Christopher Harris v. Lesko

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-2604
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2604 __________

CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, Appellant

v.

OFFICER LESKO, Badge No. 3374, individually and as a police officer for the; OFFICER DOHAN, Badge No. 4690, individually and as a police officer for the; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-01475) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 9, 2025 Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 14, 2025) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Christopher Harris appeals from the District Court’s orders

denying his motions to vacate the dismissal of his case and denying reconsideration

thereof. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.

I

Harris commenced his civil action against two police officers and the City of

Philadelphia in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in 2016. In 2018, Harris added

several federal law claims and Appellees removed the case to the District Court. The

District Court dismissed Harris’s suit pursuant to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 41.1(b) 1 because a status conference had established, on

the record, that the parties had settled. Harris filed several unsuccessful motions with the

District Court, arguing it had improperly dismissed his case under Rule 41.1(b) because

he had refused to sign the agreement and therefore the parties had not settled. Harris then

appealed to this Court. We dismissed Harris’s appeal in part because the notice of appeal

was untimely as to the underlying orders of dismissal. See Harris v. Lesko, 763 F. App’x

291, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (non-precedential). However, we affirmed the

District Court order over which we had jurisdiction, a denial of reopening or

reconsideration, because Harris had argued the underlying merits of his claim instead of

“present[ing] any new evidence, facts, or issues that would tend to show that the

settlement agreement was fraudulent, or that the District Court made some sort of mistake

in its judgment.” Id. at 293.

1 Rule 41.1(b) requires dismissal of a case with prejudice when the parties settle the matter. 2 In January 2024, back in the District Court, Harris filed a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(3) motion to vacate the District Court's 2018 judgment on the grounds of

fraud. Harris then filed a second motion to vacate for fraud on the court pursuant to Rule

60(d)(3). The District Court denied Harris’s motions in February 2024 after treating both

as Rule 60(b) motions and finding them untimely under Rule 60(c)(1). Harris then filed

three successive Rule 60(d)(3) motions asking the District Court to vacate the order of

dismissal for fraud on the court. The District Court denied Harris’s motions on April 2,

2024. Harris filed a motion for reconsideration on April 17, 2024, which the District

Court denied on August 13, 2024. Harris timely appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but we stress the narrow scope of

this appeal. Harris’s notice of appeal is timely only as to the District Court’s April 2,

2024 order denying his Rule 60(d)(3) motions to vacate for fraud on the court and its

subsequent order denying reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv) (stating that a

timely filed Rule 59 motion tolls the time to file an appeal); York Grp., Inc. v. Wuxi

Taihu Tractor Co., 632 F.3d 399, 401-02 (7th Cir. 2011). The notice of appeal is not

timely as to any other prior order issued by the District Court, and we therefore lack

jurisdiction to review those orders. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007).

We exercise plenary review of any legal questions, and we review the District Court’s

decision to deny the motions for abuse of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel.

Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999); see generally In re

3 Bressman, 874 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2017); Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d

Cir. 2011).

After a review of the record, we conclude the District Court did not err when

denying Harris’s Rule 60(d)(3) motions for relief and his motion for reconsideration. A

district court “may set aside a judgment based upon its finding of fraud on the court when

an officer of the court has engaged in ‘egregious misconduct,’” such as bribery or

fabrication of evidence. In re Bressman, 874 F.3d at 150 (quoting Herring v. United

States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005)). Such a finding “must be supported by clear,

unequivocal and convincing evidence” of “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of

the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court.”

Herring, 424 F.3d at 386-87 (citation omitted).

In this case, Harris asked the District Court to vacate the 2018 order of dismissal

and recuse from hearing the case. Harris contended that the District Court itself had

committed fraud and “harmed the integrity of the judicial process” when it dismissed his

complaint based on Rule 41.1(b) since Harris had thereafter refused to sign the written

terms of the settlement and had provided “clear evidence” of his refusal to the District

Court. Harris further contended that because the District Court had not held an

evidentiary hearing regarding whether he had signed the settlement agreement, the “fraud

upon the court was directed at the ‘record’ itself.” (ECF 38 at 5.) On appeal Harris raises

similar arguments.

The record reflects that the District Court dismissed the case because the parties,

during a status conference the day prior to the dismissal, had agreed on the record to

4 settle the matter. (ECF 7, 8.) Although Harris later refused to sign the written terms, he

has not shown the type of “egregious misconduct” or “intentional fraud” that would

justify setting aside the judgment at this late stage. See Herring, 424 F.3d at 390; In re

Bressman, 874 F.3d at 152-53. The District Court therefore did not err in denying

Harris’s motions to vacate for fraud on the court and his subsequent motion for

reconsideration. 2

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.

2 We further discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision not to recuse. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (providing that adverse legal rulings are not proof of prejudice or bias and almost never a basis for recusal); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 5