1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 CHRISTOPHER DOMINGUEZ, as an Case No. 1:22-cv-01018-KES-EPG individual and on behalf of all others 11 similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF 12 Plaintiff, CLASS CERTIFICATION AND APPROVAL OF A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 13 v. (ECF Nos. 63, 73) 14 LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, 15 Defendants. 16
17 The parties, Plaintiff Christopher Dominguez and Defendant Leprino Foods Company, 18 have reached a settlement in this putative class action case that alleges a violation of California 19 Labor Code section 226(a)(2). Before the Court is Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to preliminarily 20 certify the settlement class and approve the parties’ proposed settlement. (ECF No. 63). 21 Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion, the record, and the September 18, 2025 hearing, the 22 Court will grant the motion. (ECF No. 63).1 23 \\\ 24 \\\ 25 \\\ 26 1 The parties have provided the undersigned with limited consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C section 636(c) and 27 Local Rule 305 to adjudicate Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement. (ECF No. 71). 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Procedural History 3 On June 28, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a class action complaint in 4 California Superior Court for the County of Kings. (ECF No. 1-1). Defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on August 12, 2022. (ECF 5 No. 1, p. 9). 6 Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on 7 February 14, 2024. (ECF Nos. 31). 8 On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification. (ECF No. 41). 9 Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s class certification motion on May 24, 2024. (ECF No. 10 43). On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant’s opposition (ECF No. 44). Defendant 11 filed a request for leave to file a sur-reply on June 20, 2024. (ECF No. 45). The Court held a 12 hearing on the motion for class certification on July 12, 2024. (ECF No. 48). 13 On July 26, 2024, while the motion for class certification was pending, Defendant filed a 14 Notice of Related Cases identifying the settled action of Vazquez, et al. v. Leprino Foods 15 Company, et al., in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Case 16 No: 1:17-cv-00796-JLT-BAM. (ECF No. 53). In Vasquez, there was a Court-approved settlement 17 that released “claims for alleged violations of California Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 18 210, 218, 218/5, 218/6, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226.6, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 1174, 1194, 1194.2, 19 1197.1, 1198, and 2699” during the period from November 15, 2009, through October 16, 2023. 20 (ECF No. 63, p. 14). According to the parties, this settlement resulted in a bar of Plaintiff’s first 21 and second causes of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint. 22 On January 3, 2025, the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations 23 Recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certificated Be Granted. (ECF No. 56). Defendant timely filed objections. (ECF No. 57). 24 On or about February 21, 2025, the parties reached an agreement on the material terms of 25 the settlement and Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action 26 Settlement (ECF No. 63, p. 14). As condition of the proposed settlement, the Parties agreed to file 27 a Second Amended Complaint. (Id., p. 14). 28 1 B. The Second Amended Complaint 2 Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint on May 8, 2025. (ECF No. 68). Plaintiff’s 3 Second Amended Complaint alleges a single cause of action for violation of California Labor 4 Code § 226(a). (ECF No. 68). In this cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements because, as the Plaintiff and Class were hourly non-exempt 5 employes, the wage statements should have accurately reflected the total hours worked, whereas 6 Defendant’s wage statements issued to Plaintiff and the Class failed to accurately identify and 7 itemize this information, in violation of California Labor Code § 226(a). (Id., p.7) 8 C. Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement 9 On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Settlement 10 (ECF No. 63). Plaintiff moves the court for preliminary approval of the proposed Joint 11 Stipulation of Class Action Settlement entered into by Plaintiff and Defendant Leprino Foods 12 Company (Defendant). Plaintiff asks that the Court grant certification of the proposed class for 13 settlement purposes only, and make other orders to facilitate final approval and settlement of the 14 class claims in the Second Amended Complaint. 15 1. Proposed settlement class and class period 16 The proposed settlement class covers “all current and former non-exempt employees of 17 [Defendant] in the State of California who received payment of overtime and/or shift differential 18 wages, at any time from October 17, 2023, to February 24, 2024.” (ECF No. 63, p. 14). 19 Defendant represents that there are approximately 965 individuals that comprise the class. (Id., p. 20 15). 21 2. Terms of the settlement agreement 22 The Gross Settlement Amount (“GSA”) is $220,000. The GSA is premised on 23 Defendant’s representation that Class Members received approximately 15,609 wage statements reflecting the payment of overtime and/or shift differential wages during the Class Period. The 24 approximate dollar value of each wage statement is $14.09. (ECF No. 63, p.15). The agreement 25 proposes that the gross settlement amount be allocated as follows: 26 Settlement Allocation 27 GSA $220,000 28 1 Enhancement Payment Not to $12, 500 2 Exceed 3 Litigation Costs Not to Exceed $30,000 4 Administrator Costs Not to Exceed $11, 995 5 Attorney Fees Not to Exceed $73,333.333 6 Expected Net Settlement $92, 171.67 7 Amount for Estimated 965 8 Members 9 (ECF No. 63, pp. 15-16). 10 Under the proposed settlement, Settlement Class members will receive a pro rata share of 11 the Net Settlement Amount based on the number of wage statements reflecting the payment of 12 overtime and/or shift differential wages each employee received during the Class Period. (ECF. 13 No 63, p. 16). Based on this pro rata share, each Settlement Class Member may recover 14 approximately $95.52 or $5.91 per wage statement. (Id.). The amount recovered by a Settlement Class member may be greater or lower than the average depending on the number of overtime 15 and/or shift differential wage statements each respective Class Member received during the Class 16 Period and the number of classes opt-outs received. (Id.). 17 As part of the settlement, Plaintiff and all class members who do not opt out, and all 18 aggrieved employees, will release Defendant from “all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, 19 actions, damages, causes of action, and charges of whatever nature, under state, federal, or local 20 law, alleged in the Operative Complaint, including but not limited to, for violation of California 21 Labor Code section 226.” The released claims are narrowly tailored to align with the claims 22 alleged in the Second Amended Complaint and do not include a California Civil Code section 23 1542 waiver2. (ECF No. 63, p. 17). 24 The funds are represented by settlement checks and those checks returned as 25 undeliverable as well as the funds represented by settlement checks not negotiated within one- 26 2 Section 1542 provides as follows: “A general release does not extend to claims that the creditor or 27 releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor or 28 released party.” 1 hundred and eighty calendar days after issuance will be issued to the California Controller’s 2 Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Settlement Class Member. (ECF No. 63, p.17). 3 Within ten (10) business days after the order granting preliminary approval of the 4 settlement, Defendant will provide the Settlement Administrator with the Class List and Data. (ECF No. 63, p. 17). Within 10 days of the receipt of the Class List and Data, the Settlement 5 Administrator will mail a notice packet and establish a toll-free number. (Id.) A copy of the 6 proposed notice is attached to Plaintiff’s motion and copy of the settlement opt-out form has been 7 provided. (ECF No. 63-1, pp. 39-45). 8 II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND SETTLEMENT AND 9 APPROVAL OF PAGA REPRESENTATIVE ACTION 10 A court tasked with determining whether to approve a proposed class action settlement 11 will almost always be confronted with a “difficult balancing act.” Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 12 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015). “On the one hand, . . . there is a strong judicial policy that favors 13 settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “But on the other hand, settlement class actions present 14 unique due process concerns for absent class members, and the district court has a fiduciary duty 15 to look after the interests of those absent class members.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 16 citations omitted). “To ensure the interests of the absent class members are properly safeguarded, 17 the judge must adopt the role of a skeptical client and critically examine the class certification 18 elements, the proposed settlement terms, and procedures for implementation.” Lusk v. Five Guys 19 Enterprises LLC, No. 1:17-CV-00762-AWI-EPG, 2021 WL 2210724, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 20 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 21 Class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. There are two stages to 22 approving a class action settlement. In the first stage, which is at issue here, “the court 23 preliminarily approves the settlement pending a fairness hearing, temporarily certifies a 24 settlement class, and authorizes notice to the class.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 363 25 (E.D. Cal. 2014). At the second stage, the Court holds a fairness hearing, entertaining objections 26 from putative class members, and thereafter making “a final determination as to whether the 27 parties should be allowed to settle the class action pursuant to the terms agreed upon.” Id. 28 “Parties seeking class certification must satisfy each of the four requirements of Rule 1 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy—and at least one of the requirements 2 of Rule 23(b),” with Plaintiffs arguing here that, under Rule 23(b)(3), common questions of law 3 or fact predominate over individual class member questions and that a class action is superior to 4 other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this case. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2017); (ECF No. 253-1, p. 20). Plaintiff bears the burden of 5 meeting these requirements. Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 6 1977). 7 After the certification inquiry, the Court considers whether the settlement is “fair, 8 reasonable, and adequate” under Rule 23(e)(2). See Kim v. Allison, 8 F.4th 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 9 2021) (describing factors guiding inquiry under Rule 23(e)(2)). 10 The Court will evaluate the settlement agreement “as a whole” and “for overall fairness.” 11 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by 12 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). The Court does “not have a duty to 13 maximize settlement value for class members,” but instead, the “inquiry is much more modest 14 and limited to ensuring that the class settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” In re 15 California Pizza Kitchen Data Breach Litig., 129 F.4th 667, 678 (9th Cir. 2025). Relatedly, the 16 Court does not “have the ability to delete, modify or substitute certain provisions”; rather, “[t]he 17 settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 18 III. ANALYSIS 19 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary class certification and approval of 20 the class action settlement for the reasons discussed below. 21 The Court will begin with the Rule 23(a) and(b) factors regarding class certification and 22 then turn to the Rule 23(e) factors regarding approval of the settlement. 23 A. Rule 23(a) Requirements 1. Numerosity 24 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a proposed class be “so numerous that joinder of all members 25 is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “The numerosity requirement requires examination of 26 the specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. 27 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Courts in the Ninth Circuit 28 1 have found the requirement satisfied when the class is composed of as few as thirty-nine 2 members. See Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 266 F.R.D. 468, 474 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing 3 Jordan v. L.A. County, 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that class sizes of thirty-nine, 4 sixty-four, and seventy-one are sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810, 103 (1982)). 5 Here, joinder of the 965 class members as plaintiffs would be impracticable. (ECF No. 63, 6 p. 18). Furthermore, the proposed Class is ascertainable because all proposed members have been 7 employed by Defendant and can be easily identified through Defendant’s employee and payroll 8 records. (ECF No. 63, p. 18, citing ECF No. 63-1, p. 41) Thus, the Court finds the numerosity 9 requirement satisfied. 10 2. Commonality 11 Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Class members need not “have all suffered a violation of the same provision 13 of law”; rather, their claims must “depend upon a common contention.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. 14 The “common contention . . . must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – 15 which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 16 validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. “The commonality preconditions of Rule 17 23(a)(2) are less rigorous than the companion requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).” Hanlon, 150 F.3d 18 at 1019. “Indeed, Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively.” Id. “The existence of shared 19 legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts 20 coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Id. 21 The claims here are based on Defendant’s alleged failure to provide accurate itemized 22 wage statements that complied with California Labor Code section 226. (ECF No, 63, p.18, citing 23 ECF Nos. 63-1, ¶ 34; 63-4, ¶ 3). As such, the claims of Plaintiff and the Class stem from the same factual and legal issues and as a result, the Court finds the commonality requirement satisfied. See 24 Kincaid v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00863-TLN-JDP, 2024 WL 1344595, at 25 *4-10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2024) (finding commonality requirement met for similar Labor Code 26 claims); Goodwin v. Winn Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 1:15-CV-00606-DAD-EPG, 2017 WL 3173006, 27 at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2017) (same). 28 1 3. Typicality 2 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 3 of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). As the Ninth Circuit has 4 explained, “[t]he test of typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought.” Jones v. 5 Shalala, 64 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508). 6 While representative claims must be “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class 7 members,” they “need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. Here, as 8 Plaintiff notes, his claims are typical of the claims of other Class members because they arise 9 from the same facts and are predicated upon the same legal theories. (ECF No. 63, p.19, citing 10 ECF Nos. 63-1, ¶ 34; 63-4, ¶ 3). The Court finds the typicality requirement satisfied. 11 4. Adequacy of representation 12 Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 13 the interests of the class.” “[A] class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the 14 same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 15 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) (citations omitted). “The proper resolution of this issue requires that 16 two questions be addressed: (a) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of 17 interest with other class members and (b) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the 18 action vigorously on behalf of the class?” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462 19 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (June 19, 2000) (citations omitted). 20 Plaintiff contends and Defendant offers no dispute that for settlement purposes, Plaintiff 21 and his counsel are adequate representatives of the Class. (ECF No. 63, p.19). Specifically, it is 22 represented that Plaintiff has been committed to pursuing this action on behalf of the Class by 23 “locating and retaining attorneys, filing this [a]ction and willingly exposing his name and reputation to criticism, participating in discovery and investigation, appearing at deposition, and 24 reviewing the settlement documents with counsel.” (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that his 25 interests in pursuing this action and obtaining the most beneficial recovery possible are in the 26 interests of the entire class. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that any class member who wishes to 27 opt-out or object to the settlement will have the opportunity to do so. (Id.). 28 1 Further, Plaintiff states that Plaintiff’s counsel has no conflicts of interest that have arisen, 2 and counsel is committed to the case and has experiencing in litigating similar cases, supported 3 by certifications by numerous state and federal courts as competent and adequate class counsel. 4 (ECF No. 63, p. 19). Additionally, the Court notes that “[t]he competence of counsel seeking to represent a class” may be evaluated by considering whether they “are labor lawyers experienced 5 in class actions.” Loc. Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Tr. Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 6 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). Subsequently, Plaintiff’s counsel has provided declarations 7 supporting their experience by listing numerous class action cases they have been involved in. 8 (ECF Nos. 63-1 ¶ 38; 63-2 ¶ 7; 63-3, ¶¶3-8; 63-5, ¶ 10; 63-6 ¶¶ 8-9). Accordingly, the Court finds 9 the adequacy requirement satisfied. 10 B. Rule 23(b) Requirements 11 Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that “questions of law or 12 fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 13 members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 14 adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); (ECF No. 22, p. 24). The test of Rule 15 23(b)(3) is “far more demanding,” than that of Rule 23(a). Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., 16 LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24). 17 1. Predominance 18 First, questions of law or fact common to class members must predominate over any 19 questions affecting only individual members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This “predominance 20 inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 21 representation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623). “This analysis 22 presumes that the existence of common issues of fact or law have been established pursuant to 23 Rule 23(a)(2); thus, the presence of commonality alone is not sufficient to fulfill Rule 23(b)(3).” Id. “In contrast to Rule 23(a)(2), Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the relationship between the common 24 and individual issues.” Id. “When common questions present a significant aspect of the case and 25 they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear 26 justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis.” Id. 27 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & 28 1 Procedure § 1778 (2d ed.1986)). 2 Here, there are issues that will predominate over individual issues in the case, specifically 3 whether Defendant’s wage statements violated California law because they were not accurate nor 4 itemized correctly. As such, “[a] common nucleus of facts and potential legal remedies dominates this litigation,” the Court finds that the predominance requirement is met. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 5 1022. 6 2. Superiority 7 Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action must be “superior to other available methods for fairly 8 and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Pertinent to this finding is: 9 “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 10 separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 11 begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 12 litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class 13 action.” Id.; see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616. The purpose of this “requirement is to assure that the 14 class action is the most efficient and effective means of resolving the controversy,” and “[w]here 15 recovery on an individual basis would be dwarfed by the cost of litigating on an individual basis, 16 this factor weighs in favor of class certification.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 17 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see Local Joint Exec. Bd. of 18 Culinary/Bartender Tr. Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This 19 case involves multiple claims for relatively small individual sums. . . . If plaintiffs cannot proceed 20 as a class, some – perhaps most – will be unable to proceed as individuals because of the disparity 21 between their litigation costs and what they hope to recover.”). 22 The Court concludes that a class action is a superior method of resolving this action. First, 23 it does not appear economical for each individual member of the proposed 965-member class to bring their claims separately. The class action litigation here allows the class members to pool 24 their individual claims together, which claims would otherwise not be economical to litigate. See 25 Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Tr. Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d 1152, 1163 26 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This case involves multiple claims for relatively small individual sums. . .. If 27 plaintiffs cannot proceed as a class, some – perhaps most – will be unable to proceed as 28 1 individuals because of the disparity between their litigation costs and what they hope to 2 recover.”). Further, a lack of knowledge of the legal system and limited economic resources 3 would likely deprive most class members of the opportunity to pursue their claims outside of a 4 class action. Finally, any prospective class member that wishes to pursue their own case may opt out of the class. 5 Second, there does not appear to be any related pending litigation. Third, this District is a 6 desirable forum for the litigation as the operative complaint alleges that Plaintiff primarily 7 performed his work for Defendant within the City of Lemoore and County of Kings. (ECF No. 1, 8 p. 3-4). Thus, much of the evidence will likely be found within this District and the Court can 9 efficiently conduct proceedings here. See Soares v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 320 F.R.D. 464, 486 10 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“This case involves drivers who serviced routes in Northern California, many 11 of whom worked out of Flowers warehouses in San Jose and Salinas, which are in this District. 12 Because much of the evidence will be found here, it would be efficient to try the case here.”). 13 Finally, there are no apparent difficulties likely to be encountered in managing this class action. 14 Thus, the Court finds that the superiority requirement is met. 15 C. Rule 23(e) Requirements 16 If a proposed settlement agreement “would bind class members,” the Court must find that 17 it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). A court considers whether: 18 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; 19 (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: 20 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; 21 (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims; 22 (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and 23 (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 25 The Ninth Circuit has provided the following guidance regarding Rule 23(e)(2): 26 In this Circuit, a district court examining whether a proposed settlement comports 27 with Rule 23(e)(2) is guided by the eight “Churchill factors,” viz., “(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of 28 1 further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the 2 stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members of the 3 proposed settlement.” 4 Kim, 8 F.4th at 1178 (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th 5 Cir. 2011)); see Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (listing the 6 Churchill factors). “In addition, the settlement may not be the product of collusion among the 7 negotiating parties.” In re Mego, 213 F.3d at 458. “This list is not exclusive, and different factors 8 may predominate in different factual contexts.” Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 9 1376 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 10 Moreover, consideration of these factors alone is insufficient. Id. at 1179. Because Rule 11 23(e)(2) also requires courts to “now consider ‘the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s 12 fees’ when determining whether ‘the relief provided for the class is adequate[,]’ . . . courts must balance the ‘proposed award of attorney’s fees” vis-à-vis the ‘relief provided for the class in 13 determining whether the settlement is ‘adequate’ for class members.” Briseño v. Henderson, 998 14 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii)). This is done by 15 reviewing the “so-called Bluetooth factors to smoke out potential collusion.” Id. at 1023. Signs of 16 such collusion include: 17 (1) “when counsel receive[s] a disproportionate distribution of the settlement”; (2) 18 “when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing arrangement,’” under which the defendant agrees not to challenge a request for an agreed-upon attorney’s fee; and 19 (3) when the agreement contains a “kicker” or “reverter” clause that returns unawarded fees to the defendant, rather than the class. 20 Id. (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 947). 21 The Court will begin with the Churchill factors to determine if the proposed settlement 22 aligns with Rule 23(e)(2) and then move to the Bluetooth factors, to determine if there are any 23 signs of potential collusion. 24 1. Churchhill Factors 25 a. The strength of Plaintiff’s case 26 A court should “evaluate objectively the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the 27 litigation and the impact of those considerations on the parties’ decisions to reach these 28 1 agreements.” Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 913 F.Supp.2d 964, 975 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citation 2 omitted). However, “the court does not reach any ultimate conclusions regarding the contested 3 issues of fact and law that underlie the merits of this litigation.” Id. (internal citation and 4 quotation marks omitted). i. Failure to Provide Accurate and Itemized Wage Statements 5 Plaintiffs allege a single cause of action for failure to provide accurate and itemized wage 6 statement. This claim is based on Labor Code § 226, which generally requires an employer to 7 provide employees with accurate itemized wage statements showing a variety of information 8 (including gross wages earned and total hours worked) and penalizes knowing and intentional 9 failures to do so by permitting recovery of $50 for the initial pay period in which a violation 10 occurs and $100 per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not to exceed an 11 aggregate penalty of $4,000. See Cal. Labor code §226. During the class period, Defendant’s 12 wage statements separated overtime hours into two distinct overtime categories, “overtime 1.0” 13 and “overtime premium,” but these hours constituted the same hours worked. Further, the wage 14 statements provide a “shift differential hours” category, which constitute a premium payment 15 received by employees, but does not indicate separate hours worked. This results in wage 16 statements that present hours that are redundant and do not allow an easy summation of total 17 hours worked. (ECF No. 63, p. 23). 18 Regarding risks, Plaintiffs state that Defendant has asserted numerous defenses aimed at 19 restricting the Plaintiff’s and Class member’s claims and penalties that may be available. (ECF 20 No. 63, p.23). Specifically, Defendant argued that its wage-statement policy complies with the 21 labor code § 226 because even if all hours listed do not add up to the total hours worked, the wage 22 statements accurately provided the total hours worked. (ECF No. 43, pp. 15-19). Furthermore, 23 Plaintiff would have great difficult establishing that violation of Section 226(a) was “knowing and intentional” because Defendant had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the wage statements 24 complied with law and had no indication from employees that there was confusion regarding the 25 hours presented on the wage statement. (ECF No. 43, pp. 19-21). Naranjo v. Spectrum Security 26 Services, Inc., 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1087 (2024) (employer’s failure to include meal and rest period 27 premium pay on the wage statements was not “knowing and intentional” because it had a good 28 1 faith belief that it was not in violation of Labor Code section 226); Apodaca v. Costco Wholesale 2 Corp., 2014 WL 2533427, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2014) (“Where an employer has a good faith 3 belief that it is not in violation of Section 226, any violation is not knowing and intentional”); 4 Arroyo v. Int'l Paper Co., 611 F. Supp. 3d 824, 841-43 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (ruling that employer did not knowingly and intentionally violate section 226(a) in part because it had conducted extensive 5 internal audit, it made changes to increase wage statement's clarity, and employer’s payroll 6 compliance specialist declared that “there were never any complaints from” employees “claiming 7 that they did not understand ‘Regular Hours’ to equal the total hours worked, or claiming that 8 they did not understand their overtime rate”). Finally, Defendant routinely reviewed its wage 9 statements for compliance and, in response to the lawsuit, modified those wage statements to 10 comply with the law on February 24, 2024. (ECF No. 63-1, pp, 8-9). 11 As an initial matter regarding the valuation of penalties Defendant faces, the Court looks 12 Section 226(e), which provides as follows 13 An employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to comply with subdivision (a) is entitled to recover the greater of all actual 14 damages or fifty dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, 15 not to exceed an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars ($4,000), and is entitled to an 16 award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. In valuing the claims, Plaintiff estimates that Defendant could face a potential maximum liability 17 of $1,512,6503. Plaintiff estimates the actual value of the claim to be approximately $907,590 18 when assuming a 60% chance of success on the merits due to the risks associated in establishing 19 liability at a trial. (ECF No. 63-1, p.8). 20
21 b. The risk, expense, complexity, likely duration of further litigation, and risks of maintaining class action status throughout trial 22 “Approval of settlement is ‘preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain 23 results.’” Munoz v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp., 2017 WL 2665075, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 24 2017). Moreover, “[e]mployment law class actions are, by their nature, time-consuming and 25 expensive to litigate.” Aguilar v. Wawona Frozen Foods, 2017 WL 2214936, at *3 (E.D. Cal May 26 19, 2017). 27
28 3 [$50 x 965] + [$100 x 14,644 pay periods] (ECF No. 63-1, p. 8). 1 In support of the parties’ proposed settlement, Plaintiff believes the class can be certified 2 and that the settlement is fair when factoring in the uncertainty and risks to Plaintiff involved in 3 not prevailing on the single claim and the potential for any appeals. (ECF No. 63, p. 22). 4 Based on the record evidence, including the discovery so far taken and strengths and weakness of the case, the Court concludes that this consideration weighs in favor of approving the 5 parties’ proposed settlement. 6 c. The amount offered in settlement 7 The amount offered in settlement “is generally considered the most important” factor of 8 any class settlement. See Bayat v. Bank of the West, 2015 WL 1744342, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 9 2015). In determining whether the amount offered in settlement is fair and reasonable, a court 10 compares the proposed settlement amount to the maximum potential amount recoverable through 11 successful litigation. See In re Mego, 213 F.3d at 459. “It is well-settled law that a cash settlement 12 amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se render the settlement 13 inadequate or unfair.” Id. (citation omitted). For complex class action cases, Ninth Circuit has “a 14 strong judicial policy that favors settlements. Parties represented by competent counsel are better 15 positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome 16 in litigation.” In re Pacific Enter. Sec. Lit., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation 17 marks and citation omitted). 18 i. Percentage recovery 19 If Plaintiff were to prevail on all claims, the estimated potential maximum recovery would 20 be $1,512,650 in penalties. The gross settlement amount of $220,000 is approximately 14.54% of 21 $1,512,650. 22 Ultimately, the Court finds this recovery reasonable and above other percentages that 23 courts have approved. Numerous courts have held that a gross settlement approximating between 8%-25% of the total estimated liability is reasonable. In re Mego Fin. Corp. Secs. Litig., 213 F.3d 24 454, 459 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that class action settlement recovering 16% of potential 25 exposure was fair and reasonable; “[i]t is well-settled law that a cash settlement amounting to 26 only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se render the settlement inadequate or unfair. 27 Rather, the fairness and the adequacy of the settlement should be assessed relative to risks of 28 1 pursuing the litigation to judgment”; noting that whether the settlement is fair and adequate 2 depends on the “the difficulties in proving the case”);Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., 306 3 F.R.D. 245, 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“From here, the agreed upon common fund represents between 4 27 percent and 11 percent of the total potential recovery. The Court is satisfied that these numbers are fair.”); Van Ba Ma v. Covidien Holding Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct. Case No. 8:12-cv-02161 (C.D. 5 Cal. 2014) (court granted preliminary approval of wage and hour class settlement which obtained 6 only 9.1% of projected damages, given the risks of continued litigation) Villegas v. J.P. Morgan 7 Chase & Co., No. CV 09-00261 SBA EMC, 2012 WL 5878390, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012) 8 (holding that gross class action settlement of approximately 15% of the potential recovery was 9 fair and reasonable). 10 In reaching this determination, the Court reiterates that “a proposed settlement may be 11 acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery that might be 12 available to the class members at trial.” Nat’l Rural Telecommunications Coop. v. DIRECTV, 13 Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 14 ii. Allocation of settlement shares 15 The Court also considers whether the allocation of the settlement is fair, reasonable and 16 adequate, with it being “reasonable to allocate the settlement funds to class members based on the 17 extent of their injuries or the strength of their claims on the merits.” In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 18 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 19 Plaintiff describes the allocation of the settlement shares as follows: The Net Settlement Amount will be available for distribution to Settlement Class 20 Members (i.e. Class Members who do not opt-out). See SA §§ A-30, D-7. Settlement 21 Class Members will receive a pro rata share of Net Settlement Amount based on the number of wage statements reflecting the payment of overtime and/or shift differential 22 wages each employee received during the Class Period. See id. at § D-7. All Individual Settlement Payments will be allocated as one hundred percent (100%) to penalties. See 23 SA § D-8.
24 Based on an estimated Net Settlement Amount of $92,171.67, each Settlement Class 25 Member may potentially recover approximately $95.52 or $5.91 per wage statement reflecting the payment of overtime and/or shift differential. See Agnew Decl. ¶ 31. The 26 amount any particular Settlement Class Member will be entitled to recover will be greater or lower than this average, depending on the number of overtime and/or shift differential 27 wage statements each respective 28 (ECF No. 63, p. 16). 1 The Court finds this allocation acceptable. 2 Accordingly, the allocation of settlement payments based on the number of wage 3 statements that were inaccurate during the class period would be fair to the class members and 4 aggrieved employees. d. The extent of discovery completed and the stage of proceedings; 5 experience and views of counsel 6 “An initial presumption of fairness is usually involved if the settlement is recommended 7 by class counsel after arm’s-length bargaining.” Riker v. Gibbons, No. 3:08-CV-00115-LRH, 8 2010 WL 4366012, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010) (quoting 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, 9 Newberg on Class Actions § 11:42 (4th ed.2002)); see also Nat’l Rural Telecommunications 10 Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 527–28 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“A settlement following 11 sufficient discovery and genuine arms-length negotiation is presumed fair.” (citations omitted)). 12 Here, the parties engaged in extensive pre-class certification discovery. (ECF No. 63, 13 p.13). Specifically, discovery topics ranged from information regarding the number of putative class members, Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding its wage statements, and 14 depositions of Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness and Plaintiff. (Id.). On January 18, 2024, the 15 parties engaged in private mediation but were unable to resolve the matter. (Id.). Settlement 16 negotiations resumed on July 26, 2024, and during those negotiations the Vasquez matter settled, 17 requiring Plaintiff to dispose of his first and second causes of action, directing the parties to focus 18 on a resolution for violation of Labor Code section 226(a). (ECF No. 63, p.14). Settlement 19 negotiations were conducted at arms-length and in adversarial positions and an agreement on the 20 material terms of a settlement were reached on February 21, 2025. (Id.). 21 Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel provided declarations, generally summarizing the experience 22 with class action litigation and stating that the settlement is fair and reasonable and in the best 23 interests of the those concerned. (ECF No. 63-1, p. 9). 24 Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval. 25 e. The reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement 26 At this stage, the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement is unknown, so 27 this factor cannot be addressed. 28 \\\ 1 2. Collusion (Bluetooth Factors) 2 “The potential for collusion reaches its apex pre-class certification because, among other 3 things, (1) the court has not yet approved class counsel, who would owe a fiduciary duty to the 4 class members; and (2) plaintiffs’ counsel has not yet devoted substantial time and money to the case, and may be willing to cut a quick deal at the expense of class members’ interests.” Briseño, 5 998 F.3d at 1024. 6 The Court now turns to the Bluetooth factors, which are indications courts evaluate to 7 determine whether class counsel have allowed their own interests to infect settlement 8 negotiations— (1) whether counsel receives a disproportionate amount of the settlement; (2) 9 whether there is a clear “sailing agreement”; (3) and whether the agreement contains a “kicker” or 10 “reverter” clause. Briseño, 998 F.3d at 1024. The Court “ha[s] an independent obligation to 11 ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already 12 agreed to an amount.” Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941; see also Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 13 192 F.3d 1323, 1328–29 (9th Cir. 1999). Where, as here, fees are to be paid from a common fund, 14 the relationship between the class members and class counsel “turns adversarial.” In re 15 Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994). As a result, 16 the Court must assume a fiduciary role for the class members in evaluating a request for an award 17 of attorneys’ fees from the common fund. Id.; Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 18 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 The Ninth Circuit has approved two methods for determining attorneys’ fees in cases 20 where the award is taken from the common fund set aside for the entire settlement: the 21 “percentage of the fund” method and the “lodestar” method. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 22 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Court retains discretion in common fund 23 cases to choose either method. Id.; Vu v. Fashion Inst. of Design & Merch., No. CV 14-08822 SJO (EX), 2016 WL 6211308, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). Under either approach, 24 “[r]easonableness is the goal, and mechanical or formulaic application of either method, where it 25 yields an unreasonable result, can be an abuse of discretion.” Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance 26 Soc’y of the U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). 27 Under the percentage of the fund method, the Court may award class counsel a given 28 1 percentage of the common fund recovered for the class. Id. In the Ninth Circuit, a twenty-five 2 percent award, is the “benchmark” amount of attorneys’ fees, but courts may adjust this figure if 3 the record shows special circumstances justifying a departure. Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. 4 Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Ninth Circuit has permitted courts to award attorneys’ fees using this method “in lieu of the often more time-consuming task of 5 calculating the lodestar.” Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942. In evaluating a percentage for attorneys’ 6 fees, the Court is required to “consider[] all the circumstances of the case and reach a reasonable 7 percentage.” Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048. Such circumstances include (1) the results reached for 8 the class; (2) the risk to class counsel; (3) counsel’s performance; and (4) the amount sought to be 9 awarded compared to the market rate. Id. at 1048-49. 10 Here, Defendant’s counsel will not oppose or impede any application or motion by 11 Plaintiff’s counsel for attorney fee’s not to exceed $73,333.33 (or approximately 33%) of the 12 gross settlement. (ECF No. 63, p.16). Additionally, the settlement agreement caps costs at 13 $30,000, subject to this Court approving the settlement. (Id.). 14 Plaintiff generally indicates that the fee award is warranted based on significant benefits 15 that Plaintiff and Class Counsel have conveyed upon the class. The Court finds that the requested 16 attorneys fees fall within the range of reasonableness warranting preliminary approval of the 17 settlement but will reserve a final determination for final approval, with the benefit of further 18 briefing and consideration. The Court notes that 33% request is higher than typically awarded. 19 However, the Court recognizes that this case lost the potential for a significant award due to the 20 Vasquez action, which caused two of the three causes of action to be barred. 21 Next, the proposed settlement contains a clear sailing provision, i.e., a provision that 22 Defendants will not object to a certain fee request. Notably, it states that Defendants will not 23 oppose a fee award that does not exceed 1/3 of the settlement and will not oppose costs that do not exceed $30,000 (ECF No. 63, p. 16). However, there is no “reverter” clause, i.e., a provision 24 that fees not awarded revert to Defendant rather than the class fund. Rather, the settlement 25 agreement expressly states that “Any portion of the requested attorney fees’ and/or costs not 26 approved by the Court shall be added to the Net Settlement Amount.” (ECF No. 63-1, p.22). 27 The Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of preliminary approval. 28 1 8. Class representative service payment 2 A court may award incentive payments to named plaintiffs in class action cases. 3 Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958-59. The purpose of incentive awards is to “compensate class 4 representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaking in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a 5 private attorney general.” Id. To justify notable disparities between a class representative award 6 and what other class members receive, a Plaintiff must present “evidence demonstrating the 7 quality of plaintiff’s representative service,” such as “substantial efforts taken as class 8 representative to justify the discrepancy between [his] award and those of the unnamed 9 plaintiffs.” Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 669 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 10 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized, however, that “district courts must be vigilant in 11 scrutinizing all incentive awards.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1165 12 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In keeping with that admonition, 13 courts have declined to approve incentive awards that represent an unreasonably high proportion 14 of the overall settlement amount or are disproportionate to the recovery of other class members. 15 See Ontiveros, 303 F.R.D. at 365-66 (finding an incentive award of $20,000, comprising 1% of 16 the common fund, to be excessive under the circumstances, and reducing the award to $15,000, 17 where class representative spent 271 hours on the litigation and relinquished the opportunity to 18 bring several of his own claims in order to act as class representative); see also Ko v. Natura Pet 19 Prods., Inc., Civ. No. 09–2619 SBA, 2012 WL 3945541, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) 20 (holding that an incentive award of $20,000, comprising one percent of the approximately $2 21 million common fund was “excessive under the circumstances” and reducing the award to 22 $5,000). In reducing an award, courts have noted that overcompensation of class representatives 23 could encourage collusion by causing a divergence between the interests of the named plaintiff and the absent class members, destroying the adequacy of class representatives. See Staton, 327 24 F.3d at 977-78; see also Radcliffe, 715 F.3d at 1165. 25 Here, the settlement agreement provides for an “enhancement payment,” up to $12,500 26 intended to compensate named Plaintiff and in exchange for execution of a general release of all 27 claims, including a waiver under California Civil Code § 152. (ECF No. 63, p.15). However, 28 1 neither the motion, nor declarations of defense counsel or Plaintiffs provide specific support for 2 this especially high incentive award. 3 Moreover, the proposed payment represents about 18% of the gross settlement amount 4 ($12,500 / $220,000). This amount is well over 100 times the average $92.52 estimated to go to the average class member. And the Court notes that the requested award is higher than the $5,000 5 incentive award that has been recognized as “presumptively reasonable” by some courts. Austin v. 6 Foodliner, Inc., No. 16-CV-07185-HSG, 2019 WL 2077851, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2019). 7 The Court cannot fully evaluate the incentive reward request based on the information 8 provided. However, it will preliminarily approve the settlement and address the request further 9 after considering to-be-filed briefing on this issue. 10 9. Approval of a settlement administrator 11 The parties agree to use third-party settlement administrator Phoenix Settlement 12 Administrators (“Phoenix”) with an estimated $11,995.00 in costs and any portion of the costs not 13 used or approved by the Court shall revert to the Net Settlement Amount. (ECF No. 63, p. 15). 14 According to Plaintiff’s counsel, Phoenix has “substantial experience in administering class 15 action settlements.” (Id., p. 26). The Court finds Phoenix Settlement Administrators is an 16 appropriate settlement administrator should the settlement be eventually approved. 17 10. Notice procedures 18 For proposed settlements under Rule 23, “the court must direct notice in a reasonable 19 manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B); 20 see also Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1025 (“Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class 21 settlement under Rule 23(e).”). A class action settlement notice “is satisfactory if it generally 22 describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to 23 investigate and to come forward and be heard.” Churchill Vill., LLC, 361 F.3d at 575 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The absent class members must be provided with notice, an 24 opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt-out of the class. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 25 563 U.S. 333, 349 (2011). “The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood 26 language” the following information: 27 the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class 28 claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance 1 through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for 2 requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 4 The contents of the notice that Plaintiffs propose includes the following: 5 (1) the material terms of the settlement and a brief explanation of the case; (2) the 6 proposed attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and the costs of administration; (3) a statement that the court will exclude the Class Member from the class if the 7 member so requests by a specified date; (4) a procedure for the Class Member to 8 follow in requesting exclusion from the class; (5) a statement that the judgment will bind all Class Members who do not request exclusion; and (6) a statement that 9 any Class Member who does not request exclusion may, if the Class Member so desires, enter an appearance through counsel; and (7) how Class Members can 10 obtain additional information. In addition, the Notice will inform Class Members of their estimated settlement shares. 11 (ECF No. 63-1, pp.39-44). 12 The Court finds the proposed notice acceptable. 13 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 14 Based on the forgoing, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 15 1. Plaintiff’s motion for class certification and preliminary approval (ECF No. 63) is 16 GRANTED. 17 2. The following settlement class is conditionally certified: All non-exempt employees of 18 Leprino Foods Company who performed work in California from October 17, 2023 19 through February 24, 2024. 20 3. Plaintiff Christopher Dominguez is conditionally approved as the class representative for 21 the settlement class. 22 4. Kristen Agnew, Larry Lee, Max Gavron, and Kwanporn “Mai” Tulyathan of Diversity 23 Law Group, P.C. are conditionally approved as class counsel for the settlement class. 24 5. The Court conditionally approves Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the settlement 25 administrator and payment of $11,995.000 to it as costs. 6. The Court approves, and authorizes the issuance of, the notice (as submitted to the Court) 26 and the parties shall implement the notice schedule set forth in the settlement agreement. 27 7. A final approval hearing is scheduled for February 19, 2026, at 10:30 a.m. before 28 1 Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean, in Courtroom 10 on the 6" Floor of the Robert E. 2 Coyle United States Courthouse. Alternatively, the parties and their counsel may 3 participate telephonically. To connect to the conference via telephone, the parties shall (1) 4 dial 1-669-254-5252, (2) enter 161 733 0675 for the meeting ID followed by #, (3) enter # 5 when asked for the participant ID, (4) enter 740484 for the meeting passcode followed by 6 #, and (5) enter *6 to unmute. 7 8. A combined motion for final approval of the settlement, the class incentive award, and an 8 award of attorney fees and costs shall be filed by no later than January 29, 2026.
9 9. The settlement administrative shall file a report regarding the outcome of the notice
10 process by no later than January 29, 2026.
1) | TIS SO ORDERED. 12 | Dated: _ October 9, 2025 [spe ey □□ 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23