UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Christopher Beres
v. Case No. 25-cv-79-SM-AJ Opinion No. 2025 DNH 058 RELX, Inc., d/b/a LexisNexis USA, and Portfolio Media, Inc.
O R D E R
After multiple unsuccessful defamation suits against RELX,
Inc., d/b/a LEXIS NEXIS USA, and Portfolio Media, Inc., in other
courts, Christopher Beres, who is a lawyer proceeding pro se,
brought the same claims in Hillsborough County (New Hampshire)
Superior Court. Defendants removed the action to this court,
but Beres then added Andrew Delaney as a plaintiff to destroy
diversity jurisdiction and sought remand to state court. The
court granted the defendants’ motion to sever Delaney from the
case to preserve diversity jurisdiction, and denied the
plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Doc. no. 29. Delaney is no
longer a party in this case.
In response, Beres filed a notice of voluntary dismissal
without prejudice. Doc. no. 30. Defendants move to convert
Beres’s notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice to
dismissal with prejudice and also seek an award of fees incurred
in litigating this case. Doc. no. 31. Beres responded to the defendants’ motion by refiling his notice of voluntary dismissal
but did not address the issues defendants raise. For the
reasons that follow, the case is dismissed with prejudice. The
defendants’ request for an award of fees and costs is granted.
Standard of Review
In the circumstances presented here, a “plaintiff may
dismiss an action without a court order by filing [] a notice of
dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a
motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
Unless otherwise stated, a voluntary dismissal is without
prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). “But if the plaintiff
previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on
or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as
an adjudication on the merits.” Id. The limit on voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is known as the “two-dismissal
rule.” García–Monagas v. De Arellano, 674 F.3d 45, 49 n.3 (1st
Cir. 2012).
When the two-dismissal rule applies, the court may award
defendants costs incurred in the prior suit. Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(d). A circuit split exists as to whether fees incurred in a
prior suit are recoverable under Rule 41(d) as costs. Horowitz
v. 148 South Emerson Associates LLC, 888 F.3d 13, 24-25 (2nd
Cir. 2018). Under New Hampshire law, the court, in its
2 discretion, may award fees as a sanction for bad faith
litigation, “to do justice and vindicate rights, as well as to
discourage frivolous lawsuits.” Fat Bullies Farm, LLC v.
Devenport, 170 N.H. 17, 30 (2017).
Background
Delaney was employed in a temporary position at a law firm,
where he worked on a project for the firm’s client, Toyota, and
apparently had access to confidential documents. The project
was suspended during the COVID pandemic, resulting in Delaney
losing his job. Delaney, through Beres, who was acting as his
legal counsel, sent a demand letter to Toyota, but Toyota did
not respond. In April of 2020, Beres filed a lawsuit against
Toyota on Delaney’s behalf in Brevard County, Florida. Beres
included allegedly sensitive information about Toyota in that
complaint. Delaney later dismissed the suit without prejudice.
The agency that employed Delaney and placed him in a
temporary position at the law firm filed suit against Delaney in
federal court in the Southern District of New York, alleging
breach of contract and other claims, arising from information
about Toyota that Delaney included in the complaint filed in
Florida state court. That case remains stayed because of
Delaney’s ongoing bankruptcy proceeding.
3 Defendant RELX owns PMI, which publishes Law360, an
internet legal news service. Between December 20, 2021, and
January 6, 2023, Law360 published articles about the case
against Delaney in the Southern District of New York. Delaney
and Beres then filed a series of defamation lawsuits against PMI
and RELX, based upon statements published in those articles.
The first defamation suit was filed in federal court in the
Southern District of Florida on February 10, 2022, challenging
eight statements in four of the Law360 articles as defamatory.
When defendants moved to dismiss the claims, Delaney and Beres
voluntarily dismissed the suit without prejudice. A year later,
however, Delaney and Beres filed an identical complaint in
Florida state court, and, again, when defendants moved to
dismiss, Delaney and Beres voluntarily dismissed the suit. In
that suit, the court awarded defendants fees under Florida’s
two-dismissal rule and Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute, because
Beres and Delaney had previously dismissed the same defamation
claims against the same defendants in the federal action.
Several months later, Delaney and Beres, undeterred, filed a
third suit in Florida state court, alleging defamation based on
the same statements as well as three additional statements in
new Law360 articles. And, once again, when defendants moved to
dismiss, Delaney and Beres filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal.
4 Delaney then filed a similar defamation complaint in
Minnesota state court, and when that suit was dismissed, filed a
new and similar action in New York state court. Beres filed
this suit in Rockingham County Superior Court (New Hampshire) on
January 3, 2025, alleging defamation against the same defendants
based on many of the same claims that were previously dismissed
in Florida federal and state courts, Minnesota state court, and
New York state court.
Discussion
Beres has filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this
case without prejudice. Defendants move to have the claims
dismissed with prejudice and seek an award of attorneys’ fees.
The two issues are addressed as follows.
A. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
Beres repeatedly filed the same defamation claims against
the defendants named in this action and then voluntarily
dismissed the claims without prejudice. As the Minnesota court
wrote when dismissing Delaney’s defamation claims against the
same defendants: “Justice is not served by allowing this game
of whack-a-mole to continue.” Doc. no. 11-19, at 16. Beres’s
claims in this case are dismissed with prejudice under the two-
dismissal rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
5 B. Award of Fees
Defendants seek an award of the fees they have incurred in
this action under New Hampshire law and, alternatively, under
the New York anti-SLAPP statue (N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 70-
a(1)(a)). 1 Under New Hampshire law, the court may award fees
“when one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Christopher Beres
v. Case No. 25-cv-79-SM-AJ Opinion No. 2025 DNH 058 RELX, Inc., d/b/a LexisNexis USA, and Portfolio Media, Inc.
O R D E R
After multiple unsuccessful defamation suits against RELX,
Inc., d/b/a LEXIS NEXIS USA, and Portfolio Media, Inc., in other
courts, Christopher Beres, who is a lawyer proceeding pro se,
brought the same claims in Hillsborough County (New Hampshire)
Superior Court. Defendants removed the action to this court,
but Beres then added Andrew Delaney as a plaintiff to destroy
diversity jurisdiction and sought remand to state court. The
court granted the defendants’ motion to sever Delaney from the
case to preserve diversity jurisdiction, and denied the
plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Doc. no. 29. Delaney is no
longer a party in this case.
In response, Beres filed a notice of voluntary dismissal
without prejudice. Doc. no. 30. Defendants move to convert
Beres’s notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice to
dismissal with prejudice and also seek an award of fees incurred
in litigating this case. Doc. no. 31. Beres responded to the defendants’ motion by refiling his notice of voluntary dismissal
but did not address the issues defendants raise. For the
reasons that follow, the case is dismissed with prejudice. The
defendants’ request for an award of fees and costs is granted.
Standard of Review
In the circumstances presented here, a “plaintiff may
dismiss an action without a court order by filing [] a notice of
dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a
motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
Unless otherwise stated, a voluntary dismissal is without
prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). “But if the plaintiff
previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on
or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as
an adjudication on the merits.” Id. The limit on voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is known as the “two-dismissal
rule.” García–Monagas v. De Arellano, 674 F.3d 45, 49 n.3 (1st
Cir. 2012).
When the two-dismissal rule applies, the court may award
defendants costs incurred in the prior suit. Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(d). A circuit split exists as to whether fees incurred in a
prior suit are recoverable under Rule 41(d) as costs. Horowitz
v. 148 South Emerson Associates LLC, 888 F.3d 13, 24-25 (2nd
Cir. 2018). Under New Hampshire law, the court, in its
2 discretion, may award fees as a sanction for bad faith
litigation, “to do justice and vindicate rights, as well as to
discourage frivolous lawsuits.” Fat Bullies Farm, LLC v.
Devenport, 170 N.H. 17, 30 (2017).
Background
Delaney was employed in a temporary position at a law firm,
where he worked on a project for the firm’s client, Toyota, and
apparently had access to confidential documents. The project
was suspended during the COVID pandemic, resulting in Delaney
losing his job. Delaney, through Beres, who was acting as his
legal counsel, sent a demand letter to Toyota, but Toyota did
not respond. In April of 2020, Beres filed a lawsuit against
Toyota on Delaney’s behalf in Brevard County, Florida. Beres
included allegedly sensitive information about Toyota in that
complaint. Delaney later dismissed the suit without prejudice.
The agency that employed Delaney and placed him in a
temporary position at the law firm filed suit against Delaney in
federal court in the Southern District of New York, alleging
breach of contract and other claims, arising from information
about Toyota that Delaney included in the complaint filed in
Florida state court. That case remains stayed because of
Delaney’s ongoing bankruptcy proceeding.
3 Defendant RELX owns PMI, which publishes Law360, an
internet legal news service. Between December 20, 2021, and
January 6, 2023, Law360 published articles about the case
against Delaney in the Southern District of New York. Delaney
and Beres then filed a series of defamation lawsuits against PMI
and RELX, based upon statements published in those articles.
The first defamation suit was filed in federal court in the
Southern District of Florida on February 10, 2022, challenging
eight statements in four of the Law360 articles as defamatory.
When defendants moved to dismiss the claims, Delaney and Beres
voluntarily dismissed the suit without prejudice. A year later,
however, Delaney and Beres filed an identical complaint in
Florida state court, and, again, when defendants moved to
dismiss, Delaney and Beres voluntarily dismissed the suit. In
that suit, the court awarded defendants fees under Florida’s
two-dismissal rule and Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute, because
Beres and Delaney had previously dismissed the same defamation
claims against the same defendants in the federal action.
Several months later, Delaney and Beres, undeterred, filed a
third suit in Florida state court, alleging defamation based on
the same statements as well as three additional statements in
new Law360 articles. And, once again, when defendants moved to
dismiss, Delaney and Beres filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal.
4 Delaney then filed a similar defamation complaint in
Minnesota state court, and when that suit was dismissed, filed a
new and similar action in New York state court. Beres filed
this suit in Rockingham County Superior Court (New Hampshire) on
January 3, 2025, alleging defamation against the same defendants
based on many of the same claims that were previously dismissed
in Florida federal and state courts, Minnesota state court, and
New York state court.
Discussion
Beres has filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this
case without prejudice. Defendants move to have the claims
dismissed with prejudice and seek an award of attorneys’ fees.
The two issues are addressed as follows.
A. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
Beres repeatedly filed the same defamation claims against
the defendants named in this action and then voluntarily
dismissed the claims without prejudice. As the Minnesota court
wrote when dismissing Delaney’s defamation claims against the
same defendants: “Justice is not served by allowing this game
of whack-a-mole to continue.” Doc. no. 11-19, at 16. Beres’s
claims in this case are dismissed with prejudice under the two-
dismissal rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
5 B. Award of Fees
Defendants seek an award of the fees they have incurred in
this action under New Hampshire law and, alternatively, under
the New York anti-SLAPP statue (N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 70-
a(1)(a)). 1 Under New Hampshire law, the court may award fees
“when one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons, when the litigant’s conduct can be
characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and when it
should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have
defended the action.” Short v. LaPlante, 174 N.H. 384, 392-93
2021). Because New Hampshire law provides the relief defendants
request and defendants have not shown a conflict with New York
law, the court need not address the New York anti-SLAPP
statute’s attorneys’ fees provision. See Ortiz v. Sig Sauer,
Inc., 596 F. Supp. 3d 339, 350 (D.N.H. 2022).
Beres’s practice of filing multiple defamation actions
against these defendants arising out of the same or similar
claims and then voluntarily dismissing the actions without
prejudice, only to refile the same claims, is plainly vexatious.
Beres and Delaney have continued that practice here, which
1 Because defendants seek their current fees, not fees incurred in any of the prior suits, Rule 41(d) does not apply. Referring to their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that New York provides the governing law in this case, which causes the New York anti-SLAPP statute to apply here.
6 appears to be aimed at harassing the defendants despite a
demonstrated lack of merit in the claims. The harassing and
vexatious conduct here included adding Delaney as a party to
destroy subject matter jurisdiction in this case. That maneuver
required defendants and the court to spend time and resources
sorting through plaintiffs’ tangled litigation history to
determine that Delaney did not belong in this case. There is no
doubt that Beres’s litigation tactics were pursued in bad faith
and were vexatious. In the interests of justice and to
discourage Beres’s practice of filing frivolous lawsuits,
defendants are entitled to an award of fees.
Defendants did not seek a specific amount of fees or
provide supporting documentation for an award. 2 For that reason,
the court is unable to award fees based on the present record.
Defendants will be given an opportunity to file a supplemental
motion for an award of fees that addresses the amount and
provides sufficient detail to allow the court to make a reasoned
decision in calculating the award.
2 Supporting documentation would include counsel’s affidavit to address the hourly rate(s) charged and contemporaneous timesheets with sufficient detail to show the work done. See, e.g., Neal v. Omni Boston Corp., 2025 WL 942893, at *12-*14 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2025); Huntington Distribution Fin., Inc. v. Outdoor Performance LLC, 2024 WL 2939176, at *5-*6 (D.N.H. May 2, 2024).
7 Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to
convert Beres’s notice of voluntary dismissal to dismissal with
prejudice (doc. no. 31) is granted.
This case is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ motions
to dismiss (doc. nos. 10 & 11) are terminated as moot.
Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable
attorneys’ fees incurred in this case, and, for that purpose,
they shall file an appropriate motion with sufficient supporting
documentation on or before May 30, 2025. Plaintiff shall file
any appropriate response on or before June 20, 2025.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
May 8, 2025
cc: Christopher Beres, pro se Counsel of Record