Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-24-00453-CV
Christopher HUGHES, Appellant
v.
Christina HUGHES, Appellee
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. 22823A Honorable Albert D. Pattillo, III, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 23, 2025
AFFIRMED
After a bench trial, the trial court signed a final decree of divorce appointing Christina
Hughes and Christopher Hughes as joint managing conservators of their two young children,
E.L.H. and G.L.H. The decree designated Christina as the joint managing conservator with the
exclusive right to determine the children’s primary residence without geographic restriction. On
appeal, Christopher argues the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing a geographic
restriction on the children’s primary residence. We affirm. 04-24-00453-CV
BACKGROUND
Christina and Christopher were married on October 17, 2015. Their first child, E.L.H., was
born in 2018. On December 4, 2022, Christopher told Christina he wanted a divorce and the couple
separated. At the time, Christina was twenty-three weeks pregnant with G.L.H., who was not born
until March 2023. Christina filed a petition for divorce on December 20, 2022, and Christopher
filed a counterpetition on February 2, 2023.
Before the separation, Christina was a stay-at-home parent, and Christopher supported the
family financially by working as a traveling nurse. Christopher was working and staying in Dallas,
Texas, while Christina and E.L.H. were living in the marital home in Kerrville, Texas. Christina
and E.L.H. would sometimes visit Christopher in Dallas, and Christopher would sometimes come
home to Kerrville to visit Christina and E.L.H. After the separation, Christopher continued to work
and live in Dallas. Meanwhile, Christina, E.L.H., and G.L.H. lived in the marital home in Kerrville,
Texas.
On June 20, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and rendered temporary
orders. Both parents were appointed temporary joint managing conservators of the children.
Christina was designated the temporary joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to
determine the children’s primary residence with a geographic restriction limited to Kerr County
and the contiguous counties. Christopher was ordered to pay $1,500.00 per month in temporary
child support in accordance with the child support guidelines and $1,000.00 per month in
temporary spousal support. Because Christopher resided more than one hundred miles from
E.L.H., Christopher was given the right to possession of four-year-old E.L.H. for one weekend per
month. Because G.L.H. was only three months old, Christopher was not given the right to
overnight possession of G.L.H.; however, Christopher and Christina were ordered to work in good
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faith with a parent facilitator to establish an increasing or “stair step” schedule for Christopher to
have possession and access to G.L.H.
Final trial on the merits was held on March 18, 2024. At trial, Christina testified that since
the separation she and the children had experienced financial difficulties. Christopher had failed
to make multiple mortgage payments on the marital home and the home’s water was shut off due
to nonpayment. Christina’s father had helped Christina and the children by making the mortgage
payments for several months and buying necessary items for the children. After the marital home
was sold, Christina and the children went to live with friends. By the time of trial, Christina was
employed at a daycare center in Kerrville, where she was earning $13.75 an hour. Christina’s
employer offered her a fifty-percent reduction on childcare, which helped her pay for E.L.H.’s
daycare.
Christina explained that she was contemplating a move to Lexington, South Carolina, so
she could earn a better living and better support the children. Christina had an aunt who lived in
Lexington, and the aunt owned a large house with extra bedrooms and a one-bedroom, one-bath
cottage on the property. The aunt, with whom Christina had a close relationship, had invited
Christina and the children to come live with her rent free. The aunt had also offered to provide
childcare for the children while Christina was at work. The aunt’s home was in a top school district.
After researching the issue, Christina felt that her economic opportunities were better in Lexington
than in Kerr County. Christina, who had a bachelor’s degree in science and public health, had
already applied for two jobs in South Carolina. One of these jobs was an early interventionist/case
manager, a field in which Christina had seven years’ experience. Both jobs would pay Christina
more than she was making at her current job, increasing her annual salary by about $20,000 a year.
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Christina testified that even if she and the children were allowed to relocate to South
Carolina, the children would be able to maintain a relationship with Christopher. Christina
presented evidence showing that two airlines offered roundtrip airfares between Dallas, Texas, and
Charlotte, North Carolina for $123.00 or less. Christina believed that she and Christopher could
afford this airfare and that it would be feasible for the children to have in-person visits with him.
Additionally, Christina said that if they were allowed to move to South Carolina, she and the
children would still return to Texas for visits with family and friends, which would provide
additional opportunities for Christopher and the children to visit in person. Christina added that
the children had daily electronic communications with Christopher, and they would continue to do
so. Finally, Christina testified she had researched nursing jobs in South Carolina and the salary for
these jobs was commensurate with the salary Christopher was now earning in Dallas.
Christina’s father, David Mauk, testified that after the couple separated, Christina and the
children struggled without Christopher’s consistent financial support. During this time, Mauk had
helped Christina and the children by making $7,976.08 in mortgage payments on the marital home
and providing $18,800.24 in other economic support for Christina and the children. Christina’s
friends had also helped Christina and the children during this difficult time. After the marital home
was sold, some of her friends had welcomed Christina and the children into their home. In Mauk’s
opinion, Christopher’s lack of support made it hard for Christina and the children to thrive in
Kerrville. Even though it pained him to say so, Mauk felt that the economic and educational
opportunities for Christina and the children were better in South Carolina than in Kerrville. Mauk
was afraid that if Christina and the children continued to live in Kerrville, they would wind up
economically disadvantaged.
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Christopher testified that by the time of trial he was $9,000.00 in arrears on temporary child
and spousal support, but he also said that on the morning of trial he paid $3,000.00 toward this
arrearage. According to Christopher, these arrearages accrued because in addition to the temporary
child and spousal support he had other bills to pay such as his rent, insurance, and cell phone bills.
Christopher also mentioned that he had lost his job and was out of work for a month. Christopher
acknowledged that after he and Christina separated, he made numerous discretionary purchases,
including the purchase of a motorcycle. Christopher was currently living with his girlfriend in her
home, where he paid for part of the cost of housing and groceries.
Christopher further testified that—if it was best for the children—he would be willing to
move back to another city in the Texas Hill Country, but he would not move back to Kerrville.
Christopher did not feel he could work and live in Kerrville, expressing frustration about the gossip
circulating in the small community and calling it “a toxic environment.” Christopher
acknowledged that he had chosen to live in Dallas, even if it meant not being near his children.
Christopher objected to Christina and the children moving to South Carolina. Christopher felt that
it was more convenient for him to visit the children if Christina and the children were required to
stay in Kerr County. Christopher said he was not interested in relocating to South Carolina.
Christopher’s parents and most of his siblings lived in Kerrville. However, Christopher
preferred to visit with E.L.H. at his girlfriend’s home in Dallas, Texas, rather than visiting with
E.L.H. in Kerrville. Christopher stated that the trip between Dallas and Kerrville takes him only
three and a half to four hours each way. Apart from mentioning that his side of the family did not
have any time to interact with the children except for during his own visitation times, Christopher
did not elaborate on the relationship the children had with his side of the family.
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Finally, parenting facilitator, Carrie Beaird, testified that she had met with Christina and
Christopher nine times. She and the parties had struggled with establishing a “parenting plan” for
the youngest child, G.L.H. However, the month before trial, Christopher had visited with G.L.H.
for eight consecutive hours, and the parties had agreed that the following month Christopher’s
visits with G.L.H. would increase to ten hours. Beaird stated that based upon her understanding of
the court’s temporary orders for possession and access, Christopher was able to exercise all his
possession and access to the children. Beaird also explained that the daily electronic
communications between Christopher and the children had been complicated by Christopher’s
varying work schedule. Beaird had to explain to Christina and Christopher that they needed to be
flexible and communicative with each other so the electronic communications could take place at
alternative times. Beaird believed that the parties’ problems with the electronic communications
had been handled by the time of trial.
At the conclusion of the trial, Christina asked the trial court to refrain from imposing a
geographic restriction on the children’s primary residence because she wanted the flexibility to
move to South Carolina, where she had extended family, free housing and childcare, and job
opportunities. Christopher opposed this request, urging the trial court to restrict the children’s
primary residence to Kerr County. The amicus attorney, Sara Neel, recommended that no
geographic restriction be imposed. In making her recommendation, Neel stated: “[Christopher]
has the ability to move. [He] had the ability to move this entire time to be with his [children] and
not force [Christina] into this situation she is in where she cannot provide for her children.”
The trial court granted Christina the exclusive right to determine the children’s primary
residence without imposing a geographic restriction. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.134(b)(1)(B). In
making its ruling, the trial court stated that it had “consider[ed] the evidence before the Court at
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today’s hearing, as well as prior hearings, and [] the various Lenz 1 factors and the testimony of the
witnesses in this hearing, in particular the traveling nature and ability of the father to relocate, as
he’s done, and taking into consideration the fact that since the filing of this action the father has
changed his county of residency away from [Kerr County].”
Christopher appealed. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were not requested or filed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
We review conservatorship orders for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if the trial
court’s decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). A
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence or if there is
some evidence of substantive and probative value to support its decision. See Gillespie v. Gillespie,
644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). In conducting our review, we defer to the trial court’s resolution
of the underlying facts and its credibility determinations that may have affected its decision.
Mendez v. Delgado, No. 04-18-00454-CV, 2019 WL 3208829, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
July 17, 2019, no pet.). When, as here, the trial court does not file findings of fact and conclusions
of law, we imply that the trial court made all findings necessary to support the judgment and uphold
those findings if supported by the evidence. In re M.I.M., No. 04-22-00361-CV, 2023 WL
7552681, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 15, 2023, no pet.).
The primary consideration of the court in determining issues of conservatorship and
possession and access is the best interest of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002. The court
should also be guided by the public policy considerations identified in section 153.001 of the Texas
Family Code: (1) assuring that children have frequent and continuing contact with parents who
have shown an ability to act in the children’s best interest; (2) providing a safe, stable, and
1 Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 15–16 (Tex. 2002).
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nonviolent environment for the children; and (3) encouraging parents to share in the rights and
duties of raising their children post-divorce. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.001; see In re M.V., 583
S.W.3d 354, 359–60 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).
In Lenz v. Lenz, the Texas Supreme Court articulated numerous factors relevant to the
determination of whether a geographic restriction is in the children’s best interest: (1) the reasons
for and against the move, including the parents’ good faith motives in requesting or opposing it;
(2) health, education, and leisure opportunities; (3) the degree of economic, emotional, and
educational enhancement for the custodial parent and the children; (4) the effect on extended
family relationships; (5) accommodation of the children’s special needs or talents; (6) the effect
on visitation and communication with the non-custodial parent to maintain a full and continuous
relationship with the children; (7) the possibility of a visitation schedule allowing the continuation
of a meaningful relationship between the non-custodial parent and the children; and (8) the ability
of the non-custodial parent to relocate. 79 S.W.3d 10, 15–16 (Tex. 2002); In re W.J.M., No. 04-
20-00532-CV, 2022 WL 946636, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 30, 2022, no pet.).
Decisions concerning geographic restrictions and the children’s best interest are intensely fact
driven. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 19; In re W.J.M., 2022 WL 946636, at *5.
DISCUSSION
Christopher first argues that Christina’s request for no geographic restriction on the
children’s primary residence was not made in good faith. According to Christopher, Christina’s
plan to move to South Carolina was motivated by her desire to prevent him from visiting the
children. However, the evidence supported implied findings that Christina’s request was motivated
by a bona fide attempt to achieve financial security for herself and the children and that it was
made in good faith. The evidence showed that since the separation, Christina’s financial struggles
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had been significant and that she and the children had relied on her father and her friends to meet
their basic needs. The evidence also showed that by relocating to South Carolina, Christina would
likely have an opportunity to overcome these financial struggles. Furthermore, the parent
facilitator, Beaird, testified that Christopher was in fact able to exercise all his visitation with the
children in accordance with the temporary orders. Finally, Christina testified that she had already
demonstrated she would not block Christopher’s possession and access to the children, and she
would not block Christopher’s possession and access to the children in the future. As the fact
finder, the trial court was entitled to believe Christina’s testimony on this issue. See In re O.L.P.,
No. 04-23-00838-CV, 2025 WL 1452053, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 21, 2025, no pet.
h.) (recognizing trial court is the sole judge of witness credibility in a bench trial); Mendez, 2019
WL 3208829, at *5 (recognizing appellate court must defer to trial court’s credibility
determinations). Based on the evidence presented, the trial court could have reasonably concluded
that not imposing a geographic restriction afforded Christina and the children a high degree of
economic enhancement and, therefore, was in the children’s best interest. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at
17 (highlighting evidence showing custodial parent “ha[d] a chance of better employment and a
stable financial situation” if allowed to relocate, which “may provide a higher standard of living
for her” children); In re W.J.M., 2022 WL 946636, at *6 (affirming trial court’s lifting of
geographic restriction when “a refusal to lift the geographic would likely have caused Mother to
remain under financial stress and have a negative impact on Mother’s emotional state, which in
turn could have a detrimental impact on the child”); In re M.V., 583 S.W.3d at 363-64 (upholding
trial court’s decision to lift geographic restriction based on evidence supporting an inference that
custodial parent’s economic and financial outlook would improve if she and the children were
permitted to relocate).
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Christopher next argues that if Christina and the children do relocate to South Carolina it
will be overly burdensome for him to visit the children. Christopher’s right to have regular and
meaningful contact with the children is an important factor in the best interest analysis. However,
Christopher presented no details about the alleged burden the relocation placed on him. On the
other hand, Christina presented evidence that if she and the children relocate to South Carolina,
Christopher will still be able continue to have regular and meaningful contact with the children.
Christina testified that in-person visits between Christopher and the children could be achieved by
utilizing air travel and that the airfare was affordable for them. Plus, the evidence showed that
when E.L.H. visits with Christopher for the weekend, the child spends a substantial amount of
time—about ten hours—traveling in a car between Kerrville and Dallas and back again. The trial
court could have inferred that if Christina and the children moved to South Carolina, E.L.H. would
spend a comparable amount of time traveling to visit Christopher. Additionally, the evidence
showed that Christina and the children planned to return to Kerrville for occasional visits with
friends and family and these visits would provide additional opportunities for Christopher and the
children to visit in person. Finally, the evidence showed that Christopher and the children engaged
in daily electronic communications, which could certainly continue from South Carolina. Based
on the evidence presented, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the possibility
existed for regular contact and a visitation schedule allowing for the continuation of a meaningful
relationship between Christopher and the children. 2 See In re M.V., 583 S.W.3d at 364 (upholding
trial court’s decision to lift geographic restriction when custodial parent “did come forward at the
hearing with a plan to help ensure that [the child] would be able to maintain a meaningful and
continuing relationship with [the noncustodial parent]”).
2 The decree essentially provides that once G.L.H. turns three years old, both children will be on the same visitation schedule with Christopher.
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Christopher testified that he did not want to relocate to South Carolina, but the evidence
showed it would be possible for him to find comparable employment and relocate to South
Carolina to be close to his children. The evidence also showed that Christopher had accepted
multiple nursing jobs outside of Texas in the past. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably
concluded that Christopher had the ability to relocate to South Carolina. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at
18 (noting “[i]n certain situations” a factfinder “may consider evidence of the possibility and
feasibility of a parallel move by a committed noncustodial parent as an alternative to restricting
the custodial parent’s mobility”); In re D.L.N., 609 S.W.3d 237, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2020, no pet.) (affirming order awarding parent exclusive right to establish children’s residence
without geographic restriction when evidence showed that custodial parent wished to accept a new
job out of state, and nothing showed noncustodial parent was unable to relocate to the same area).
Christopher further argues that the evidence showed that the educational, health, and
leisure opportunities for the children were comparable in Texas and South Carolina. Although
Christopher presented some evidence about the educational and health opportunities near his home
in the Dallas area, he did not present any evidence about the educational and health opportunities
in Kerrville, which was the relevant comparison for purposes of evaluating whether the children’s
primary residence should be restricted to Kerr County. On the other hand, Christina presented
testimony that the educational system in Lexington was highly rated, and that if she and the
children were permitted to move there, they would be surrounded by her extended family,
including Christina’s aunt and a multitude of cousins. The trial court could have reasonably
concluded that these Lenz factors—educational opportunities and the presence of the children’s
extended family—weighed in favor of no geographic restriction. See In re M.V., 583 S.W.3d at
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364 (recognizing “the presence of family” and “the opportunity to cultivate [] new family
relationships” as evidence supporting trial court’s decision to lift geographic residency restriction).
After reviewing the evidence and considering the relevant Lenz factors and the best interest
of the children, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to impose a
geographic restriction on the children’s primary residence. 3
The final decree of divorce is affirmed.
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
3 Christopher also argues that section 153.004(b) of the Texas Family Code precluded the appointment of Christina as a joint managing conservator, but because he never presented this argument to the trial court it is not properly preserved for review on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Martinez v. Martinez, 157 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (concluding appellant waived complaint on appeal that the final divorce decree violated section 153.004 because “[n]o mention of any of the provisions in [s]ection 153.004 was made by either party in the court below”). However, even if Christopher had properly preserved this argument for our review, we would overrule it because the record is devoid of any evidence within the scope of section 153.004(b). See TEX. FAM. CODE 153.004(b) (precluding appointment of “joint managing conservators if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present . . . physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent”).
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