Christopher Bell v. Joann Bell

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 03-24-00145-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00145-CV

Christopher Bell, Appellant

v.

Joann Bell, Appellee

FROM THE 169TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. 322086, THE HONORABLE CARI L. STARRITT-BURNETT, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Christopher Bell, appearing pro se, appeals from the trial court’s order in a

suit to modify the parent–child relationship rendered after an evidentiary hearing. The order

appointed Joann sole managing conservator and Christopher possessory conservator of the

parties’ fifteen-year-old child (Child).1 In the order, the trial court found that Christopher should

not be appointed managing conservator because it would not be in Child’s best interest because

such appointment would significantly impair Child’s physical health or emotional development.

See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.131. The order further required Christopher to complete a thirty-hour

high-conflict parenting course before he may exercise his possession periods, which must be

supervised and are limited to the first, third, and fifth weekend of each month and to Father’s

Day. As explained below, we affirm the order.

1 Because the parties share a surname, for clarity we refer to them by their first names. Christopher contends on appeal that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s findings in the order that his appointment as managing

conservator would significantly impair Child’s physical health or emotional development, that

the imposition of supervised visitations is in the best interest of Child, and that Joann should be

appointed Child’s sole managing conservator. He also complains that the trial court “erred by

admitting statements and false accusations of Father” and that it violated his constitutional

rights to due process and equal protection by severely limiting his possession of Child.2

However, Christopher did not request a reporter’s record, and thus no reporter’s record was filed

in this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(b) (providing that it is appellant’s responsibility to

request reporter’s record). In the absence of a reporter’s record, we must presume that the trial

court heard sufficient evidence to make all necessary findings in support of its judgment.

Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex. 2002); De Leon v. De Leon, No. 03-15-00027-

CV, 2016 WL 4506783, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also

Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c) (if no reporter’s record is filed due to appellant’s fault, appellate court

may consider those issues that do not require reporter’s record). Each of Christopher’s issues

requires a review of the reporter’s record, which is not before us. Consequently, Christopher has

not shown reversible error, and we affirm the trial court’s order.3

2 Christopher does not challenge the constitutionality of any of the Family Code provisions authorizing trial courts to limit a parent’s possession and access when determining a child’s best interest. 3 We recognize that Christopher has attempted to represent himself in this proceeding, but we must apply the same substantive and procedural standards to him as we do to litigants represented by counsel, lest we afford him an unfair advantage merely because he is pro se. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). 2 __________________________________________ Karin Crump, Justice

Before Justices Theofanis, Crump, and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: May 29, 2025