Christopher Busbee v. State of Florida

187 So. 3d 1266, 2016 WL 1337359, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5242, 41 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 850
District Court of Appeal of Florida·Decided April 6, 2016·No. 1D15-4472·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

' Christopher Busbee files a petition alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective in his direct criminal appeal, We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App, P. 9.141(d). For the reasons explained below, we find merit in Busbee’s claims and grant the petition.

Busbee received 17 overall-sentences, all concurrent. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court announced its intent to sen *1268 tence Busbee as a habitual felony offender (“HFO”) on all counts.

Case No. ll-CF-1166

The first three sentences were imposed in a violation of probation case, lower tribunal case number ll-CF-1166. We first note that the HFO designation in these three sentences was improper. “If the trial court did not place appellant on probation as a habitual felony offender, then it cannot sentence him as a habitual felony offender upon revocation of probation.” Powell v. State, 774 So.2d 869, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citations omitted). In this case, it is clear that the petitioner was not placed on probation as a habitual felony offender. Nonetheless, upon violation of probation, he was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. This was improper. Id.

The first sentence imposed was for unarmed burglary of an occupied dwelling, contrary to sections 810.02(l)(b) and (3)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). This offense is a second-degree felony punishable by 15 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011). The court orally pronounced a 15-year sentence, and awarded 293 days’ credit for time served. The written sentence was consistent with the oral pronouncement. This sentence was legal; 15 years’ imprisonment is the statutory maximum for a second-degree felony even without the HFO designation. Id.

The second sentence imposed in that case was for one count of unarmed burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, contrary to sections 810.02(l)(b) and (4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011). This offense is a third-degree felony punishable by 5 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2011). HFO enhancement allows a court to sentence a third-degree felony offender to no more than 10 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.084(4)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2011). That provision provides a mandatory minimum term of 5 years’ imprisonment for such offenders. Id. However, as discussed above, the HFO designation was improper. Accordingly, the 5-year statutory maximum imposed by section 775.082(3)(e) applies. Here, the trial court imposed, orally and in writing, a 15-year sentence.

The question becomes, therefore, whether the lowest permissible sentence in the Criminal Punishment Code (“CPC”) scoresheet utilized in this case created an exception to the statutory maximum. “If the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25); see also § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). However, “when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence ... is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.” Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003). Here, the CPC scoresheet listed a lowest permissible sentence of 140.175 months, and we find no error in that calculation. Per section 921.0024(2) and Butler, this approximately 11.7 year calculation becomes the required sentence for this count; because the lowest permissible sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, the trial court was required to impose the CPC sentence, but could not exceed the lowest permissible sentence itself. In short, the trial court was required to impose a sentence of 140.175 months (or roughly 11.7 years) on this count, and instead imposed a 15-year sentence. This sentence is, accordingly, illegal.

*1269 The third sentence was for second-degree petit theft, third subsequent offense, contrary to sections 812.014(l)(a-b), (3)(a), and (c), Florida Statutes. This offense is a third-degree felony punishable by 5 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2011). Similar to the above count, the trial court imposed, orally and in writing, a 15-year sentence. The above analysis controls this count as well; the trial court was required to impose the lowest permissible CPC sentence of 140.175 months. The 15-year sentence is illegal.

Case No. 12-CF-960

Busbee received two sentences in lower tribunal case number 12-CF-960. The first was for unarmed burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, contrary to sections 810.02(l)(b) and (4)(b), Florida Statutes (2012). This offense is a third-degree felony punishable by 5 years’ imprisonment.- See § 775.082(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2012). HFO enhancement allows a court to sentence a third-degree felony offender to no more than 10 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.084(4)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2012). The trial court orally announced a five-year sentence on this count, but imposed an inconsistent written sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. The oral pronouncement controls over the written sentence where there is a discrepancy. Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 602 (Fla.2007). The orally pronounced sentence was legal. However, a discrepancy remains between the oral and written, sentence on this count.

The second sentence that Busbee received- in this case was for second-degree petit theft, third, subsequent offense, contrary to sections 812.014(l)(a-b), (3)(a), and (c), Florida Statutes. This offense is a third-degree felony punishable by 5 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2012). HFO enhancement allows a court to sentence a third-degree felony offender to no more than 10 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.084(4)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2012). As on the above count, trial court orally announced a five-year sentence on this count, but imposed a written sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. The orally pronounced sentence was legal. The trial court also, although announcing its intent to sentence the petitioner as an HFO on all counts, neglected to include the HFO designation in the written sentence for these two counts. Finally, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court erroneously announced a five-year sentence for a nonexistent third count in this case.

Case No. 12-CF-961

Next, Busbee received three sentences in lower tribunal case number 12-CF-961. The first was for unarmed burglary of an occupied dwelling,, contrary to - sections 810,02(l)(b) and (3)(a), Florida Statutes (2012). This offense is a second-degree felony punishable by 15 years’ imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2012). • The trial court imposed a 15-year sentence on this count orally and in writing. However, the written sentence omitted the HFO designation for this count and the others in this case.

The second sentence in this case was for third-degree grand theft, contrary to sections 812.014(l)(a, b) and (2)(c)(l), Florida Statutes:(2012). .This offense is a third-degree felony punishable by 5 years’ imprisonment.

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Christopher Busbee v. State of Florida, 187 So. 3d 1266, 2016 WL 1337359, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5242, 41 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 850 (Fla. Ct. App. 2016).

187 So. 3d 1266 (Christopher Busbee v. State of Florida) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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