Christopher Lamont Adkinson v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 26, 2005
• Docket: 12-04-00270-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

                            NO.  12-04-00269-CR

                                    12-04-00270-CR

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

          TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                TYLER, TEXAS

CHRISTOPHER LAMONT ADKINSON,     §                 APPEAL FROM THE 173RD

APPELLANT

V.                                                                         §                 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE                                                       §                 HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

                                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Christopher Lamont Adkinson pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to fifteen years on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.  In one issue, Appellant challenges the voluntariness of his pleas.^[1]  We affirm.

                                                                Background

On November 24, 2003, Appellant was indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery.  On April 23, 2004, the State filed and was granted a “Motion to Reduce Offense,” which asked the court to reduce the charged offenses from two aggravated robberies to two “simple” robberies.  That same day, Appellant appeared before the trial court to enter an open plea of guilty to the lesser offenses without the benefit of a negotiated plea bargain.  At the plea hearing, the trial court admonished Appellant that 1) he did not have a plea bargain, 2) the punishment range for robbery, a second-degree felony, was no less than two years and no more than twenty and that the punishment could fall somewhere within that range, and 3) he had the right to a speedy trial by jury.  Appellant acknowledged that he understood each of these admonishments and pleaded guilty to both counts.  Appellant also acknowledged that he was pleading guilty because he was “in fact guilty” and that his decision to plead guilty in each case was freely and voluntarily made.  After the guilty plea, the court recessed so that a presentence investigation could be made in order to determine Appellant’s suitability for probation. 

On June 4, the trial court heard evidence regarding Appellant’s sentencing for the robberies.  After the testimony of witnesses, the court found Appellant guilty of the two robberies and sentenced him to fifteen years of imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.  Appellant’s counsel did not object to the sentencing. 

On June 22, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary because he believed that if he pleaded guilty, the State would recommend a sentence of ten years of imprisonment.  The State failed to make such a recommendation, and Appellant contended that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that the State would not make the recommendation.^[2]

The motion for new trial was heard on August 16.  At the hearing, Appellant testified that his trial counsel told him that the State would recommend ten years of imprisonment and that the judge would not exceed that recommendation.  Appellant complained that his guilty pleas were involuntary because he expected to receive a sentence of no more than ten years of imprisonment.  He also did not understand that the court could assess a punishment in excess of ten years because the punishment range for such an offense was two to twenty years of imprisonment.  Accordingly, Appellant testified, he was seeking a new trial on the original aggravated robbery charges, which carry a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years or life in prison. 

On cross-examination, he did not remember the trial court telling him that he did not have the benefit of a plea bargain in association with his guilty plea.  He did remember that the trial court admonished him that the punishment range for the robbery offense is not less than two years and no more than twenty years of imprisonment and that the court could sentence him to the minimum or the maximum, or anywhere in between.  Appellant also remembered telling the trial court that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily.  He acknowledged that the State did not make any specific recommendation of years of imprisonment at the punishment hearing. 

Shari Moore, the State’s prosecuting attorney, testified that she could specifically recall that on the day of the punishment hearing, she told Appellant’s trial counsel, John Youngblood, that the trial court would probably sentence Appellant to seven to ten years of imprisonment.  She also recalled telling him that she could not specifically recommend that to the judge. 

After obtaining a waiver of the attorney-client privilege from Appellant, Youngblood stated that he had a conversation with Moore where she told him that she would recommend ten years of imprisonment for Appellant at the punishment hearing.  He also testified that before the hearing, he had discussed with Appellant the range of punishment (two to twenty years) and that Appellant understood this range.  Youngblood further stated that Appellant understood, based on his representation to Appellant, that the State would recommend ten years of imprisonment. 

On cross-examination, Youngblood testified that Appellant had disclosed to him that he in fact was guilty of taking part in the robbery.  He did not tell Appellant that he would not receive a sentence of more than ten years, and he remembered Appellant’s understanding the trial court’s admonishment regarding the range of punishment for the offenses. 

Appellant testified again and stated that his plea was involuntary based on his false assumption that he would receive a sentence of ten years of imprisonment. 

After closing arguments by both parties, the trial court overruled Appellant’s motion for new trial. 

Analysis

On appeal, Appellant challenges the voluntariness of his guilty pleas based on his misunderstanding of the punishment he would receive from the trial court.  The State argues that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas and waived his right to a jury trial.

Standard of Review

For a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, a defendant must knowingly and voluntarily enter the plea. Brady v. United States, 390 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756 (1970); Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).  We determine the voluntariness of a plea of guilty from the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of the entire record.  Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2001, no pet.).

Applicable Law

Under article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court must admonish the defendant of the applicable range of punishment before accepting his plea of guilty.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).  Article 26.13 ensures that defendants enter and trial courts accept only constitutionally valid pleas.  Meyers v. State, 623 S.W.2d 397, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).  The trial court's substantial compliance with article 26.13 establishes a prima facie showing of a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); Eatmon v. State, 768 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).  A trial court substantially complies with article 26.13 by admonishing the defendant of the appropriate range of punishment and sentencing him within the range prescribed by law.  See Hughes v. State, 833 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).  Once we determine the trial court's substantial compliance, the burden then shifts to the appellant to show that he entered the plea without understanding the consequences of his action and was thus harmed.  Eatmon, 768 S.W.2d at 312.  However, receiving a greater punishment than anticipated or not assessing every relevant factor when deciding to enter a plea of guilty will not render a guilty plea involuntary.  Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1993, no pet.).

Application of Law to Facts

In the instant case, the trial court substantially complied with article 26.13 by admonishing Appellant of the appropriate range of punishment.  Also, the trial court sentenced Appellant within the range prescribed by law.  On appeal, Appellant does not show that he entered the plea without understanding the consequences of his action or that he suffered harm.  He merely concludes that his plea of guilty to the charges was neither freely nor voluntarily made because he “misunderstood” the range of punishment after he received a sentence in excess of what he anticipated.  Because Appellant does not affirmatively show that he was unaware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the trial court's admonishment, he does not rebut the prima facie showing that he knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it accepted Appellant's pleas.  Appellant's sole issue is overruled.

Disposition

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

    DIANE DEVASTO   

     Justice

Opinion delivered January 26, 2005.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

                                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

 

                                                COURT OF APPEALS

                     TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                                             JUDGMENT

                                                            JANUARY 26, 2005

                                                       NOS. 12-04-00269-CR

                                           CHRISTOPHER LAMONT ADKINSON,

                                                                            V.

                                                        THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                      Appellee

                                         Appeal from the 173rd Judicial District Court

                          of Henderson County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.Nos. A-12,371; A-12,372)

THESE CAUSES came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being inspected, it is the opinion of this court that there were no errors in the judgments.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgments of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.

Diane DeVasto, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.