Christopher Caine Donaldson v. State
This text of Christopher Caine Donaldson v. State (Christopher Caine Donaldson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00272-CR
CHRISTOPHER CAINE DONALDSON, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 19th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013-822-C1
ABATEMENT ORDER
On July 14, 2014, Appellant entered an open plea of guilty to three counts of
aggravated assault against a public servant and to one count of credit card abuse. That
same day, Appellant and his counsel signed, and the trial court approved, a “Waiver of
Appeal, “ in which Appellant waived all rights he had to appeal, including the filing of
a motion for new trial.
On August 25, 2014, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, following which
Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment on each count of aggravated assault against a public servant and two years’ confinement in state jail on
the one count of credit card abuse, to be served concurrently. That same day, the “Trial
Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal,” stating that this case is not a plea-
bargain case and that Appellant has the right of appeal, was signed.
On August 29, 2014, Appellant’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal and a
motion to withdraw as counsel. In his motion to withdraw, Appellant’s trial counsel
alleged that he was unable to effectively communicate with Appellant so as to be able to
adequately represent him. That same day, the trial court granted the motion to
withdraw as counsel. At that time, 26 days remained of the 30-day period for filing a
motion for new trial. When the time period for filing a motion for new trial expired on
September 24, 2014, no motion for new trial had been filed.
On September 16, 2014, this Court directed both Appellant and the State to file a
response on whether Appellant had waived his right of appeal. We received a response
from Appellant’s trial counsel and from the State, which included an affidavit from the
trial court judge. On September 25, 2014, the Clerk of the Court sent a letter to
Appellant, his trial counsel, and the State (with a copy going to the trial court),
informing them that the Court concluded that Appellant’s waiver of appeal was
ineffective and that the scope of Appellant’s appeal was not limited by the waiver. See
Washington v. State, 363 S.W.3d 589, 589-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Sims v. State, 326
S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.); see also Nichols v. State, 349
S.W.3d 612, 614-15 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d). In the meantime, on
Donaldson v. State Page 2 September 24, 2014, the trial court clerk filed a letter from Appellant (dated September
22, 2014) that requested the appointment of an appellate attorney.
On October 2, 2014, the trial court signed an order appointing Appellant’s
appellate counsel. Appellant has now filed a motion to abate this appeal and remand
this cause to the trial court to the point at which a motion for new trial can be filed,
presented, and heard. The State has filed a response opposing the motion.
The time for filing a motion for new trial is a critical stage of the proceedings,
and a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel during that period. Cooks v. State,
240 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tex. 2007). There exists, however, in cases like this where a
defendant is represented by counsel during trial, a rebuttable presumption that this
counsel continued to adequately represent the defendant during this critical stage. Id.
We conclude that this presumption has been rebutted. As stated, four days after
Appellant’s sentence was imposed, his trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel, stating that he was unable to effectively communicate with Appellant so as to
be able to adequately represent him. The motion to withdraw was granted that day,
and Appellant’s appellate counsel was not appointed until after the 30-day time period
had expired. Although Appellant’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal, which
indicates Appellant was informed of at least some of his appellate rights, attached to
Appellant’s motion is Appellant’s appellate counsel’s affidavit in which he states that
he has determined that Appellant was not advised by any lawyer about the merits of
filing a motion for new trial from the time he was sentenced until he was appointed.
Donaldson v. State Page 3 Appellant has therefore established that he was denied counsel during this critical stage
of the case.
But even when a defendant rebuts the presumption with evidence that he was
deprived of adequate counsel during this critical stage, the deprivation of counsel is
subject to a harmless-error or prejudice analysis. Id. Appellant contends that there are
several “facially plausible claims” that could have been presented in a motion for new
trial. First, Appellant argues that there were unavailable material witnesses that could
have provided necessary testimony. Attached to the motion is Appellant’s father’s
affidavit, in which he states that he and his wife, Appellant’s mother, were unavailable
at the time of trial but that they could have offered testimony that (1) would have been
pertinent to their son’s physical, emotional, and psychological condition before and at
the time of the incident and (2) would have been considered in mitigation as to their
son’s ultimate sentence. Additionally, Appellant’s father averred that, as a former
licensed peace officer and constable, he could have testified as to what extent the subject
“BB gun” was a deadly weapon.
Appellant also argues as a “facially plausible claim” that he did not understand
the plea-bargain process and therefore did not knowingly reject the plea offer by the
State. Appellant indicates that this was because his trial counsel was ineffective.
Appellant’s appellate counsel refers in his affidavit to the record of the admonishment
hearing where Appellant’s trial counsel states that he had tried to communicate with
Appellant about his options and Appellant responds that he had not made clear what
the options actually meant.
Donaldson v. State Page 4 We conclude that, at a minimum, Appellant has asserted a facially plausible
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Appellant was unable to present this
claim to the trial court and make a record for appellate review because he was without
counsel during the time period a motion for new trial must be prepared and filed.
Therefore, on this record, we cannot declare that the denial of counsel did not harm or
prejudice Appellant. See Prudhomme v. State, 28 S.W.3d 114, 121 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2000, order) (deprivation of counsel during period for filing motion for new trial not
harmless where defendant had “facially plausible claim” that he was unable to present
to trial court in a motion for new trial and to make a record for appellate review);
Massingill v. State, 8 S.W.3d 733, 737-38 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (deprivation
of counsel during period for filing of motion for new trial not harmless where
defendant asserted a “facially plausible claim” that could have been presented in
motion for new trial).
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