Christopher J. Robbins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 17, 2019
• Docket: 18A-CR-3145
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 17 2019, 9:08 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Mark K. Leeman Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Leeman Law Office Attorney General of Indiana Pulaski County Public Defender George P. Sherman Logansport, Indiana Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher J. Robbins, July 17, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-3145 v. Appeal from the Pulaski Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael A. Shurn, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 66C01-1608-F1-2

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3145 | July 17, 2019 Page 1 of 5 Statement of the Case [1] Christopher Robbins (“Robbins”) appeals his conviction for Level 3 felony

aggravated battery.1 Specifically, Robbins asserts that his guilty plea must be

reversed because he was insane at the time of the offense. Concluding that

Robbins may not challenge his conviction on direct appeal, we dismiss

Robbins’ appeal.

[2] We dismiss.

[3]

Issue Whether Robbins may challenge his conviction on direct appeal after pleading guilty but mentally ill.

Facts [4] On August 17, 2016, police and emergency personnel responded to a 9-1-1 call

at the home of Robbins’ mother (“Mother”) and father (“Father”). When they

arrived, they learned from Mother that Robbins had stabbed Father in the chest

with a large knife. Mother also informed the police that Robbins suffered from

schizophrenia.

[5] Police subsequently found Robbins hiding in a nearby woods. Robbins allowed

police to take him into custody without incident. However, as police walked

1 IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(a).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3145 | July 17, 2019 Page 2 of 5 Robbins back to the patrol car, he began screaming at Mother and Father when

he saw them outside.

[6] The following day, the State charged Robbins with three counts: Count I,

Level 1 felony attempted murder; Count II, Level 3 felony aggravated battery;

and Count III, Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon.

[7] On October 14, 2016, Robbins filed a notice of intent to raise a defense of

insanity. On October 25, 2016, Robbins filed a motion for psychiatric

evaluation to determine his competence to stand trial. In November 2016, the

trial court appointed three doctors to evaluate Robbins. Following a

competency hearing on March 21, 2017, the trial court found that Robbins was

competent to stand trial.

[8] On August 21, 2018, the day that Robbins was scheduled to begin trial, Robbins

instead elected to plead guilty but mentally ill to the offense of aggravated

battery, with the agreement that the State would dismiss the other two counts.

Thereafter, Robbins pleaded guilty to the aggravated battery charge, and the

trial court accepted his guilty plea.

[9] On November 27, 2018, the trial court sentenced Robbins to ten (10) years in

the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) with five (5) years suspended

to probation. The trial court further ordered that Robbins be evaluated and

treated by the DOC after transfer and undergo treatment during his probation.

[10] Robbins now appeals.

Decision

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3145 | July 17, 2019 Page 3 of 5 [11] On appeal, Robbins argues that his guilty plea must be reversed “because there

was no evidence of probative value that Robbins was sane at the time he

stabbed his father.” (Robbins’ Br. 12). In response, the State asserts that

Robbins may not challenge his conviction on direct appeal because he pleaded

guilty but mentally ill. We agree with the State.

[12] It is well established that direct appeal is an improper means by which to

challenge a guilty plea conviction. Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind.

1996). As a general rule of jurisprudence, entering a guilty plea restricts the

ability to challenge a conviction on direct appeal. Id.; see also Creech v. State, 887

N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ind. 2008) (“[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty, he waives his

right to appeal his conviction.”); Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind.

2004) (“A person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety

of that conviction on direct appeal.”); Hayes v. State, 906 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ind.

2009) (a reversal of a conviction on direct appeal due to a guilty plea having an

inadequate factual basis is “contrary to [its] precedent in Tumulty[.]”). Rather,

the proper avenue to challenge a conviction based on a guilty plea is to file a

petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1.

Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 395.

[13] Although Robbins argues that our supreme court’s precedent in Tumulty does

not apply to his guilty plea, we are unpersuaded by his attempts to distinguish

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3145 | July 17, 2019 Page 4 of 5 Tumulty.2 We conclude that Robbins may not challenge his conviction on

direct appeal. See id. (identifying policy reasons for “[t]he long-standing judicial

precedent limiting the avenue of direct appeal for guilty plea challenges,” and

noting that a plea “brings to a close the dispute between the parties, much as

settling civil parties do by submitting an agreed judgment”). Accordingly, we

dismiss his appeal.

[14] We dismiss.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

2 Robbins’ arguments mischaracterize sanity as an element of aggravated battery. Rather, insanity is an affirmative defense. See Carson v. State, 807 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. 2004) (“The ‘insanity’ defense is an affirmative defense for which the burden of proof is on the defendant.”). To the extent that Robbins is attempting, on appeal, to assert an affirmative defense of insanity, he waived any such defense by pleading guilty but mentally ill. Accordingly, we cannot and will not consider such arguments on direct appeal. See Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 396.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3145 | July 17, 2019 Page 5 of 5