Christine M. Searle v. John M. Allen, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00025
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Christine M. Searle, No. CV-24-00025-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 John M. Allen, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Having gone through a federal appeal and simultaneous state court litigation, this 16 matter has evolved considerably since the Court entered its original dismissal order. Now, 17 there is great need for a comprehensive restatement of which claims are now viable, and 18 which dispositive motions are properly before the Court and pending resolution. To put it 19 simply, a portion of all of Plaintiff’s claims remain viable and are subject to the original 20 Motion to Dismiss1 as supplemented by the parties’ recent briefing. Meanwhile, Counts 21 One and Six are subject to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the briefing 22 and resolution of which shall proceed in the ordinary course. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff sued Arapaho, American Pride, Maricopa County, and 25 county treasurer Mr. John M. Allen for retaining excess sale proceeds from the foreclosure 26 sale of her property in violation of the federal and state constitutions. Arapaho and 27 1 The original Motion to Dismiss was granted by the Court on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 28 alone and was later reversed in part, and now the Court must evaluate the remaining arguments raised but never reached. 1 American Pride (“Private Defendants”) moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, and among the 2 arguments for dismissal were preclusion under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See Doc. 3 31.) Maricopa County and Mr. Allen (“County Defendants”) joined the Motion. (Doc. 51.) 4 The Motion was fully briefed by the parties. (See Docs. 37, 49, 50, 52, 60, 62.) 5 On July 16, 2024, the Court dismissed most of Plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker- 6 Feldman doctrine and dismissed the remaining state law claim for lack of supplemental 7 jurisdiction. (See Doc. 70.) Plaintiff appealed (Doc. 72), and what followed can only be 8 described as a procedural mess. In addition to appealing this Court’s dismissal order, 9 Plaintiff filed a nearly identical state court action in the Maricopa County Superior Court, 10 cause number CV2024-022530. (See Doc. 89.) In the ensuing state court action, 11 Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims and Plaintiff separately moved to stay the 12 state court action pending the resolution of the federal appeal. The state court granted both 13 motions and ultimately deferred entering the dismissal as a final order until the federal 14 appeal reached resolution. (See Doc. 89-1 at 442–44.) 15 On August 28, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part this 16 Court’s dismissal. Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121 (9th Cir. 2025). Two months later, the 17 state court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, except for Counts One and 18 Six,2 which were dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 89-1 at 453–57.) Plaintiff appealed. 19 (Id. at 459–61.) That appeal was “indefinitely stayed” because the state court judgment was 20 “defective” and “not a final judgment that could be subject to appeal.” (Doc. 103 at 2). As 21 of the date of this Order, the state court has not yet issued a final order and the state appeal 22 remains stayed. (See, e.g., Docs. 103, 113.) 23 On November 3, 2025, this Court held a status conference and ordered the parties 24 to file supplemental briefs identifying which of Plaintiff’s claims are viable in light of the 25 federal appeal and state court judgment. The parties submitted briefing (Docs. 88, 90, 92) 26 and a joint appendix of the state court filings (Doc. 89). Private Defendants now move for 27 leave to file a reply to their supplemental briefing (Doc. 93), and Plaintiff moves for partial

28 2 The state court dismissed the first and fifth claim before it, which were identical to Counts One and Six of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at issue here. (See Doc 88 at 4.) 1 summary judgment as to liability on her first and sixth claims (Doc. 97). Defendants 2 request—and Plaintiff contests—that the Court either strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 3 Summary Judgment, deny it without prejudice, stay briefing pending resolution of the 4 earlier Motion to Dismiss, or stay this entire matter under the state appeal resolves. (Docs. 5 100–01, 104–06.) 6 II. VIABLE CLAIMS AND MOTION TO DISMISS 7 As a threshold matter, it is clear that all of Plaintiff’s claims survived the federal 8 appeal but the scope of each claim was narrowed to those portions that “challenge [] 9 Defendants’ post-judgment retention of the excess equity.” Searle, 148 F.4th at 1131. In 10 applying this filter, the viable claims include: (1) the parts of Counts One, Two and Six 11 that directly challenge Defendants’ failure to provide just compensation in violation of the 12 federal and state constitution Takings Clause; (2) the parts of Counts Three and Five that 13 challenge Defendants’ retention of the excess equity as a taking without a valid public use 14 in violation of the federal and state constitution Takings Clause; and (3) the parts of Counts 15 Four, Seven, and Nine that challenge the retention of surplus proceeds as unjust enrichment 16 or an excessive fine. Id. at 1131–32. The Ninth Circuit did not address Count Eight, but the 17 Court reads the mandate to instruct that this claim is also narrowed by the same filter. 18 The Court’s inquiry does not end here. Another, perhaps more complicated, layer is 19 the effect of the state court judgment which, at the time of this Order, is not considered to 20 be an appealable judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54. (See Doc. 103.) The 21 parties agree that Counts One and Six of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at issue 22 here survive the state court judgment regardless of that judgment’s appealability. (See Doc. 23 92 at 2). As for the other claims, Defendants argue—and Plaintiff disputes—that they are 24 barred under the claim preclusion doctrine as a result of the state court judgment. 25 The Court need not resolve the issue of claim preclusion and its interplay with the 26 state court judgment here. It will be decided alongside Defendants’ other bases for 27 dismissal as argued in the original Motion to Dismiss3 briefing. To assist the Court in

28 3 Plaintiff argues that the Motion to Dismiss is no longer pending because Defendants did not renew it and the Ninth Circuit “wiped the slate clean.” (Doc. 104 at 9–10.) But 1 evaluating whether the state court judgment precludes Plaintiff’s claims, ensure that the 2 parties had a fair opportunity to present their arguments, and in acknowledgment that 3 Defendants ultimately bear the burden of persuasion on the original Motion to Dismiss, the 4 Court will grant Private Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Support of 5 Supplemental Brief (Doc. 93) and order County Defendants to file a reply brief addressing 6 Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief (Doc. 92) no later than March 12, 2026.4 No other 7 additional briefing is permitted. Once completed, the Court will resolve which of Plaintiff’s 8 claims, if any, are either barred or fail to pass the threshold of Rule 12(b)(6). 9 III. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 As forecasted by Plaintiff in prior proceedings and briefing, she has moved for 11 partial summary judgment for liability as to Counts One and Six. (See Doc. 97.) The parties 12 disagree as to whether Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is appropriate at 13 this stage. First, Defendants maintain that the Court forbade dispositive motion practice at 14 the November 3, 2025 status conference. It is true, as Defendants contend, that the Court 15 was primarily interested in hearing what effect the Ninth Circuit mandate and state court 16 judgment had on Plaintiff’s claims and ordered briefing to that effect. But it is also true, as 17 Plaintiff contends, that the Court did not stay the matter pending resolution of that briefing. 18 In fact, the Court voiced concern about freezing these proceedings and expressed the 19 possibility of moving forward on “two tracks.” The Court need not parse its words further 20 and declines to strike Plaintiff’s Motion on the basis that she disregarded this Court’s case 21 management plan. 22 Second, Private Defendants argue that partial summary judgment is premature 23 because Defendants have not yet filed an answer, conducted discovery, or had a Rule 16

24 Defendants did renew the Motion to Dismiss in their supplemental briefs. (Doc. 88 at 1; Doc. 90 at 1.) Even if they had not, the Ninth Circuit mandate pointedly left the Court to 25 address the remaining arguments raised by the parties regarding dismissal, leaving the original Motion undecided. It is not just appropriate, but necessary, to revisit and resolve 26 the Motion. 4 In their supplemental briefing, Defendants restate many arguments they have already 27 raised, or could have raised, in the original Motion to Dismiss briefing. Those arguments exceed the bounds of the supplemental briefing. Accordingly, the Court will disregard line 28 15 of page 6 through page 17 of County Defendants’ supplemental brief (Doc. 88) and line 26 of page 6 through page 17 of Private Defendants’ supplemental brief (Doc. 90). 1 meeting. (Doc. 100 at 5.) It is fair to say that a pre-answer summary judgment motion is 2 unusual to the rote pretrial process. But it is not impermissible. Parties may move for 3 summary judgment “at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery,” Fed. R. Civ. 4 P. 56(b), and “no answer need be filed before a motion for summary judgment may be 5 entertained,” Homesite Ins. Co. v. Schlackman, 671 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 6 2023) (citation modified). Certainly, there are times when a pre-answer summary judgment 7 motion is premature. This is so when “discovery is needed to resolve factual disputes.”5 Id. 8 at 1212 (collecting cases); see Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 9 2018). But in cases where no factual disputes exist, a pre-answer summary judgment 10 motion may proceed. See Schlackman, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 1212 (allowing a pre-answer 11 summary judgment motion where the movant sought declaratory judgment regarding an 12 indemnity provision in an insurance contract). 13 Plaintiff contends, and Defendants do not contest, that no factual disputes exist as 14 to Counts One and Six. Private Defendants even concede that they “are not arguing that 15 discovery is needed before responding to the MPSJ.” (Doc. 106 at 8.) Instead, they argue 16 that proceeding to partial summary judgment is imprudent when the Motion to Dismiss 17 remains unresolved. (Doc. 100 at 8; Doc. 101 at 2.) While the Court agrees that the Motion 18 to Dismiss should be resolved first, it does not necessarily follow that the partial summary 19 judgment motion cannot be primed for prompt resolution. Doing so is not overly 20 burdensome to Defendants because no relevant facts are disputed, only two claims are at 21 issue, and many of the pertinent legal arguments have already been briefed in relation to 22 the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss or stay briefing upon 23 the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 24 Finally, Private Defendants argue that a stay of these proceedings is appropriate 25 until the state appeal is completed. (Doc. 100 at 8.) Plaintiff asserts that a stay will harm 26 her by delaying this matter indefinitely while the state appeal remains in limbo. (Doc. 104

27 5 In fact, there is a mechanism under Rule 56(d) in which the nonmovant can avoid, at least for a short time, summary judgment if more discovery is necessary. That mechanism 28 requires the nonmovant to show by affidavit or declaration that it cannot present essential facts. No Defendant presents an affidavit or declaration to this effect. 1 at 13–14.) The potential indefiniteness of a stay presents a fair possibility that Plaintiff will 2 be harmed by the delay, so Private Defendants “must make out a clear case of hardship or 3 inequity in being required to go forward.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). 4 Private Defendants assert that they should not be forced to respond to the partial summary 5 judgment motion “simply because Plaintiff chose to file one” (Doc. 106 at 8), but “being 6 required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a clear case of hardship or 7 inequity within the meaning of Landis.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1112 (9th 8 Cir. 2005) (citation modified). Private Defendants fail to demonstrate a clear case of 9 hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, so the Court declines to issue a stay 10 of these proceedings. 11 Given the consensus that Counts One and Six survive both the federal appeal and 12 state court judgment and that no factual disputes exist as to those claims, it is appropriate 13 that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment proceeds. See Sarkar v. Garland, 39 14 F.4th 611, 617 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Federal courts have inherent power to control the 15 disposition of the causes on their dockets with economy of time and effort for themselves, 16 for counsel, and for litigants.”) (citation modified). Briefing on this motion shall proceed 17 as set forth in the Court’s Order dated February 11, 2026 (Doc. 109). 18 IV. COUNSEL CONDUCT 19 There is clear strife between counsel for Private Defendants and Plaintiff. Private 20 Defendants have requested their attorney’s fees and costs related to their Motion to Strike 21 due to their belief that Plaintiff’s partial summary judgment motion was prohibited by the 22 Court. As for Plaintiff, she has twice requested that the Court “admonish” Private 23 Defendants for mischaracterizing her motivations behind filing the state court action as a 24 “deliberate abuse of the legal system,” and for repeatedly requesting attorney’s fees. (Doc. 25 95 at 3; Doc. 104 at 16–17.) The Court declines both requests. 26 Private Defendants’ characterizations are no more indecorous than Plaintiff’s own 27 satire used in several filings before the Court. (See, e.g., Doc. 95 at 5 (accusing Private 28 Defendants’ counsel of “questionable conduct around the holidays”); Doc 104 at 12 1 (“While the Defendants don’t like playing defense . . .”). The Court has little interest in 2 these trifling attacks upon an opposing counsel’s litigation strategy—whether it is 3 Plaintiff’s filing of the state court action or Private Defendants’ decision to move for 4 dismissal of that state court action rather than staying it—so long as the action is 5 permissible in rule and law. Similarly, the Court will not referee a game of “they started it” 6 between counsel. That is but a mere distraction from the Court’s administration of not only 7 this case, but the hundreds of others before it. And while counsel for both parties implies 8 some nefarious design by the other, the Court observes no frivolous or baseless motion 9 before it. Counsel may disagree with another’s position or arguments, such as Private 10 Defendants disagreeing that Plaintiff is permitted to move for partial summary judgment, 11 but those disagreements have not yet been found unsupported either by law or reason. 12 On balance, there is no sanctionable or reprimandable conduct from Plaintiff’s or 13 Private Defendants’ counsel. Still, to the extent their advocacy entails unhelpful rhetoric or 14 negative insinuations, counsel should avoid such practice as it will ordinarily be nothing 15 more than a waste of time and paper. Such inflammatory practices also have the tendency 16 to impede the parties’ ability to collaborate and are ultimately a disservice to all involved. 17 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants Arapaho LLC and American Pride 18 Properties, LLC’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Support of Supplemental Brief 19 (Doc. 93). 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than March 12, 2026, Defendants 21 Maricopa County and Mr. Allen shall file a reply brief addressing Plaintiff’s Supplemental 22 Brief (Doc. 92). 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendants Arapaho, LLC And American 24 Pride Properties, LLC’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 25 and Statement of Undisputed Facts or, in the Alternative, Motion to Stay and/or Deny 26 Without Prejudice Pending Resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 100). 27 . . . 28 . . . 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that briefing related to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Defendants’ Liability Under Claims 1 and 6 (Doc. 97) shall 3 || proceed as set forth in the Court’s Order dated February 11, 2026 (Doc. 109). 4 Dated this 5th day of March, 2026. CN

Unifga State#District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-8-