Christopher Fielding v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 18, 2026
DocketSF-0752-24-0578-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Christopher Fielding v. Department of the Navy (Christopher Fielding v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christopher Fielding v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CHRISTOPHER FIELDING, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-24-0578-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: February 18, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Chalmers Johnson , Esquire, Port Orchard, Washington, for the appellant.

Joshua J. Roever and Audrey Mense , Esquire, Bremerton, Washington, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed his indefinite suspension based on his failure to maintain a condition of employment following the suspension of his access to classified information. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). On review, the appellant asserts, as he did before the administrative judge, that the indefinite suspension does not have a valid condition subsequent that would end the suspension because there is no evidence of a pending security clearance investigation. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-8; see Jones v. Department of the Navy, 48 M.S.P.R. 680, 686 (1991) (requiring, for an indefinite suspension taken because of a failure to maintain a security clearance, that the agency prove that a bona fide security clearance investigation was taking place), aff’d as modified on recons., 51 M.S.P.R. 607 (1991), aff’d, 978 F.2d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Before the administrative judge, the agency filed an affidavit from a Personnel Security Specialist, wherein she declared that she submitted information about the appellant’s security incident to the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA), that she received a notification from DCSA that information was forwarded to an adjudicator, and that “adjudication is in progress.” Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11 at 30. The agency did not explain the relevant policies and procedures governing DCSA’s adjudication of information about a security incident. However, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5510.30C, Enclosure 10, ¶ 6(e)-(f) (Jan. 24, 2020), which is 3

publicly available, 2 explains that the local suspension of an employee’s access to classified information—as was the case here—“will automatically result in the [ ] suspension of the individual’s security clearance eligibility,” and “[o]nce the DoD CAF [Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudication Facility] removes/suspends eligibility, the individual may not be granted access unless the DoD CAF reestablishes eligibility.” The DoD CAF is now known as the DCSA Adjudication and Vetting Service. 3 Considering the agency’s evidence, in the form of a sworn declaration, in conjunction with the aforementioned policies, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved that there is a pending security clearance investigation. ID at 6-7; see Jones, 48 M.S.P.R. at 686 (accepting, as evidence to establish that a security clearance investigation was ongoing, sworn affidavits from the agency). On review, the appellant has also reraised his assertions that the agency violated his due process rights and the regulations at 32 C.F.R. § 154.56. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-12. For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we find that these assertions are unpersuasive. ID at 7-10. On September 8, 2025, approximately 9 months after filing his petition for review, the appellant filed an additional pleading entitled “Supplement to PFR.” PFR File, Tab 4 at 1. In his pleading, he asserted that he had obtained new evidence from a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that he submitted in June 2025. Id. at 4. The pleading was docketed as a reply to the agency’s response to the petition for review. The agency subsequently filed a motion for leave to respond to the appellant’s supplemental evidence or to strike the

2 This policy is available at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/05000%20 General%20Management%20Security%20and%20Safety%20Services/05-500%20 Security%20Services/5510.30C.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2026). The Board may take official notice of matters that can be verified, such as this. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.64. 3 See D EFENSE C OUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND S ECURITY A GENCY , What is Adjudication And Vetting Services (AVS)?, available at https://www.dcsa.mil/ Personnel-Vetting/Trust-Decision-Adjudications/About-Adjudication-and-Vetting- Services-AVS/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2026). 4

pleading. PFR File, Tab 7. On December 2, 2025, the Clerk of the Board issued an order notifying the appellant that, to the extent he was attempting to file a motion to submit new evidence, he must file a motion demonstrating that the evidence is new and material, as defined in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(1), (d), and that it was not readily available before the record closed, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a) (4). PFR File, Tab 9 at 3. The order also explained that, to the extent the appellant was attempting to reply to the agency’s response to his petition for review, his reply was untimely and he must file a motion establishing good cause for the late filing, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). Id. at 2. The appellant did not respond. We find that the appellant’s pleading, filed more than 8 months after the agency’s response to the petition for review, is untimely as a reply. 5 C.F.R. § 1201

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Christopher Fielding v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christopher-fielding-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2026.