Christopher L. Richards v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 31, 2017
• Docket: 84A04-1611-CR-2660
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED court except for the purpose of establishing May 31 2017, 9:00 am

the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Brooklyn, Indiana Christina D. Pace Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher L. Richards, May 31, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 84A04-1611-CR-2660 v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable John T. Roach, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D01-1011-FA-3721

Barnes, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1611-CR-2660| May 31, 2017 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary

[1] Christopher Richards appeals the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation

and impose the remainder of his previously-suspended sentence. We affirm.

Issues

[2] The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it

revoked probation and ordered Richards to serve the entirety of his suspended

sentence in prison.

Facts

[3] In 2010, the State charged Richards with dealing in methamphetamine, a Class

A felony. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, in 2011, Richards pled guilty

to the lesser-included offense of dealing in methamphetamine, a Class B felony.

On October 21, 2011, the trial court sentenced Richards to ten years: six years

executed in the Indiana Department of Correction, two years served as a direct

commitment to work release, and two years suspended to probation.

[4] Richards began probation on April 21, 2015. As a condition of probation,

Richards was not allowed to possess or use any controlled substances, unless

prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner. Richards’s probation officer,

Amber Loudermilk, filed a motion to modify the conditions of probation on

February 3, 2016, requesting that Richards complete alcohol and drug

counseling/treatment through Choices Consulting Center. The trial court

granted this request.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1611-CR-2660| May 31, 2017 Page 2 of 6 [5] The State filed a notice of probation violation on April 8, 2016, alleging that

Richards tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines on twenty-

two separate occasions. During the revocation hearing, on October 18, 2016,

Richards admitted he violated the terms of probation by testing positive for

methamphetamine on all of the occasions alleged in the petition to revoke his

probation. The trial court accepted his admission and found that Richards

violated the terms of his probation.

[6] At sentencing, the trial court heard testimony from Loudermilk, who testified

that she attempted to have Richards arrested in April of 2016. However,

Richards fled her office upon seeing her. Richards was not apprehended until

September of the same year. Richards testified that he was living with his

mother and working part time when he was arrested in September. Richards

stated that his mother was sick, and during his stay, he helped her administer

diabetes treatments and helped his mother with expenses. Richards stated that

he was clean for about two-and-a-half weeks prior to his arrest and had been

attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings when he had time. After the close of

evidence and argument, the trial court revoked probation and imposed the

remainder of his previously-suspended two-year sentence.

Analysis

[7] Richards contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his

probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his previously-suspended

two-year sentence in prison.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1611-CR-2660| May 31, 2017 Page 3 of 6 [8] Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) provides that, after revoking probation,

the trial court may “order execution of all or part of the sentence that was

suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Probation is a favor granted by the

State, not a right to which a defendant is entitled. Sparks v. State, 983 N.E.2d

221, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The decision to revoke probation lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Id. “Once a trial court has exercised its

grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have

considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d

184, 188 (Ind. 2007). We therefore review revocation of probation and the

subsequent sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. Sparks, 983 N.E.2d at

224. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d

614, 616 (Ind. 2013).

[9] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Sparks, 983 N.E.2d at 224 (citing

Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008)). First, the court must make a

factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation occurred. Id.

Second, if a violation is found, the trial court must determine whether the

violation warrants revocation of probation. Id. If the probationer admits to

violating probation, the court only needs to determine whether the violation

warrants revocation; however, the probationer must be given an opportunity to

provide mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant

revocation. Id. If the trial court’s finding of a violation is supported by

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1611-CR-2660| May 31, 2017 Page 4 of 6 substantial evidence of probative value, then we will affirm the revocation of

probation. Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[10] A trial court is not required to issue a detailed sentencing statement when

reinstating a portion of an already imposed sentence. Berry v. State, 904 N.E.2d

365, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Also, the trial court need not issue a written

statement indicating that it considered alternatives to incarceration. Castillo v.

State, 67 N.E.3d 661, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) trans. denied. There is no due

process requirement that a statement of reasons for sanctions imposed,

following revocation of probation, be provided. Id.

[11] Richards contends that the trial court should have placed him in a less

restrictive environment, but there is no requirement that the trial court consider

alternatives. Richards admitted to repeatedly relapsing and has been placed in

various drug treatment programs. He also attempted to avoid arrest for several

months. The trial court stated that it had run out of options and that, at the

very least, Richards would be given the opportunity to reflect on his addiction

while serving the remainder of his sentence in prison. Richards does not argue

that the trial court was required to state specific reasons for imposing the

sanction. He only contends that his incarceration would result in “significant

hardship to his mother, who had no one else to care for her.” Appellants Br. p.

7. The trial court, however, acknowledged his mother’s condition and

concluded that his continued use of methamphetamines does not benefit her.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1611-CR-2660| May 31, 2017 Page 5 of 6 [12] After arguments and evidence had been presented, the trial court ordered what

it believed would be the appropriate sanction given the circumstances. We

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the

remainder of Richards’s two-year sentence to be served in prison.

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the remainder of a

previously-suspended sentence to be served in prison, instead of a less restrictive

environment. We affirm.

Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1611-CR-2660| May 31, 2017 Page 6 of 6