Christopher Blake Stites v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER BLAKE STITES, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00009-CAB-SBC

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 13 v. RECONSIDERATION

14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, [Doc. No. 17] 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff Christopher Blake Stites (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint seeking review of 18 the decision of Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his 19 application for Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 20 benefits. The Court remanded to the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for consideration 21 of the paragraph C criteria. [Doc. No. 16.] Defendant has now moved for reconsideration 22 of that order under Local Rule 7.1(i) because the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s 23 step three paragraph C finding was located elsewhere in the opinion. [Doc. No. 17 at 1– 24 2.] For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration. 25 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a district court may reconsider and amend a previous 26 order if the district court committed clear error. Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 850 27 (9th Cir. 2022). However, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used 28 1 sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona 2 Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 The paragraph C inquiry asks whether the claimant has a “serious and persistent” 4 mental disorder, that is, the claimant must have a medically documented history of the 5 existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 6 App. 1 § 12.00(G). It also requires evidence of both: medical treatment, mental health 7 therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that 8 diminishes the symptoms and signs of the claimant’s mental disorder (“C1 criteria”) and 9 marginal adjustment, that is, the claimant has minimal capacity to adapt to changes in their 10 environment or to demands that are not already part of their daily life (“C2 criteria”). Id. 11 at § 12.00(G)(2)(b)–(c). Here, the ALJ found that “the record fails to document the 12 existence of any of these criteria.” [Doc. No. 8-2 at 24.] 13 Defendant first argues that the ALJ’s paragraph B analysis of Plaintiff’s performance 14 at school via his Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) provides substantial evidence that 15 the C1 criterion was not met. [Doc. No. 17 at 5.] Even assuming that the evidence from 16 Plaintiff’s IEP and school program meet the criteria for “medical treatment, mental health 17 therapy, psychosocial support(s) or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing,” 1 it is 18 unclear how the cited paragraph B evidence of Plaintiff’s positive performance at school 19 supports a conclusion that “the record fails to document the existence of [ongoing treatment 20 that diminishes the signs and symptoms of the claimant’s mental disorder.]” [Doc. No. 8- 21 2 at 24]. To the contrary, it directly contradicts the ALJ’s paragraph C conclusion because 22 it shows that Plaintiff did participate in a structured program, albeit not medical, and 23 experienced improvement. 24 25 26 27 1 The Court notes that the C1 criterion emphasizes evidence of “medical treatment,” “medical evidence,” and “medical practice” to treat a “medical condition.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 28 1 Defendant also argues that the ALJ’s paragraph B finding that Plaintiff has a 2 moderate limitation in adapting or managing oneself provides substantial evidence for the 3 ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not satisfy the C2 criterion. [Doc. No. 17 at 4 (referring to 4 Doc. No. 8-2 at 23–24).] The Court disagrees. 5 The paragraph B criteria are not a substitute for the paragraph C criteria; they are an 6 “alternative.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(G)(1). In other words, the 7 evidence that is examined is different for each. For example, the paragraph B criteria for 8 adapting and managing oneself “refers to the abilities to regulate emotions, control 9 behavior, and maintain well-being in a work setting.” Id. at § 12.00(E)(4). On the other 10 hand, the C2 criterion asks whether: 11 [D]espite [the claimant’s] diminished symptoms and signs [due to treatment], [he has] achieved only marginal adjustment. “Marginal adjustment” means 12 that [the claimant’s] adaptation to the requirements of daily life is fragile; that 13 is, [the claimant] ha[s] minimal capacity to adapt to changes in [his] environment or to demands that are not already part of [his] daily life. 14 15 Id. at § 12.00(G)(2)(c). The Court therefore concluded it could not, and still cannot, 16 meaningfully evaluate whether the ALJ’s finding as to the C2 criterion is supported by 17 substantial evidence by simply looking to the evidence supporting the ALJ’s paragraph B 18 analysis. In particular, the paragraph B analysis focuses on behaviors “in a work setting” 19 and the ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff “can adapt to occasional changes in the 20 workplace.” On the other hand, the C2 criterion addresses adapting to changes in the 21 environment and daily life more broadly. In doing so, the Court joins many other district 22 courts in the Ninth Circuit that have come to the same conclusion regarding the inability to 23 simply interchange evidence for paragraph B and C. E.g. Martinez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 24 Admin., No. CV-22-00504-TUC-JR, 2023 WL 5346033, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2023); 25 J.A. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-07142-VKD, 2022 WL 2181693, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 26 2022). 27 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843 (9th Cir. 2022) 28 does not change the Court’s conclusion. There, the district court originally erred by 1 |}overlooking the ALJ’s full explanation and therefore missing substantial evidence 2 supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant’s alleged limitations were contradicted 3 || with evidence of her daily activities. /d. at 851. Here, even looking to all of the ALJ’s 4 || decision, the evidence (1) squarely contradicts the ALJ’s conclusion that the C1 criterion 5 || was not met, and (2) does not allow the Court to meaningfully evaluate whether the ALJ’s 6 || paragraph C finding is supported by substantial evidence. While an ALJ is not required to 7 ||explain a decision with “ideal clarity,” the Ninth Circuit “still demand|[s] that the agency 8 forth the reasoning behind its decisions in a way that allows for meaningful review.” 9 || Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). 10 The Court is not persuaded that its order was incorrect. Accordingly, Defendant’s 11 ||motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 12 Itis SO ORDERED. 13 || Dated: April 14, 2026 © g 14 15 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28