Christopher Frenci v. Rush Auto Corporation, LLC

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 15 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTOPHER FRENCI, No. 22-16628

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00414-MTL

v. MEMORANDUM* RUSH AUTO CORPORATION, LLC, DBA Pick-A-Part, DBA Rush Auto Recyclers Incorporated, DBA We Buy Scrap, named as Rush Auto Corporation LLC; JANET RUSH, in her official and individual capacities; DANIEL THORPE, in his official and individual capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 12, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Christopher Frenci appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissing his federal and state law employment action. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) on the basis of claim preclusion. Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d

1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Frenci’s action because Frenci’s claims

were raised or could have been raised in a previous action between the parties that

resulted in a final adjudication on the merits. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,

1166 (9th Cir. 2003) (federal court must follow state’s preclusion rules to

determine effect of a state court judgment); Peterson v. Newton, 307 P.3d 1020,

1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing requirements for claim preclusion under

Arizona law); see also Phillips v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 601 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz.

1979) (explaining that any dismissal, other than for lack of jurisdiction, improper

venue, or failure to join a party, is an adjudication on the merits, unless the court

specifies otherwise).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Frenci’s motion for

reconsideration because Frenci failed to establish a basis for such relief. See

D. Ariz. R. 7.2(g)(1) (setting forth grounds for reconsideration); Bias v. Moynihan,

508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the standard of review for

compliance with local rules, and noting that “[b]road deference is given to a

2 22-16628 district court’s interpretation of its local rules”).

AFFIRMED.

3 22-16628