Christopher Howard Marraro, II v. Janae Irene Haaland

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedJune 27, 2017
Docket1635164
StatusUnpublished

This text of Christopher Howard Marraro, II v. Janae Irene Haaland (Christopher Howard Marraro, II v. Janae Irene Haaland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christopher Howard Marraro, II v. Janae Irene Haaland, (Va. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Alston, O’Brien and Senior Judge Clements UNPUBLISHED

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

CHRISTOPHER HOWARD MARRARO, II MEMORANDUM OPINION BY v. Record No. 1635-16-4 JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. JUNE 27, 2017 JANAE IRENE HAALAND

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY John M. Tran, Judge

Trevor D. Anderson (Thomas P. Silis; Silis & Associates, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.

Maureen E. Danker (Ann N. Luu; Laura M. O’Brien; Kelly Byrnes & Danker, PLLC, on brief), for appellee.

Christopher Howard Marraro, II (appellant) appeals the trial court’s decision to “credit

[appellant] for [pre-tax] contributions as the equivalent of premium payments” so long as he does

not seek reimbursement from Janae Irene Haaland (appellee) “unless and until [appellant] has

fully funded the insurance for the year (or pays medicals up to the level of the annual funding).”

Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court ordered that the children’s medical expenses not

covered by the “high-deductible” healthcare plan be paid “first from the Health Care Savings

Plan funded only by [appellant’s] employer and [appellant’s] pre-tax contribution before

[appellee] is required to pay any amount, without finding good cause or that the circumstances

warranted a deviation,” contrary to Code § 20-108.2(D). We affirm the trial court’s ruling

because the record is incomplete, and thus, insufficient for appellate review.

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. BACKGROUND

On September 22, 2014, the parties were divorced. Less than two years later, on

February 24, 2016, appellant filed a motion to modify child support. The trial court held a

hearing on the motion from August 1 to August 2, 2016. At the hearing, the parties stipulated

that appellant’s income was $115,000.

At the hearing, appellee testified that appellant pays $40 per month through his current

employer for health insurance for the children. She also indicated that appellant had a health

savings account (HSA), which was partially funded by his employer in the amount of $1,000 per

year.

Appellant testified that with his new employer, he has a high deductible plan, meaning

that the health insurance does not actuate until the deductible is met. Prior to meeting the

deductible, appellant has to pay all out-of-pocket expenses. After the deductible is met, all

medical expenses are covered through the insurance plan. The deductible for appellant’s plan, at

the time of the hearing, was $4,000 for “in network” medical expenses and $8,000 for

“out-of-network” medical expenses. Appellant testified that his employer pays $1,000 toward

the deductible. However, appellant noted that the $1,000 payout is paid incrementally, with a

small amount paid during each pay period.

On cross-examination, appellant stated that his employer gives him a $1,000 payout

because he enrolled for coverage for both himself and his children, whereas if the plan only

covered him the payout would be cut to half or $500. Appellant also stated that he personally

contributes $150 per paycheck to the HSA. The money that appellant contributes to the HSA

comes from pre-tax dollars, and he also receives a tax benefit for having the HSA.

During cross-examination, appellant’s counsel objected to opposing counsel testifying, and

argued that appellant makes personal contributions every paycheck to the HSA account, and thus,

- 2 - he should receive a credit for these contributions. Additionally, at the conclusion of the hearing

appellant argued that he

receive a credit . . . for the monies that he puts in to the . . . children’s . . . fund, [appellee’s] explanation of it just doesn’t seem . . . right. It’s, it’s a fund that he puts the money in every month. His employer puts the money in every month. If the medical bills are . . . high in a particular year, there’s no money left. If they’re not, the money doesn’t accrue and build, but there’s no way of knowing that. . . . And [appellee] benefits from it. When he puts money into an, into that account and it gets covered based upon that money, she benefits. So they somehow . . . misrepresented in some way that . . . he’s shifting the money to himself that he’s going to benefit only. She will benefit from the fact that he puts his money in there. The children benefit.

On August 19, 2016, the trial court issued a letter opinion finding that a material change

in circumstances warranted a modification of child support. In regard to health insurance costs,

the trial court issued the following decision:

Under Code § 20-108 (D), the parties must pay in proportion to their gross incomes, as used for calculating the monthly support obligation, any reasonable and necessary unreimbursed medical or dental expenses. [Appellant]’s health care plan includes pre-tax contributions. The Court is willing to credit [appellant] for those contributions as the equivalent of premium payments, but [appellant] cannot claim these payments from his pre-tax contributions as “unreimbursed” payments. That is, [appellant] cannot present a bill as “not reimbursed” unless and until he has fully funded the insurance for the year (or pays medicals up to the level of the annual funding).

It is incumbent upon [appellant] to maintain complete records as to his medical contributions and payment of medical bills. When appropriate, [appellant] must present [appellee] with a demand for contribution, along with an itemized explanation as to why her obligations have kicked in, within a reasonable time, but not exceeding 90 days from the date of the last bill for which [appellant] seeks reimbursement.

Following the trial court’s ruling, on September 2, 2016, appellant filed objections to the

proposed order modifying child support. Therein, appellant argued that the proposed order

erroneously failed to provide that the parties pay for any reasonable and necessary unreimbursed - 3 - medical or dental expenses for the children in proportion to their respective gross incomes.

However, on September 6, 2016, the trial court entered an order modifying child support,

ordering appellant to continue to maintain health insurance for the minor children, with the

following conditions:

[Appellant]’s employer provided healthcare plan also includes a pre-tax contribution, Health Savings Account (“HSA”) plan that is presently funded by [appellant]’s employer and by [appellant]. Provided that [appellant] continues to participate in pre-tax contributions, the children’s medical bills are covered by those pre-tax contributions and beyond the contributions, once exhausted, insurance will cover.

[Appellant] shall not then claim the payments from his pre-tax contributions as “unreimbursed” payments. For example, [appellant] shall not present a bill as “non-reimbursed” unless and until he has fully funded the insurance for the year (or pays medicals up to the level of the annual funding). It is incumbent upon the [appellant] to maintain complete records as to his medical contributions and payment of medical bills.

When appropriate, the [appellant] shall present the [appellee] with a demand for contribution, along with an itemized explanation as to why her obligations have kicked in, within a reasonable time, but not exceeding 90 days from the date of the last bill for which the [appellant] seeks reimbursement.

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