Christopher J. Bloodworth v. Commonwealth of Virginia
This text of Christopher J. Bloodworth v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Christopher J. Bloodworth v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judge Russell and Senior Judge Bumgardner UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER J. BLOODWORTH MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0472-15-1 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III MAY 17, 2016 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK John R. Doyle, III, Judge
J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
David M. Uberman, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Christopher J. Bloodworth appeals his convictions of grand larceny and felony destruction
of private property maintaining the evidence was insufficient to prove his presence at or his
participation in the offenses. Concluding the evidence was sufficient, we affirm.
We view the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the prevailing party. Commonwealth
v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). We “discard the evidence of the accused
in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to
the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 221
Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980) (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 137,
82 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1954)) (emphasis omitted).
A mother and daughter, who did not live in Virginia, were selling their house in Norfolk. In
preparation for closing the sale, a real estate agent conducted an inspection of the house. He found
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. the property to be in good condition with all necessary repairs completed pursuant to the sales
contract. Two days later on the day of the closing, another real estate agent went to the property to
remove the lockbox and for sale signs.
When that agent arrived, there was a truck in the carport, he heard “banging and clanging”
inside the house, but no one answered when he knocked at the front door. He then knocked on a
side door, and the defendant opened the door. When asked why he was in the house, the defendant
replied that he was performing “demolition work” for the “real estate company.” The agent did not
recognize the name the defendant provided. When asked a second time, the defendant said he was
working for “a rental company.” The agent could see damage to the walls, cabinets, and appliances.
He heard more “banging” within the house and then saw a second man appear from “around a
corner.”
While the agent was trying to contact the buyers’ realtor, the defendant and the second man
left the house and got into the truck. When again asked for whom they were working, the defendant
replied they were going to get lunch and would return. They never did. Neither owner gave the
defendant permission to be in the house or to remove property.
The house sustained extensive damage, including damaged drywall, missing copper pipes
and bathroom fixtures, damaged and destroyed cabinets and countertops, damage to the refrigerator
including removal of the compressor, destruction of the back door lock, a missing air conditioning
unit, and missing components of the heating and cooling system. One of the property owners
testified she submitted an insurance claim for about $15,000 which included $11,531 in parts and
repairs. The Commonwealth introduced invoices showing the cost of repairs was $11,927.
The defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of grand larceny and
felony property damage because it only established his presence at the house. He maintains the
evidence did not prove that he had an intent to commit larceny or any other felony when entering
-2- the house or had an intent to permanently deprive the owners of the missing contents. He also
argues the evidence failed to prove that he took and carried away any property, or that he
participated in damaging the property.
When the trier of fact has rendered its verdict, “it is not for this court to say that the evidence
does or does not establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because as an original proposition it
might have reached a different conclusion.” Cobb v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 941, 953, 146 S.E.
270, 274 (1929). It only determines “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657
S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in
original). This Court asks only whether a reasonable fact finder could have rejected the defense
theories and found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 273
Va. 639, 646, 643 S.E.2d 166, 170 (2007).
The defendant attacks each item of circumstantial evidence individually while arguing that
each individual item failed to prove guilt. However, circumstances do not exist alone.
“Circumstances do not exist in isolation of one another but exist together with every other proven
fact and circumstance in the case.” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 524, 446 S.E.2d
451, 460 (1994) (en banc). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the ‘combined
force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may lead a
reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.’” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 505, 704
S.E.2d 135, 140 (2011) (en banc) (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 273, 257
S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979)). While each circumstance alone may be insufficient, “the combined force
of [the] many concurrent and related circumstances” can lead to the conclusion that the evidence is
sufficient to sustain his convictions. Id.
-3- In this case, the evidence, taken as a whole, leads to the reasonable conclusion that the
defendant was indeed doing demolition work, but without authorization. The defendant stated he
was doing demolition work, thereby admitting his active participation in the destruction of the
property. The sounds of ongoing demolition came from within the house. The defendant gave
conflicting statements about who authorized the demolition work. The fact finder was entitled to
weigh the defendant’s contradictory statements, Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 781-82,
51 S.E.2d 210, 213-14 (1949), and to infer that the defendant was attempting to conceal his guilt,
Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). The
defendant’s incriminating statements, his presence in the house, the forced entry at the back door,
the ongoing demolition, the immediate departure upon being discovered in the house, and the
missing property that had previously been in the house, permit the conclusion that the trial judge
drew that the defendant had been “caught red handed.”
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