In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo ________________________
No. 07-13-00297-CR ________________________
CHRISTOPHER EARL DARCY, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 69th District Court Moore County, Texas Trial Court No. 4750; Honorable Ron Enns, Presiding
June 25, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
“[W]hat use is a defendant’s right to effective counsel at every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in the absence of counsel . . . ?” Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326, 79 S. Ct. 1202, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1265 (1959) (William O. Douglas, concurring)
In this appeal, we are confronted with, among other issues, whether an
accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when an agent of the District
Attorney’s office covertly contacted Appellant, Christopher Earl Darcy, after judicial proceedings had been initiated and while Appellant was represented by counsel.
Finding his right to counsel was violated, we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Richard and Brenda Kiewiet were in the process of remodeling a house.1 Just
prior to leaving town for four or five days, Brenda drove by the house and noticed a
vehicle parked in the carport. Realizing there was a woman in the car, she approached
the vehicle. The woman in the vehicle identified herself as Rebecca Morris and inquired
whether the house was for sale or rent. Brenda obtained Rebecca’s phone number
and, after explaining that she would be out of town for a few days, told her she would
contact her at a later date.
When Richard and Brenda returned from being out of town, Richard went to the
house to continue his remodeling project. When he could not locate his drill, he realized
his tool box and tools were missing. He observed a broken storm window at the back of
the house and wheel tracks from his missing tool box leading to the back gate.
Nine or ten days later, Brenda was driving around when she observed Rebecca’s
vehicle parked at a house on a different street. Also parked at the house was a green
pickup with a tool box in the back. Because the tool box resembled Richard’s missing
tool box, she reported her observation to Richard, who then called the police.
Sergeant Kerry Hayes of the Dumas Police Department was dispatched to the
scene on a stolen property call. When he arrived, Sergeant Hayes observed Appellant
1 Although the house was not their personal residence, it was a structure “adapted for overnight accommodation of persons,” and was, therefore, a “habitation” for purposes of the offense at issue. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.01 (1) (West 2011). 2 exit the house while carrying a large Rubbermaid bin containing items he was moving
into the green pickup. Sergeant Hayes advised Appellant he was there on a call
concerning the possibility of stolen property having been seen in the pickup. Appellant
informed the officer that the pickup belonged to his nephew, Wesley, and he had merely
borrowed it to move. Appellant consented to a search of the pickup and then asked if
he could return to the house to continue moving items. Appellant then confronted
Rebecca in her garage and accused her of calling the police. When she denied having
done so, he left and did not return to the pickup. When Sergeant Hayes realized that
Appellant was not returning, he asked about his whereabouts and was told Appellant
had left through the back of the house.
Because Sergeant Hayes did not have any backup to pursue Appellant, he
proceeded to search the pickup. There he found a tool box, tools, a red Marlboro duffle
type bag containing Appellant’s name and various other items of personal property,
including a bong.2 Richard later identified the tool box and some of the tools as his.
Appellant was eventually arrested and charged with burglary of a habitation.3 A jury trial
commenced on June 17, 2013, and Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
During trial, Rebecca testified she knew Appellant through his brother, Pat, who
was a former classmate of hers. Rebecca explained that Pat, Pat’s son Wesley, and
Appellant would occasionally stay at her home. She testified she was looking at houses
for her guests to move into because her home could not accommodate both her family
and Appellant’s family. She also testified she told Appellant about the Kiewiets’ house
2 Photos were taken at the scene, but no fingerprints were taken. 3 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (a)(3) (West 2011). As charged, an offense under this section is a second degree felony. See id. at § 30.02 (c)(2).
3 being available. According to Rebecca’s testimony, Appellant explained to her he had
been by the house and that the owners were “stupid” for leaving the house open.
The jury convicted Appellant of burglary of a habitation and sentenced him to
twelve years confinement and a fine of $10,000. After sentence was pronounced, the
trial court entered an order requiring Appellant to pay restitution of $2,237.94. Appellant
advances five points of error challenging his conviction and the resultant order of
restitution. By his first three issues, he questions the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction. By his fourth issue, he maintains his due process right to a fair
trial was violated by the State creating “evidence” intended to “open the door” to the
introduction of extraneous offenses. His fifth and final issue alleges a violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a result of the District Attorney’s office contacting
him while awaiting trial, without the benefit of having his counsel present.
ISSUES FOUR & FIVE—RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In addressing Appellant’s issues, we do so in a logical rather than sequential
order. Issue four, by which Appellant asserts his due process right to a fair trial was
violated by the State creating “evidence” intended to “open the door” to extraneous
offenses is inextricably tied to his fifth issue, by which he contends his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated when an agent of the District Attorney’s office
surreptitiously contacted him during adversarial proceedings without the benefit of his
counsel being present. Agreeing Appellant’s rights were violated, we sustain issues
four and five.
During Rebecca’s testimony, the defense questioned her concerning prior
convictions for theft and possession, implying she had concocted a plan to burglarize 4 the Kiewiets’ house because she knew they would be out of town. After several
exchanges, during recross-examination, defense counsel approached her and asked
her to identify the handwriting on a note which was read to the jury. In its entirety, the
note provided as follows:
Chris, I know you are going to court Monday. And I have been asked to be a witness. I have talked to Pat & told him I have not given them a statement. Is there anything I can do to help you[?] Please get a note back to me as soon as possible. Rebecca.
The prosecutor stated “No objection,” to which the court responded, “I don’t think it was
offered . . . .” Defense counsel expressed his intent not to offer the note into evidence.
The prosecutor then insisted on offering it because Rebecca had read it in the jury’s
presence. The note was marked and admitted as State’s Exhibit 17.
Rebecca confirmed the note was in her handwriting. She further stated Terry
Vogel, an investigator for the Moore County District Attorney’s office, had asked her to
write it and send it to Appellant. According to instructions from Vogel, she gave the note
to the jail cook to deliver to Appellant. Rebecca also testified that Pat informed her
Appellant received the note, but the record is unclear concerning whether Appellant
actually replied using Pat as a courier. Defense counsel then questioned Rebecca
concerning her attempt to solicit a response from Appellant, and she answered
affirmatively when asked whether the State assisted in the “ruse.”
During his testimony, Vogel explained that he asked Rebecca to write the note to
Appellant as part of a separate investigation concerning illicit activities being conducted
at the Moore County Jail facility, including an illegal smuggling network. Vogel testified
5 that his review of jail phone calls verified that Rebecca’s note was delivered to
Appellant.
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
One of the primary purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to
preserve the integrity of the attorney-client relationship once it has been established.
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1988). The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is triggered “at or after the time that judicial proceedings
have been initiated” against an accused “whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
398, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977). Once the adversarial judicial process has
been initiated, the right to counsel guarantees an accused the right to have counsel
present at all “critical” stages of the criminal proceeding. United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 227-28, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). The period from
arraignment to trial is “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . during
which the accused requires the guiding hand of counsel . . . .” Id. at 226. Interrogation
by police, after charges have been brought, is such a critical stage. Brewer, 430 U.S. at
401.
Concerning Vogel’s claim that the note was part of an investigation involving a
separate offense, we note the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific.
Rubalcado v. State, 424 S.W.3d 560, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In determining what
constitutes an “offense” for Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel purposes, and
consequently, whether a separate offense is involved, the Supreme Court has resorted
to double jeopardy law. Id. Offenses are considered separate if they would be
6 considered separate under the Blockburger same-elements test. Id. at 571 (citing
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932)).
ANALYSIS
Here, Appellant’s right to counsel for burglary of a habitation had attached prior
to the time Vogel asked Rebecca to contact Appellant. Rebecca was a key witness for
the State in Appellant’s case. Vogel, as an investigator for the Moore County District
Attorney’s office, was an agent of the State.4 Rebecca likewise acted as an agent of the
State under Vogel’s direction to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from
Appellant. See Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 576 (concluding that sexual assault victim
was a government agent where she was recruited by law enforcement to record
conversations intended to deliberately elicit incriminating responses from her assailant).
In its defense of Vogel’s conduct, the State maintains Rebecca was asked to
create the note as part of an on-going investigation into a separate offense (smuggling
contraband into a correctional facility) that did not pertain to the pending offense for
which the State acknowledges that Appellant’s right to counsel had already attached.
While we agree the two offenses are separate offenses for purposes of Appellant’s right
to counsel, we disagree with the State’s position that the contact in question did not
pertain to the offense at issue in this proceeding.
The note specifically referred to Appellant’s upcoming appearance in court on the
burglary of a habitation offense that is the subject of this appeal. Rebecca indicated she
4 The State is responsible, in Sixth Amendment context, for the knowledge of all of its actors . . . . Rubalcado v. State, 424 S.W.3d 560, 574-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 634, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 797, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 173 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2009)). 7 was going to be a witness in that case and that she had not given authorities a
statement. She also asked Appellant what she could do to help him in that particular
case. The words written by Rebecca at Vogel’s request are specifically tied to the
pending burglary of a habitation charge and are not solely related to a separate offense
for which the right to counsel had not attached. Furthermore, nothing in the note
supports the State’s contention that it was created solely to investigate a jail smuggling
operation. Accordingly, we find the District Attorney’s office knowingly circumvented
Appellant’s right to counsel in this case by using a government agent to elicit
incriminating information. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S. Ct. 477, 88 L.
Ed. 2d 481 (1985); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 246 (1964).
The note also had the effect of eliciting evidence of an extraneous offense during
the State’s case-in-chief in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. The
statements of defense counsel and the prosecutor made during the admission of the
note occurred in the presence of the jury. As such, the jury heard evidence that
Appellant might possibly be involved in a jail smuggling operation. Under these
circumstances, we conclude Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated
when a State agent directed Rebecca to contact Appellant while he was represented by
counsel, but without his counsel being present. See Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 578.
HARM ANALYSIS
Misconduct leading to a total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial is a
structural error that defies harmless error review. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
309, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991). “The right to counsel is too
8 fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 230
n.34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.
Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942)). See Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 578 (harmless error
analysis not conducted after finding a violation of appellant’s right to counsel occurred
when the State used the complainant to communicate with the accused in an attempt to
elicit incriminating statements). When, however, the misconduct leading to error does
not amount to a complete denial of counsel, some standard of prejudice or materiality is
required to establish a constitutional violation leading to the reversal of a conviction.
See Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 229-30. In these situations, appellate courts are guided by
the principle that such a violation will lead to a reversal unless an appellate court
determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not lead to the conviction or
punishment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Because the violation in this case did not lead to
a total deprivation of Appellant’s right to counsel, it is subject to a harm analysis.
In that regard, Rebecca’s note was introduced into evidence at the request of the
State. The jury was present and heard the discussions between defense counsel and
the prosecutor concerning the origin of the note and its unexplained possession by
defense counsel. The note was emphasized by the prosecution during the State’s
case-in-chief. Because the State’s theory behind the note was that it was part of an
investigation into jail smuggling operations, the jury was left with the impression that
Appellant’s character was that of a criminal. The note made an impression on the jury
significant enough that, during deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking
9 “[w]hat was the response given by Pat to Rebecca from [Appellant].”5 The jury’s interest
in the note and the State’s explanation for the note informed the jury that Appellant was
in jail and was under suspicion of illegal activities while in jail. Without the constitutional
protection of his right to counsel, Appellant was subjected to incriminating himself.
Furthermore, a violation of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel under
the guise of the State’s investigation of a separate offense “invites abuse by law
enforcement personnel . . . and risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right
recognized in Massiah.” Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 569. Given the totality of the
circumstances surrounding this case, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that
the violation of Appellant’s right to counsel just days before his trial did not contribute to
his conviction. Accordingly, we conclude the State’s violation of Appellant’s right to
counsel amounted to reversible error. Issues four and five are sustained.
ISSUES ONE, TWO & THREE—LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
Although we find issues four and five dispositive of this appeal, we nevertheless
consider Appellant’s sufficiency claims because, if successful, such claims would result
in greater relief through a judgment of acquittal. Green v. State 434 S.W.3d 734, 739
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. granted Sept. 17, 2014). While trial error alone
would not bar the State from retrying the case, a finding of legal insufficiency on appeal
would interpose a jeopardy bar to retrial. Benavidez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 179, 182
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
5 The judge replied, “[t]he Court cannot answer your . . . question. Please continue your deliberations.” 10 By his first three points, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction. Specifically, he maintains the finding of guilt is based on
circumstantial evidence impermissibly based on inference upon inference and the victim
did not identify any property recovered as stolen from his residence. We disagree.
SUFFICIENCY STANDARD OF REVIEW
The only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 33 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under that standard, in assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a criminal conviction, this court considers all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and determines whether, based on that evidence and
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912. We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence
by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik
v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In our review, we must evaluate
all of the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or
inadmissible. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1131, 120 S. Ct. 2008, 146 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2000).
The State was required to show that Appellant, with intent to commit theft,
entered a habitation without the effective consent of the homeowner. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 30.02(a) (West 2011). “Enter” means to intrude any part of the body or any
11 physical object connected with the body. Id. at (b). “Entry” is established when the
plane of the opening of a house is broken and may be accomplished by placing a foot
inside a door frame, by cutting window or door screens, or by breaking door lock or
frame. Martinez v. State, 304 S.W.3d 642, 660 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d).
The entry element of a burglary offense may be proven by inferences, just as inferences
may be used to prove the elements of any other offense. Lopez v. State, 884 S.W.2d
918, 921 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref’d).
Notwithstanding Appellant’s assertion that inference upon inference was
impermissibly used to convict him, there is direct evidence from which a reasonable
juror could infer someone entered the Kiewiets’ house, without their consent, and
removed Richard’s tool box and tools from the premises. Appellant admitted to
Rebecca that he had been by the Kiewiets’ house. Richard testified a window at the
back of the house had been broken to gain entry, and both he and Brenda testified that
Appellant did not have their consent to enter the house. Appellant told Sergeant Hayes
he had borrowed Wesley’s pickup to move, and upon consenting to a search, he fled.
The pickup contained Richard’s stolen tool box and tools co-mingled with Appellant’s
belongings.6 Instead of providing a reasonable explanation for possessing recently
stolen property,7 Appellant fled from Sergeant Hayes after misrepresenting that he was
6 Richard described the stolen red and black tool box, Craftsman saws and drills, and an Ideal bag containing a multimeter as some of the items stolen from his house. Brenda testified she observed what looked like Richard’s tool box in the green pickup. See Luckett v. State, 586 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (identification of stolen property necessary when the only proof of burglary is possession of stolen property). 7 Where there is independent evidence of a burglary, the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods may constitute sufficient evidence of guilt to support a conviction. Buchanan v. State, 780 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 12 going inside the house to continue moving.8 The jury was the exclusive judge of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given all testimony. Brooks,
323 S.W.3d at 899. Because this Court must resolve evidentiary inconsistencies in
favor of the judgment, id., viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict
and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, we conclude Appellant’s challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence fails. Issues one, two, and three are overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having found that Appellant’s due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to
counsel were violated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for
further proceedings.
Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
Do not publish.
8 Flight is admissible as a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 13