Christopher A. Scott, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent.

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: July 22, 2025
• Docket: SC100916
• Status: Published

Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc

CHRISTOPHER A. SCOTT, ) Opinion issued July 22, 2025 ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. SC100916 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOONE COUNTY The Honorable J. Hasbrouck Jacobs, Judge

Christopher Scott appeals the overruling of his Rule 29.15 amended motion for

postconviction relief. 1 Scott’s pro se Rule 29.15 motion was the only timely filed

motion. Because Scott does not challenge the motion court’s overruling of his pro se

claim in his amended motion, this Court affirms the motion court’s judgment denying

postconviction relief.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The state charged Scott with first-degree robbery, armed criminal action, and

unlawful use of a weapon. The circuit court entered its judgment finding him guilty, after

a jury trial, of each count. In November 2020, the circuit court sentenced Scott. The

1 Unless otherwise noted, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2020). court of appeals affirmed. State v. Scott, 636 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. App. 2021) (mem.). On

January 19, 2022, the court of appeals issued its mandate.

On April 11, 2022, Scott filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief

raising three claims. At the same time, Scott filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

On April 14, 2022, the motion court made the following docket entry: “Movant is given

leave to proceed as a poor person. Case is set for status hearing on 5/31/22 at 1:30pm.

Notice to Statewide Public Defender’s Office and Boone APA Craig Johnston.” On

April 22, 2022, a public defender entered an appearance on Scott’s behalf. The public

defender did not request an extension of time to file an amended motion. On August 4,

2022, the public defender filed an amended motion raising six claims, including Scott’s

three pro se claims. On May 26, 2023, after an evidentiary hearing, the motion court

entered its judgment denying relief on each of Scott’s claims. Scott appealed. This Court

granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of the trial court’s action on the motion filed under this Rule

29.15 shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the

trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 29.15(k). “Appellate courts presume the motion

court’s findings are correct and a judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the

entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has

been made.” Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal quotation

omitted).

2 “This Court interprets the rules by applying principles similar to those used for

state statutes.” Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. banc 2012). “In determining

statutory intent, and this Court’s intent in the rules, this Court will look to the plain and

ordinary meaning of those words as defined in the dictionary.” Id. (internal quotation and

alteration omitted).

Analysis

Courts must enforce the mandatory time limits in Rules 29.15 and 24.035

This Court adopted “Rule 29.15 as the single, unified procedure for inmates

seeking post-conviction relief after trial.” Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Mo. banc

2014) (also citing Rule 24.035 as to inmates who plead guilty). Rules 29.15 and 24.035

are interpreted in pari materia. Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721, 730 (Mo. banc 2002).

In Dorris, the Court held Rules 29.15 and 24.035 both specify a motion for

postconviction relief “shall” be filed in the time limits established by rule, and “the

failure to timely file results in a ‘complete waiver’ of any right to proceed on the

motion.” Dorris, 360 S.W.3d at 266-67 (quoting Rule 29.15(b) (2008); Rule 24.035(b)

(2008)). “The time limits in Rules 24.035 and 29.15 serve the legitimate end of avoiding

delay in the processing of prisoner[s’] claims and prevent the litigation of stale claims.”

Id. at 269 (internal quotation omitted). “It is the court’s duty to enforce the mandatory

time limits and the resulting complete waiver in the post-conviction rules—even if the

[s]tate does not raise the issue.” Id. at 268. The state cannot waive noncompliance with

the time limits in Rules 29.15 or 24.035. Id. This is true even when the state fails to raise

timeliness in the motion court, even if the motion court hearing is to determine if

3 appointed counsel abandoned movant, and even if the state fails to brief timeliness or

concedes timeliness. The state cannot waive noncompliance with the mandatory

postconviction relief deadlines period.

The Court has continued to reaffirm these principles. “[P]ostconviction deadlines

‘play such an important role in the orderly presentation and resolution of post-conviction

claims that the [s]tate cannot waive them. Instead, motion courts and appellate courts

have a duty to enforce the mandatory time limits ... even if the [s]tate does not raise the

issue.’” Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822, 826-27 (Mo. banc 2015) (Fischer, J.,

concurring) (third alteration in original) (quoting Price, 422 S.W.3d at 297). In Stanley v.

State, 420 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. banc 2014), this Court unanimously held in the Rule 24.035

context: “The time limits for filing a post-conviction motion are mandatory. The movant

is responsible for timely filing the initial motion, and appointed counsel must timely file

either an amended motion or a statement that the pro se motion is sufficient.” Id. at 540

(internal citations omitted).

The versions of Rules 29.15 and 24.035 in effect at the sentencing date govern

In this case (and the others handed down simultaneously herewith), this Court

changed the deadline for filing an amended postconviction relief motion after the

defendants were sentenced but before the amended motion was filed. 2 Accordingly, the

2 Scott was sentenced in November 2020, at which time Rule 29.15 had last been amended effective January 1, 2018. Effective November 4, 2021, this Court amended Rule 29.15. Because Scott did not file his pro se motion until April 2022, this amendment occurred well before any operative deadline for filing the amended motion under either the 2020 or the November 4, 2021, versions of the rule. This Court again amended Rule 29.15 effective July 1, 2023. But, because the motion court entered

4 central issue in this case is whether the version of Rule 29.15 in effect at Scott’s

sentencing date (which at Scott’s sentencing date had last been amended effective

January 1, 2018) governs his entire postconviction proceedings (no matter when those

proceedings started or how long they last), or whether amendments to Rule 29.15

governed Scott’s postconviction proceedings when the amendments became effective

November 4, 2021.

Ordinarily, unless the rule states otherwise, “a procedural rule applies to all

pending proceedings whether commenced before or after the adoption of the rule.”

Wiseman v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 710 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Mo. App. 2025). So, a change to the

deadline for filing an amended Rule 29.15 motion will apply to a pending Rule 29.15

action (assuming the operative deadline has not run) unless the rule states otherwise. But

the version of Rule 29.15 in effect at Scott’s sentencing date does state otherwise. That is

the purpose of Rule 29.15(m), i.e., it changes the presumption that amendments to

procedural rules occurring in the middle of an action will apply to that action.

At the time of Scott’s sentencing, Rule 29.15(m) provided: “This Rule 29.15 shall

apply to all proceedings wherein sentence is pronounced on or after January 1, 2018.”

Scott was sentenced in November 2020. Therefore, the version of Rule 29.15 in effect at

Scott’s sentencing date applies throughout his postconviction proceedings regardless of

later amendments. Were the 2021 amendments to Rule 29.15 to apply to Scott’s

proceedings as he contends they should, the language of Rule 29.15(m)—indeed, the

judgment in Scott’s postconviction proceedings in May 2023, the only versions of the rule possibly at issue in his case are the 2020 and November 4, 2021, versions.

5 entire decision to include Rule 29.15(m)—would be rendered a nullity. This is

unacceptable. This Court, like the legislature as to statutes, is presumed to intend “every

word, clause, sentence, and provision” of its rules to have effect, and, likewise, it is

presumed the Court “did not insert idle verbiage or superfluous language” in its rules.

Treasurer of Mo. v. Penney, 710 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Mo. banc 2025) (internal quotation

omitted). 3

Because Scott appealed, Rule 29.15(g) specified an amended motion must be filed

within 60 days of the earlier of both: (1) the date the mandate issues from the court of

appeals, and (2) appointment of counsel or entry of appearance on behalf of the movant

by any counsel who is not appointed. Rule 29.15(g) also permitted an extension of this

deadline, with no extension to exceed 30 days individually and the total of all extensions

not to exceed 60 days. The amended motion the public defender filed on Scott’s behalf

was not timely filed because it was filed more than 60 days after the earlier of both

issuance of the mandate of the court of appeals and entry of appearance by the public

defender on Scott’s behalf, and because the public defender neither sought nor obtained

an extension of the 60-day deadline.

3 This analysis of Rule 29.15(m) (2020) is consistent with the current version of Rule 29.15(m), which, since July 1, 2023, has provided: “For sentences pronounced on or after January 1, 2018, postconviction relief proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of Rule 29.15 in effect on the date of the movant’s sentencing.” Rule 29.15(m) (2023); see also Rule 24.035(m) (2023) (same as to Rule 24.035); Rule 29.15(m) (2025) (same); Rule 24.035(m) (2025) (same).

6 The abandonment doctrine applies only to appointed counsel

The Court created the abandonment doctrine in Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 493

(Mo. banc 1991), and Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 1991). Price, 422

S.W.3d at 297. “[T]he abandonment doctrine was created to excuse the untimely filing

of amended motions by appointed counsel under Rule 29.15(e).” Id.

In Gittemeier v. State, 527 S.W.3d 64, 69 (Mo. banc 2017), the Court held, if

appointed counsel abandons a movant by filing an untimely amended motion for

postconviction relief, the circuit court may excuse the untimely filing and must adjudicate

the amended motion. The Court explicitly held the abandonment doctrine “applies only

to situations involving appointed postconviction counsel.” Id. at 71.

The Court has never held the abandonment doctrine applies to unappointed

counsel and declines to so hold now. Scott argues the Court recognized the abandonment

doctrine applies to unappointed counsel in Watson v. State, 536 S.W.3d 716 (Mo. banc

2018). In Watson, decided just four months after Gittemeier, the Court remanded a case

for an abandonment inquiry when an unappointed public defender filed an untimely

amended motion. Id. at 717. Watson focused on the timeliness of the amended motion,

did not cite Gittemeier, and offered no analysis of whether the abandonment doctrine

applied to unappointed public defenders. “Generally, this Court presumes, absent a

contrary showing, that an opinion of this Court has not been overruled sub silentio.”

State v. Shegog, 633 S.W.3d 362, 366 n.2 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal quotation omitted).

This presumption against overruling precedent sub silentio, coupled with the fact Watson

7 did not cite Gittemeier and offered no analysis of the issue, shows Watson did not

overrule or modify Gittemeier.

The Court’s holding the abandonment doctrine applies only to appointed counsel

is consistent with the current version of Rule 29.15(g), which, since November 4, 2021,

has provided: “If an amended motion or statement in lieu of an amended motion is not

timely filed by appointed counsel, then the court shall conduct an inquiry on the record to

determine if movant was abandoned by appointed counsel.” (emphasis added); see also

Rule 29.15(g) (2025) (same).

The record reflects the public defender entered an appearance as Scott’s counsel

without an appointment order. The docket entry sustaining Scott’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis and ordering notice to the public defender and the prosecuting attorney

was not an appointment order. Creighton v. State, 520 S.W.3d 416, 419-20 (Mo. banc

2017) (holding a motion court’s memorandum notifying the public defender of the pro se

motion filing was not an appointment order and rejecting the argument the memorandum

amounted to a de facto appointment); see also Hopkins v. State, 519 S.W.3d 433, 434-35

(Mo. banc 2017) (holding a motion court’s “order of notification” directing the circuit

clerk to notify the public defender of movant’s pro se motion filing and to provide the

motion and any other pleadings the public defender might request was not an

appointment order). If counsel is not appointed as counsel of record by an appointment

order, the abandonment doctrine does not apply.

Scott requests the Court remand the case for entry by the motion court of an

appointment order, arguing the motion court did not comply with Rule 29.15(e), which

8 provides: “Within 30 days after an indigent movant files a pro se motion, the court shall

cause counsel to be appointed for the movant.” The record reflects Scott filed his pro se

Rule 29.15 motion on April 11, 2022. On April 22, 2022, well within the 30-day

deadline in Rule 29.15(e), a public defender entered an appearance on Scott’s behalf.

The public defender’s entry of an appearance without an appointment order obviates the

need for the motion court to appoint counsel under Rule 29.15(e) because the movant is

shown of record as represented by counsel. The deadlines in Rules 29.15 and 24.035 are

mandatory, however, and movants remain free to seek appropriate relief to ensure a

motion court’s appointment of counsel complies with the deadlines in Rules 29.15(e) and

24.035(e).

The Court affirms denial of postconviction relief

After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court entered its judgment denying relief.

Because Scott raises no claim of error regarding the denial of any of his three pro se

claims, the only claims properly before the motion court, the portion of the circuit court’s

judgment denying those claims is affirmed. 4

4 The motion court also addressed and rejected the other claims in Scott’s amended motion. But because the amended motion was not timely filed and this default cannot be excused under the abandonment doctrine, none of the claims in the amended motion other than Scott’s three pro se claims were properly before the motion court. The motion court should not have reached the merits of the untimely claims. Cf. Watson, 536 S.W.3d at 717 (“When a motion for postconviction relief is filed untimely, the motion court should not reach the merits of the motion.” (internal quotation omitted)).

9 Conclusion

The judgment of the motion court denying postconviction relief is affirmed.

___________________________________ Ginger K. Gooch, Judge

All concur.