Christopher Binder v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation Washington Gas Light Company and Potomac Electric Power Company. Christopher Binder v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation Washington Gas Light Company and Potomac Electric Power Company

966 F.2d 701
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMay 8, 1992
Docket91-7116
StatusUnpublished

This text of 966 F.2d 701 (Christopher Binder v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation Washington Gas Light Company and Potomac Electric Power Company. Christopher Binder v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation Washington Gas Light Company and Potomac Electric Power Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christopher Binder v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation Washington Gas Light Company and Potomac Electric Power Company. Christopher Binder v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation Washington Gas Light Company and Potomac Electric Power Company, 966 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Opinion

966 F.2d 701

296 U.S.App.D.C. 181

NOTICE: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders, judgments, and explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents, but counsel may refer to unpublished dispositions when the binding or preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is relevant.
Christopher BINDER, Appellant,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a municipal corporation; Washington
Gas Light Company; and Potomac Electric Power Company.
Christopher BINDER, Appellant,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a municipal corporation; Washington
Gas Light Company; and Potomac Electric Power Company.

Nos. 91-7116, 91-7117.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

May 8, 1992.

Before WALD, D.H. GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the motions to dismiss and the oppositions thereto; the motion to consolidate and the opposition thereto; and the motions for summary affirmance and the oppositions thereto, it is

ORDERED that the motions to dismiss be granted. Fed.R.App.P. 26(c) has no application to the thirty-day period specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1), as the latter rule states that the appeal time starts from the entry of judgment, not from service of the notice of judgment. See Sofarelli Associates, Inc. v. U.S., 716 F.2d 1395, 1396 (Fed.Cir.1983); Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 518 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Cir.1975). Thus, appellant's notice of appeal was untimely. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for an extension of time in which to appeal because appellant failed to make a sufficient showing of "excusable neglect or good cause" for not meeting the original deadline. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining motions be dismissed as moot.

The clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate in both No. 91-7116 and No. 90-7171 until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C.Cir., Rule 15. The Clerk is further directed to file a copy of this order in each of the above-captioned cases.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
966 F.2d 701, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christopher-binder-v-district-of-columbia-a-municipal-corporation-cadc-1992.