NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
21-186
CHRISTOPHER DAVID LAWRENCE
VERSUS
STACEY ELIZABETH LEBLANC
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20187431 HONORABLE DAVID BLANCHET, DISTRICT JUDGE
D. KENT SAVOIE JUDGE
Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, D. Kent Savoie, and J. Larry Vidrine*, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
____________________
*Honorable J. Larry Vidrine participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore. Jack Derrick Miller A Professional Corporation Post Office Drawer 1650 Crowley, Louisiana 70526 (337) 788-0768 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Christopher David Lawrence
Helen Popich Harris Attorney at Law 321 West Main Street, Suite 2-D Lafayette, Louisiana 70501 (337) 291-6092 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Stacey Elizabeth Leblanc SAVOIE, Judge.
Plaintiff Christopher David Lawrence appeals the amount set by the trial
court in its judgment for final periodic support awarded to Defendant Stacey
Elizabeth LeBlanc. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stacey LeBlanc Lawrence, a stay-at-home mother, filed a Rule to Show
Cause for Final Spousal Support in this divorce proceeding against her former
husband, Christopher David Lawrence, a physician. The rule was heard on
November 2, 2020, and it is now before this court on appeal.
After reviewing the evidence and listening to the hearing testimony, the trial
court ordered final periodic support be set at $6,025.34 per month, retroactive to
September 16, 2020, for a period of twelve months. Christopher Lawrence
complains that the trial court erred when it included $750.00 per month for health
insurance and $1,000.00 per month for rehabilitative education expenses in the
final periodic support amount. He requests a $1,750.00 reduction in the amount
ordered by the trial court.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
This court in Green v. Green, 20-29, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/21/20), 308
So.3d 778, 779, explained:
A trial court may award final periodic support to a party in need who is free from fault. La.Civ.Code art. 112. The trial court must consider all relevant factors in fashioning an award of final periodic support. La.Civ.Code art. 112. Some of those factors include the parties’ incomes, debts, earning ability, time necessary for work rehabilitation, health, age, duration of marriage, tax consequences, and whether one party committed domestic abuse. Id. The amount awarded cannot exceed one-third of the net income of the paying spouse. Id. We review a trial court’s award of final periodic support under the manifest error standard of review. Harmon v. Harmon, 12- 580 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/12), 101 So.3d 1122. Thus, if the trial court’s findings are reasonable, we cannot disturb them even if we may have arrived at a different conclusion. Id.; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).
The parties’ stipulated through Consent Judgment that Stacey is free from
legal fault in the dissolution of the marriage. Christopher earns more than $60,000
per month as an emergency room doctor. Therefore, the amount awarded does not
exceed one-third of his net income. Christopher requests a reduction in Stacey’s
final periodic support because he argues that there is no evidence in the record to
support the inclusion of rehabilitative education expenses and health insurance.
In Fontana v. Fontana, 13-916, p. 15 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/12/14), 136 So.3d
173, 183 n. 6 (citing 24A Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 763; see also
Daniel Jones, Rehabilitative Alimony—The Goal of Self Support, 20 J. Contemp.
Legal Issues J. 25, n. 2 (2009)), the court explained:
Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate where the dependent spouse needs to improve his or her job skills in order to obtain a standard of living approaching that enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, and the spouse indicates a desire to enroll in an educational program to obtain job skills or intends to apply the alimony towards job training designed to lead to employment. Other circumstances that may justify an award of rehabilitative alimony include the fact that the requesting party sacrificed educational and employment opportunities during the marriage and was absent from the job market for a significant length of time.
The trial court ordered rehabilitative alimony be included in Stacey’s final
spousal support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for one year. The evidence
shows that Stacey entered the military as an active-duty Marine upon completion
of high school. After four years as a Marine, she enlisted in the National Guard for
three years. During those years, she was enrolled at the University of Louisiana,
Lafayette. She obtained a four-year degree in Business Administration with a
focus in Marketing in 2001. She then graduated from Louisiana State University
2 with a Masters in Business Administration in May 2004 – the same year she
married Christopher. The evidence further shows that she had very little work
history while married, with the parties agreeing that she would be a stay-at-home
mother to their children. Their first child was born in 2006.
Included in the record is a report by Ted Deshotels, a Vocational
Rehabilitation Counselor. His report states:
Presently, Ms. Lawrence is pursuing a master’s degree in counseling and hopes to obtain her Licensed Professional Counseling license once she completes the program. The online master’s degree program in counseling is sponsored through Walden and she is studying for a Master of Science in a clinical mental health counseling program course. The course is divided into trauma and crisis counseling, forensic counseling, and military families and culture. She states that she is pursuing all three [tracks] at this time. So far, she completed eleven credit hours. The present term will end mid- august 2020[,] and she should at that time have accumulated 21 hours, she estimated. She reportedly need[s] 111 total credit hours to graduate[,] and she says she will take 10 hours per semester. With books and fees included, the cost is approximately $5,000 per semester. Once she completes the present semester, she reportedly will need approximately 90 more credit hours to graduate. At the rate of 10 hours per semester, I estimate Ms. Lawrence should complete the program in approximately 4 ½ years from August 2020.
Therefore, with nine semesters left to finish her degree at $5,000.00 per
semester, Stacey would require $45,000 in educational expenses. However, the
trial court determined that the law does not require Christopher to pay to re-educate
Stacey in a new field, but rather to update the degree she already has in order to
make her marketable and competitive with job applicants who have work
experience or those recently graduated. The trial court found that it would take
more than a few weeks of online courses in order for Stacey to be competitive due
to the length of time she was out of the workforce.
Ted Deshotels testified to the following at trial:
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
21-186
CHRISTOPHER DAVID LAWRENCE
VERSUS
STACEY ELIZABETH LEBLANC
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20187431 HONORABLE DAVID BLANCHET, DISTRICT JUDGE
D. KENT SAVOIE JUDGE
Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, D. Kent Savoie, and J. Larry Vidrine*, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
____________________
*Honorable J. Larry Vidrine participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore. Jack Derrick Miller A Professional Corporation Post Office Drawer 1650 Crowley, Louisiana 70526 (337) 788-0768 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Christopher David Lawrence
Helen Popich Harris Attorney at Law 321 West Main Street, Suite 2-D Lafayette, Louisiana 70501 (337) 291-6092 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Stacey Elizabeth Leblanc SAVOIE, Judge.
Plaintiff Christopher David Lawrence appeals the amount set by the trial
court in its judgment for final periodic support awarded to Defendant Stacey
Elizabeth LeBlanc. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stacey LeBlanc Lawrence, a stay-at-home mother, filed a Rule to Show
Cause for Final Spousal Support in this divorce proceeding against her former
husband, Christopher David Lawrence, a physician. The rule was heard on
November 2, 2020, and it is now before this court on appeal.
After reviewing the evidence and listening to the hearing testimony, the trial
court ordered final periodic support be set at $6,025.34 per month, retroactive to
September 16, 2020, for a period of twelve months. Christopher Lawrence
complains that the trial court erred when it included $750.00 per month for health
insurance and $1,000.00 per month for rehabilitative education expenses in the
final periodic support amount. He requests a $1,750.00 reduction in the amount
ordered by the trial court.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
This court in Green v. Green, 20-29, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/21/20), 308
So.3d 778, 779, explained:
A trial court may award final periodic support to a party in need who is free from fault. La.Civ.Code art. 112. The trial court must consider all relevant factors in fashioning an award of final periodic support. La.Civ.Code art. 112. Some of those factors include the parties’ incomes, debts, earning ability, time necessary for work rehabilitation, health, age, duration of marriage, tax consequences, and whether one party committed domestic abuse. Id. The amount awarded cannot exceed one-third of the net income of the paying spouse. Id. We review a trial court’s award of final periodic support under the manifest error standard of review. Harmon v. Harmon, 12- 580 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/12), 101 So.3d 1122. Thus, if the trial court’s findings are reasonable, we cannot disturb them even if we may have arrived at a different conclusion. Id.; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).
The parties’ stipulated through Consent Judgment that Stacey is free from
legal fault in the dissolution of the marriage. Christopher earns more than $60,000
per month as an emergency room doctor. Therefore, the amount awarded does not
exceed one-third of his net income. Christopher requests a reduction in Stacey’s
final periodic support because he argues that there is no evidence in the record to
support the inclusion of rehabilitative education expenses and health insurance.
In Fontana v. Fontana, 13-916, p. 15 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/12/14), 136 So.3d
173, 183 n. 6 (citing 24A Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 763; see also
Daniel Jones, Rehabilitative Alimony—The Goal of Self Support, 20 J. Contemp.
Legal Issues J. 25, n. 2 (2009)), the court explained:
Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate where the dependent spouse needs to improve his or her job skills in order to obtain a standard of living approaching that enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, and the spouse indicates a desire to enroll in an educational program to obtain job skills or intends to apply the alimony towards job training designed to lead to employment. Other circumstances that may justify an award of rehabilitative alimony include the fact that the requesting party sacrificed educational and employment opportunities during the marriage and was absent from the job market for a significant length of time.
The trial court ordered rehabilitative alimony be included in Stacey’s final
spousal support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for one year. The evidence
shows that Stacey entered the military as an active-duty Marine upon completion
of high school. After four years as a Marine, she enlisted in the National Guard for
three years. During those years, she was enrolled at the University of Louisiana,
Lafayette. She obtained a four-year degree in Business Administration with a
focus in Marketing in 2001. She then graduated from Louisiana State University
2 with a Masters in Business Administration in May 2004 – the same year she
married Christopher. The evidence further shows that she had very little work
history while married, with the parties agreeing that she would be a stay-at-home
mother to their children. Their first child was born in 2006.
Included in the record is a report by Ted Deshotels, a Vocational
Rehabilitation Counselor. His report states:
Presently, Ms. Lawrence is pursuing a master’s degree in counseling and hopes to obtain her Licensed Professional Counseling license once she completes the program. The online master’s degree program in counseling is sponsored through Walden and she is studying for a Master of Science in a clinical mental health counseling program course. The course is divided into trauma and crisis counseling, forensic counseling, and military families and culture. She states that she is pursuing all three [tracks] at this time. So far, she completed eleven credit hours. The present term will end mid- august 2020[,] and she should at that time have accumulated 21 hours, she estimated. She reportedly need[s] 111 total credit hours to graduate[,] and she says she will take 10 hours per semester. With books and fees included, the cost is approximately $5,000 per semester. Once she completes the present semester, she reportedly will need approximately 90 more credit hours to graduate. At the rate of 10 hours per semester, I estimate Ms. Lawrence should complete the program in approximately 4 ½ years from August 2020.
Therefore, with nine semesters left to finish her degree at $5,000.00 per
semester, Stacey would require $45,000 in educational expenses. However, the
trial court determined that the law does not require Christopher to pay to re-educate
Stacey in a new field, but rather to update the degree she already has in order to
make her marketable and competitive with job applicants who have work
experience or those recently graduated. The trial court found that it would take
more than a few weeks of online courses in order for Stacey to be competitive due
to the length of time she was out of the workforce.
Ted Deshotels testified to the following at trial:
3 My overall opinion is that she really lacks updated skills to work in the marketing positions, and, certainly, with positions that would require an MBA, or definitely have a preference of an MBA, you know, skills, like you know, social-media marketing, search option – search engine optimization, SEO training, sales-type software training. And those things are available, it’s just that’s a process that I think she would need to do if she were to, actually, compete for the jobs that are, actually, listed out there today with what employers are realistically looking for.
Mr. Deshotels was asked:
Q. So getting her back to her full earning capacity that she would have had if she had been working these 14 years of marriage, is going to take how long?
A. Well, I think on the lower-end of what MBA’s earn and I have the median-range listed, I would say, you know, again, one to three years and then an additional three to five. So if we do the math, I mean, I would say anywhere from five to eight years to get to the [$]60,000 plus range. But the full range, to get into the, say, [$]80,000 you know, six to eight years, I would say, from today.
When Mr. Deshotels was asked how long it would take Stacey to refresh her
master’s degree through a university, he stated that he believed it would take her
one to two years. Based on the $5,000.00 per semester estimate in Mr. Deshotels
report, if Stacey was enrolled at university for the Spring, Summer and Fall
Semesters for one year, it would cost her approximately $15,000.00. The trial
court awarded her $12,000.00.
We find there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s award of
rehabilitative education expenses. As such, we find no error in the trial court’s
inclusion of this amount in Stacey’s final spousal support award.
Moving on to the health insurance issue, “final periodic spousal support is
limited to an amount sufficient for maintenance.” Stowe v. Stowe, 49,596, p. 2
(La.App. 2 Cir. 3/4/15), 162 So.3d 638, 640. It is well settled that when
determining an award for final spousal support, maintenance includes health
4 insurance policies. See Widman v. Widman, 93-613 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/94), 631
So.2d 689. “No abuse of the trial court’s discretion occurs when the record
supports the trial court’s award of interim spousal support when the needs of a
claimant spouse are established through testimony alone with no documentary
evidence in support thereof.” Id. at 641.
In the present case, Christopher complains that there is no evidence in the
record to support an award of $750.00 to Stacey for health insurance each month.
We disagree. Christopher paid Stacey’s health insurance in the interim until final
periodic support was ordered. As such, Stacey was not paying health insurance at
the time of the trial on this matter. When Stacey testified, she was asked how
much it would cost her each month for health insurance. She answered that it
would cost her $756.21. When asked how she came to that number, she explained
that she received a quote from an insurance agent via e-mail and that is the number
she was given. Defense attorney objected citing hearsay, and the objection was
sustained. The e-mail was not entered into evidence and was proffered by Stacey.
However, the Income and Expense Sheet was entered into evidence as Leblanc’s
Exhibit 1. It includes the amount to which Stacey testified at trial.
The trial judge was asked during his oral ruling how he came up with
$750.00 as the amount awarded for health insurance. He explained that he found it
to be a reasonable amount for private insurance. We agree. “Some degree of
estimation is necessary in most alimony cases, and in cases such as these more
leeway must obviously be allowed. A permanent alimony determination is
necessarily sensitive to the particular facts of each case and is unsusceptible of
being reduced to a mathematical computation.” Jeansonne v. Jeansonne, 550
5 So.2d 973, 976 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1989). If the trial court’s findings are reasonable,
we cannot disturb them. Green, 308 So.3d 778.
Stacey is entitled to health insurance as part of the final periodic spousal
support award. She testified to an amount she was quoted for health insurance per
month. That amount is included on the Income and Expenses Sheet which is in
evidence. We do not find this amount to be unreasonable. Accordingly, we find
that the trial court did not commit manifest error in including $750.00 for health
insurance in Stacey’s final periodic spousal support award.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are
assessed against Christopher David Lawrence.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal. Rule 2–16.3.