21 in an agreement to violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel thereby forcing Plaintiff into self- 22 representation. ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. If this claim is successful it would necessarily implicate a key 23 phase of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings and, potentially, invalidate those proceedings causing 24 reversal of his convictions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck. 25 26 27 1 III. Recommendation 2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be 3 dismissed without prejudice, but without leave to amend in this Court. This will allow Plaintiff to 4 bring his Sixth Amendment claims through an appeal and then through a habeas petition as he must. 5 Dated this 16th day of March, 2026. 6 7 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 NOTICE 11 Under Local Rule IB 3-2, any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be in 12 writing and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days. The Supreme Court holds 13 the courts of appeal may determine that an appeal has been waived due to the failure to file objections 14 within the specified time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985). The Ninth Circuit also held 15 that (1) failure to file objections within the specified time and (2) failure to properly address and 16 brief the objectionable issues waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order and/or appeal 17 factual issues from the order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 18 1991); Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983). 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27