Christopher George Page v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: 13-24-00094-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00094-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CHRISTOPHER GEORGE PAGE, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

A Bell County jury convicted appellant Christopher George Page of aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon causing serious bodily injury to a person with whom he had

a dating relationship, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(1)(A).

Page pleaded true to enhancement paragraphs alleging that was a habitual felony

offender, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-six years’ imprisonment. See id. § 12.42(d) (mandating a minimum prison term of twenty-five years upon a felony

conviction where the defendant was twice previously convicted of felonies). On appeal,

Page argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm as

modified.1

I. BACKGROUND

Killeen resident Marisol Solis-Audelo testified that, on the evening of December

20, 2020, a young male neighbor came to her door asking for help. The boy “looked very

scared” and said “[m]y mom is hurt” and “[m]y dad hurt her.” Solis-Audelo called 911 and

then went to the boy’s house, where she saw his mother, Lashawn Fletcher, lying on the

floor bleeding and badly injured. Solis-Audelo said that Fletcher “could hardly move” and

“kept talking about [how] she was hurting.”

Officer John Castro of the Killeen Police Department (KPD) arrived at the scene.

He said there was blood “[a]ll over the place,” including on the “ceiling, the walls, the floor,

[and] her body.” He noticed that Fletcher had bruises all over her body and “some

lacerations” but could not tell exactly where the blood was coming from. Castro then

testified:

I saw what looked like a big piece of stick or rod, broken into multiple pieces all over the bedroom—the bedroom itself, on the floor. And she had shards of that wood[—]pieces all over her, around her body, stuck to the shirt, and around her where she was laying. . . . I believed someone had struck her multiple times with that piece of rod, as it was—the—her marks on her body were kind of consistent with getting hit by a stick like that.

Video footage obtained from Castro’s bodycam was entered into evidence and played for

the jury.

1 This appeal was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to an order issued

by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are required to follow the precedent of the transferor court to the extent it differs from our own. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 While Castro was trying to get information from Fletcher, a young girl who was

inside the house told him that “[m]y dad did this” and that “[h]e hit me[,] my brother[,] and

my mom.” The girl identified her father as Page, and police began searching for him. The

girl “complained of being hit and in pain on her rib cage,” and Castro observed a

“cylindrical injury” on her rib cage similar to the injuries suffered by Fletcher. Castro also

spoke to the young boy who sought his neighbor for help. Castro observed a “lump” on

the boy’s forehead and a “cylindrical” injury on his leg.

Fletcher and both children were taken to Baylor Scott & White Clinic for

examination and treatment. When nurse Selena McCormick asked Fletcher’s daughter

why she had been brought to the hospital, the child answered: “My Daddy beat my

Mommy to death. He beat us to death too.” According to McCormick, the girl reported:

He couldn’t find his glasses. He started thinking my Mom was having men over, like taking his glasses. He pushed my Mom to the ground and grabbed the stick and started hitting her. . . . Have us look for his glasses or we’ll get hit with the stick. He said he was going to kill everyone in the house.

She told McCormick that Page hit her on her arms, legs, and sides with “[a] wooden circle

stick that we have in our closet.” She said her half-brother “was trying to get the stick from

him and [Page] beat him up” as well.

Another nurse, Camille Miles, testified that she examined Fletcher’s son, who

reported to her that Page, his “step-dad,” “hit [him] with a stick” because “[h]e was looking

for some . . . expensive glasses” but “[c]ouldn’t find them.” The child also reported to Miles

that Page hit his mother and sister with the stick.

A third nurse, Misty Bennett, examined Fletcher. She stated that Fletcher had

“pattern injuries” all over her body, meaning “there is a consistency all throughout the

patient’s body where you can tell that how the injury occurred was likely from the same

3 object.” The injuries exhibited “central sparing,” which means “that the middle of the bruise

or the injury, you don’t really see the specific injury, but you see it on the outside” and is

typically made by “cylindrical objects.” Overall, Fletcher had “too many [injuries] to count.”

Bennett opined within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Fletcher had been

struck with a blunt object and that the injuries placed her at a substantial risk of serious

injury or death.

When Bennett asked for the name of Fletcher’s assailant, Fletcher replied, “Chris

Page.” However, Fletcher could not describe how she received the injuries. Instead, she

told Bennett:

I don’t even remember how I got on the floor. I don’t remember falling. I just remember waking up and I hurt. I hurt so bad. . . . I just remember talking to him . . . I think it was about glasses. Then I woke up on the floor and then I woke up here. . . . [L]ook at me. He had to be so mad.

Fletcher agreed with Bennett that “she has had [a] history of abuse by” Page; she also

told Bennett that she previously experienced abuse at the hands of “another person.”

KPD investigator Ramiro Martinez testified that he obtained a warrant for Page’s

arrest for the assaults of Fletcher and the two children, and Page was arrested in

Knoxville, Tennessee on January 12, 2021. Martinez agreed on cross-examination that,

though he found “at least two” cell phones in Fletcher’s house during his investigation, he

did not collect or analyze them for evidence; moreover, no DNA or fingerprint evidence

was recovered from the scene. He agreed that, when he went to interview Fletcher

“several days” after the assault, she “didn’t remember anything.” He did not interview

Page or the children.

At trial, Fletcher testified that she had been in a dating relationship with Page for

twelve years until they split up in 2019. They have one daughter together, while Fletcher’s

4 son was born of a previous relationship. Fletcher testified she remembers nothing about

what happened on December 20, 2020, except waking up in the hospital. She denied

telling a nurse that there was a dispute “about glasses” or that Page was her assailant.

Fletcher’s and Page’s daughter, twelve years old at the time of trial, testified on

behalf of the defense. When asked what happened on December 20, 2020, she testified

“I don’t remember.” She later acknowledged remembering that her mother was injured

and taken by ambulance to the hospital that day. The child did not recall her father being

at their house that day, she did not recall being struck by an object, and she did not recall

seeing her mother or brother being hit by anything.

Page testified that, on December 20, 2020, he was in the process of driving to

Knoxville “to expand [his] business”2 and was “nowhere near Texas.” When asked why

his daughter would report to police and nurses that he assaulted Fletcher, Page said “I

believe my daughter was more upset at me for not being there. And she just maybe said

it or maybe she was coerced.” When asked why Fletcher’s son would report the same

thing, Page said “his mental capacity is not all the way there” and “I believe his sister

helped him up and to the point where he was shaking his head yes and no.”

Page was convicted as charged3 and this appeal followed.

II. EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, a criminal conviction must be

2 Page testified that he operated a restaurant and a janitorial service.

3 In separate cause numbers tried together with the instant charge, Page was also convicted of

causing injury to the two children. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04. Those convictions are not at issue in this appeal.

5 supported by sufficient evidence. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 340 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2024). “Evidence supporting a conviction is legally sufficient if a rational trier of fact

could have found that the defendant committed each element of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In a

sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and

consider all of the admitted evidence. Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2020). We consider both direct and circumstantial evidence as well as all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence and are not mere

speculation. See id.; Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Clayton

v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “The jury is the sole judge of

credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses”; therefore, “[w]hen

the jury could reasonably draw conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved

the conflicts in favor of the verdict.” Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577; see TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 38.04.

Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A

hypothetically correct charge in this case would instruct the jury to return a guilty verdict

if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Page intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

caused serious bodily injury to Fletcher; (2) he used a deadly weapon during the

commission of the assault; and (3) Fletcher is a person whose relationship to or

association with Page is described by Texas Family Code §§ 71.0021(b), 71.003, or

71.005. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(1)(A). “Serious bodily injury” means “bodily

6 injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent

disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or

organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46).

B. Discussion

Page does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to show that a deadly

weapon was used during the commission of the assault, that Fletcher suffered serious

bodily injury, or that he and Fletcher were in a dating relationship as defined in the family

code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021 (providing that “dating relationship” means “a

relationship between individuals who have or have had a continuing relationship of a

romantic or intimate nature”). Nor does he dispute that, according to the evidence,

whoever assaulted Fletcher did so with the requisite mental state. See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 6.03(a)–(c) (defining intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly). Instead, Page

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the identity element of the offense.

He argues that “there is at best only a modicum of probative evidence that [he] was the

perpetrator who beat Fletcher.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320 (“Any evidence that is

relevant . . . could be deemed a ‘mere modicum.’ But it could not seriously be argued that

such a ‘modicum’ of evidence could by itself rationally support a conviction beyond a

reasonable doubt.”).

We disagree. The evidence included testimony by Solis-Audelo and Miles that

Fletcher’s son reported that Page assaulted Fletcher. It also included testimony by Castro

and McCormick that Fletcher’s daughter reported the same thing. Though this testimony

was hearsay—i.e., out-of-court statements offered into evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted, see TEX. R. EVID. 801(d)—Page does not argue that it was inadmissible.

7 See TEX. R. EVID. 803, 804 (setting forth various exclusions and exceptions to the rule

against hearsay). Even if it was inadmissible, we must consider it in our sufficiency

analysis because no objection was made to it at trial. See TEX. R. EVID. 802 (“Inadmissible

hearsay admitted without objection may not be denied probative value merely because it

is hearsay.”); Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577. Further, although Fletcher and her daughter

recanted their statements at trial,4 the jury was free to disbelieve their trial testimony and

to instead believe the other witnesses’ testimony regarding what they said immediately

after the assault. See Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

(noting that “[t]he jury observed the complainant’s demeanor and was entitled . . . to

disbelieve her recantation” of earlier videotaped testimony); Saldana v. State, 287 S.W.3d

43, 60 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, pet. ref’d) (“A fact finder is fully entitled

to disbelieve a witness’s recantation.”). Similarly, the jury was free to disbelieve Page’s

uncorroborated alibi. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04. Martinez’s testimony

that Page was apprehended in Tennessee around three weeks after the assault is also

circumstantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. See Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895,

905 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that flight evinces a consciousness of guilt).

On appeal, Page principally complains about the credibility of Fletcher’s report to

Bennett identifying him as the assailant.5 He argues that “[t]he statements initially

attributed to Fletcher about her assailant’s identity were made in the hospital while she

was still in substantial pain, under heavy medication, and fighting to recover from the

injuries she had sustained.” He also contends that Fletcher’s responses to Bennett

4 Page claims that Fletcher’s son also “later denied that [he] intended to implicate [Page].” He does

not point to anything in the record supporting this assertion, and we find nothing. 5 Page did not object to the admission of either Bennett’s testimony or her written report, both of

which relayed Fletcher’s identification of Page as the assailant.

8 “indicate the probability that Fletcher was still confused about the nature of the questions

themselves,” noting that “when Bennett asked Fletcher if there was [a] history of abuse

with Page, Fletcher answered affirmatively.” Page additionally states: “Notably, Bennett

also testified Fletcher said she had a history of abuse with another person but noted

Fletcher ‘didn’t want to talk about that.’”

Page does not explain how Fletcher’s responses to Bennett indicated she was

confused, nor does he explain why Fletcher’s report to Bennett of prior abuse by another

person is “notabl[e].” In any event, even excluding Fletcher’s statement to Bennett during

her examination, sufficient evidence supporting the identity element of the offense came

via the hearsay testimony of Solis-Audelo, Castro, Miles, and McCormick. As to this

testimony, Page emphasizes that Martinez did not interview the children or Page, and

that Page’s identity as the perpetrator was not corroborated by any forensic evidence.

That may be true, but that does not diminish the probative value of the testimony set forth

above, which the jury was entitled to believe. See Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461 (holding

that “the complainant’s recantation of her videotaped testimony did not destroy its

probative value”).

We conclude that the evidence supporting the verdict was more than a mere

“modicum,” and that a rational juror could have concluded therefrom beyond a reasonable

doubt that Page was the individual who assaulted Fletcher on December 20, 2020. See

Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 340. Page’s issue on appeal is overruled.

III. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT

The trial court’s written judgment states that Page was convicted of second-degree

felony aggravated assault under Texas Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2). See TEX. PENAL CODE

9 ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b). In fact, consistent with the indictment and jury verdict, the trial

court orally pronounced that Page was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon causing serious bodily injury to a person with whom he had or previously had a

dating relationship, a first-degree felony under penal code § 22.02(b)(1)(A). See id.

§ 22.02(b)(1)(A); see also Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

(“When the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment vary, the oral

pronouncement controls.”).

We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we are presented

with the necessary information to do so. See Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993). Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect that Page was convicted

of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon causing serious bodily injury to a person with

whom he had or previously had a dating relationship, a first-degree felony. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(1)(A).

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).

YSMAEL D. FONSECA Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 20th day of March, 2025.