IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1690 Filed August 30, 2023
CHRISTOPHER DEE NALL, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.
The applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his request for
postconviction relief concerning his convictions for eluding and harassment.
AFFIRMED.
Erin Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke and Aaron Rogers,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Christopher Nall appeals the district court’s denial of his request for
postconviction relief (PCR) concerning his convictions for eluding and harassment.
He claimed he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted
him to plead guilty when his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. We conclude
Nall has not shown counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced
by counsel’s performance. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Nall was charged in AGCR342423 with driving while barred, in violation of
Iowa Code section 321.561 (2021), as a habitual offender, and eluding, in violation
of section 321.279(2). He was charged in AGCR348827 with harassment in the
first degree, in violation of section 708.7(2). He was on probation for previous
convictions at the time of the new charges.
Nall entered into a comprehensive plea agreement, pursuant to which he
pled guilty to first-degree harassment and eluding. He also stipulated that he
violated his probation. The charge of driving while barred was dismissed. The
written plea agreement provided:
The sentences imposed on AGCR348827 and AGCR34[2]423[1] shall run consecutive to one another and consecutive to the sentences for which Defendant is currently on probation for a total aggregate sentence of 7 years across all matters.[2] All sentences will be suspended and the Defendant will be continued on probation.
1 This portion of the plea agreement mistakenly refers to AGCR343423, rather than
AGCR342423. The caption of the document refers to the correct case number. This typographical error does not change any part of our analysis. 2 Nall was previously convicted of two domestic abuse assault cases, which carried
sentences of two years and one year. The convictions for first-degree harassment and eluding each carried a sentence of two years. Nall was sentenced to consecutive terms for a total of seven years. 3
The plea agreement also states, “Consecutive means one disposition after another
for a longer term and concurrently means dispositions would run at the same time.”
The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Nall in accordance
with the terms of the agreement. Subsequently, Nall signed a stipulation that he
violated his probation. The stipulation states the parties jointly recommended that
“[p]robation be revoked and original sentence be imposed 7 years in prison.” Nall
was sentenced to consecutive sentences, for a total term of imprisonment not to
exceed seven years.
On February 10, 2022, Nall filed a PCR application. He claimed he received
ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted him to plead guilty when
his plea was not knowing and voluntary.
At the PCR hearing, Nall testified he did not know the difference between
concurrent and consecutive sentences at the time he signed the plea agreement.
He stated, however, that he knew the plea agreement was for seven years in
prison. He also testified that he thought he was going to a substance-abuse
treatment facility rather than prison. Nall claimed he would not have pled guilty if
he knew he would be spending seven years in prison.
In a deposition, defense counsel stated Nall wanted to avoid going to prison
and the plea agreement accomplished that goal by giving him a suspended seven-
year sentence. Defense counsel testified:
Q. And when he agreed to the seven years, was that 7 consecutive sentencing or concurrent sentencing? A. Everything was consecutive. Q. Do you think he understood that? A. I’d imagine so. In reviewing my file, I note that I talked to him five times, which was— is frankly quite a lot for how many times I talk to my clients. 4
.... Q. Do your notes reflect whether you discussed the whole concurrent/consecutive issue with him? A. I don’t have notes from all the meetings. . . . The text of the plea was clear. The text of the stipulation that he signed was clear as to the sentence.
Defense counsel stated, “My ordinary practice would certainly be to discuss
consecutive and concurrent with him.”
The district court denied Nall’s PCR application. The court found, “The
Petitioner claims he did not understand the word ‘consecutive.’ However, he
clearly understood when he pled guilty to AGCR342423 and AGCR348827, he
was agreeing to recommend a seven-year sentence. He was sentenced in
accordance to his understanding.” The court determined Nall did not show counsel
breached an essential duty. The court also found Nall did not show he was
prejudiced, as he “was sentenced in a manner exactly as he requested.” Nall
appeals the denial of his PCR application.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, an applicant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an
essential duty and (2) the failure resulted in prejudice. State v. El-Amin, 952
N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa 2020). “We presume counsel performed competently
unless the claimant proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.” State
v. Booth-Harris, 942 N.W.2d 562, 577 (Iowa 2020). When there has been a guilty
plea, to show prejudice an applicant must establish that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error he or she would not have pleaded guilty and 5
would have insisted on going to trial.” Horton v. State, 966 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted).
III. Ineffective Assistance
Nall claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did
not ensure that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. He states defense
counsel should have fully explained the difference between concurrent and
consecutive sentences. Nall testified he would not have pled guilty and would have
gone to trial if he knew he would be sentenced to a seven-year term of
imprisonment.
The district court found Nall’s claims were not credible. The court found
Nall’s “assertion is puzzling and contrary to all the evidence, including the
Petitioner’s own testimony.” The written plea agreement provided, “The sentences
imposed on AGCR348827 and AGCR34[2]423 shall run consecutive to one
another and consecutive to the sentences for which Defendant is currently on
probation for a total aggregate sentence of 7 years across all matters.” The
stipulation to probation violation, again signed by Nall, recommended the “original
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1690 Filed August 30, 2023
CHRISTOPHER DEE NALL, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.
The applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his request for
postconviction relief concerning his convictions for eluding and harassment.
AFFIRMED.
Erin Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke and Aaron Rogers,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Christopher Nall appeals the district court’s denial of his request for
postconviction relief (PCR) concerning his convictions for eluding and harassment.
He claimed he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted
him to plead guilty when his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. We conclude
Nall has not shown counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced
by counsel’s performance. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Nall was charged in AGCR342423 with driving while barred, in violation of
Iowa Code section 321.561 (2021), as a habitual offender, and eluding, in violation
of section 321.279(2). He was charged in AGCR348827 with harassment in the
first degree, in violation of section 708.7(2). He was on probation for previous
convictions at the time of the new charges.
Nall entered into a comprehensive plea agreement, pursuant to which he
pled guilty to first-degree harassment and eluding. He also stipulated that he
violated his probation. The charge of driving while barred was dismissed. The
written plea agreement provided:
The sentences imposed on AGCR348827 and AGCR34[2]423[1] shall run consecutive to one another and consecutive to the sentences for which Defendant is currently on probation for a total aggregate sentence of 7 years across all matters.[2] All sentences will be suspended and the Defendant will be continued on probation.
1 This portion of the plea agreement mistakenly refers to AGCR343423, rather than
AGCR342423. The caption of the document refers to the correct case number. This typographical error does not change any part of our analysis. 2 Nall was previously convicted of two domestic abuse assault cases, which carried
sentences of two years and one year. The convictions for first-degree harassment and eluding each carried a sentence of two years. Nall was sentenced to consecutive terms for a total of seven years. 3
The plea agreement also states, “Consecutive means one disposition after another
for a longer term and concurrently means dispositions would run at the same time.”
The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Nall in accordance
with the terms of the agreement. Subsequently, Nall signed a stipulation that he
violated his probation. The stipulation states the parties jointly recommended that
“[p]robation be revoked and original sentence be imposed 7 years in prison.” Nall
was sentenced to consecutive sentences, for a total term of imprisonment not to
exceed seven years.
On February 10, 2022, Nall filed a PCR application. He claimed he received
ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted him to plead guilty when
his plea was not knowing and voluntary.
At the PCR hearing, Nall testified he did not know the difference between
concurrent and consecutive sentences at the time he signed the plea agreement.
He stated, however, that he knew the plea agreement was for seven years in
prison. He also testified that he thought he was going to a substance-abuse
treatment facility rather than prison. Nall claimed he would not have pled guilty if
he knew he would be spending seven years in prison.
In a deposition, defense counsel stated Nall wanted to avoid going to prison
and the plea agreement accomplished that goal by giving him a suspended seven-
year sentence. Defense counsel testified:
Q. And when he agreed to the seven years, was that 7 consecutive sentencing or concurrent sentencing? A. Everything was consecutive. Q. Do you think he understood that? A. I’d imagine so. In reviewing my file, I note that I talked to him five times, which was— is frankly quite a lot for how many times I talk to my clients. 4
.... Q. Do your notes reflect whether you discussed the whole concurrent/consecutive issue with him? A. I don’t have notes from all the meetings. . . . The text of the plea was clear. The text of the stipulation that he signed was clear as to the sentence.
Defense counsel stated, “My ordinary practice would certainly be to discuss
consecutive and concurrent with him.”
The district court denied Nall’s PCR application. The court found, “The
Petitioner claims he did not understand the word ‘consecutive.’ However, he
clearly understood when he pled guilty to AGCR342423 and AGCR348827, he
was agreeing to recommend a seven-year sentence. He was sentenced in
accordance to his understanding.” The court determined Nall did not show counsel
breached an essential duty. The court also found Nall did not show he was
prejudiced, as he “was sentenced in a manner exactly as he requested.” Nall
appeals the denial of his PCR application.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, an applicant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an
essential duty and (2) the failure resulted in prejudice. State v. El-Amin, 952
N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa 2020). “We presume counsel performed competently
unless the claimant proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.” State
v. Booth-Harris, 942 N.W.2d 562, 577 (Iowa 2020). When there has been a guilty
plea, to show prejudice an applicant must establish that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error he or she would not have pleaded guilty and 5
would have insisted on going to trial.” Horton v. State, 966 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted).
III. Ineffective Assistance
Nall claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did
not ensure that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. He states defense
counsel should have fully explained the difference between concurrent and
consecutive sentences. Nall testified he would not have pled guilty and would have
gone to trial if he knew he would be sentenced to a seven-year term of
imprisonment.
The district court found Nall’s claims were not credible. The court found
Nall’s “assertion is puzzling and contrary to all the evidence, including the
Petitioner’s own testimony.” The written plea agreement provided, “The sentences
imposed on AGCR348827 and AGCR34[2]423 shall run consecutive to one
another and consecutive to the sentences for which Defendant is currently on
probation for a total aggregate sentence of 7 years across all matters.” The
stipulation to probation violation, again signed by Nall, recommended the “original
sentence be imposed 7 years in prison.” At the PCR hearing, Nall testified he knew
his sentence would be for seven years.
As part of the plea agreement, Nall agreed to consecutive sentences for a
total of seven years in prison. The written plea agreement also explained the
difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences. “Plea bargains are
akin to contracts.” State v. Beres, 943 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Iowa 2020).
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Nall’s claims that he did
not understand the terms of the written plea agreement are not credible. The terms 6
of the written plea agreement are not ambiguous. Even if Nall did not entirely
understand the meaning of the word “consecutive,” he was aware the
recommendation was for a term of imprisonment not to exceed seven years.
“[W]hen an applicant’s assertions concerning the knowing and intelligent
nature of a guilty plea are directly contradicted by the record, the applicant bears
a special burden to establish that the record is inaccurate.” See Arnold v. State,
540 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1995). Nall has not met this burden. We conclude
Nall has not shown counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced
by counsel’s performance. We affirm the decision of the district court.