TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00281-CV
Christine Hanson, Appellant
v.
Johny Jideofor Nwachukwu, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 21-2178-FC4, THE HONORABLE JOHN B. MCMASTER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Christine Hanson appeals the trial court’s final order appointing Hanson and
Johny Jideofor Nwachukwu as joint managing conservators of their daughter. In one issue,
Hanson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing her and Nwachukwu as
joint managing conservators after finding that Nwachukwu committed family violence against
Hanson. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004(b) (providing that court may not appoint joint managing
conservators if credible evidence is presented of history or pattern of physical abuse by one
parent directed against other parent). We will reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
In November 2023, Hanson filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
seeking to be appointed sole managing conservator of her and Nwachukwu’s three-year-old
daughter. Hanson alleged that Nwachukwu had a history or pattern of committing family violence against her in the previous two-year period. Nwachukwu filed a counter-petition
alleging that it was in their daughter’s best interest that he and Hanson be appointed as her joint
managing conservators. In November 2024, the court conducted a bench trial during which it
heard testimony from two witnesses—Hanson and Nwachukwu. Hanson testified that she was
assaulted by Nwachukwu in June 2021 in Harris County after which she stated she drove to
Williamson County because she was “done with the continuous abuse.” Hanson described an
incident in January 2023 during which Nwachukwu came to her home in Williamson County,
“broke through the master bedroom door,” hit her in the face twice, and left the residence.
Hanson testified that she called the police, and Nwachukwu “ended up getting arrested” and
charged with family violence. When asked whether Nwachukwu had “been physical” with her
before the January 2023 incident, Hanson answered, “countless amount of times, yes,” and that
she “lost count, honestly” of the number of times he had caused physical injury to her. Hanson
described another incident in August 2022 that left “bruising on [her] legs” and “another black
eye and knot on [her] forehead.” Hanson’s testimony described other incidents as well,
including one when Nwachukwu “tickled” her until she urinated on herself and left scratches on
her stomach.
Nwachukwu admitted that he had “pushed” Hanson and caused a scratch on her
eye. When Nwachukwu was shown photographs of injuries to Hanson and asked if he denied
causing them, Nwachukwu stated, “I mean, I’m not denying that,” and agreed that things “got
out of hand.” But Nwachukwu denied that his actions constituted family violence because he
“got the case dismissed.” Regarding the tickling incident, Nwachukwu agreed that Hanson “was
crying” but that he “tickled her in a playful manner, so it wasn’t purposefully.”
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court stated:
2 Okay. I believe that he was violent with her. I believe that he was proactive in addressing that issue, and that he went, and he got counseling and help for it, and that’s 24 classes he took over a year, at an hour and a half, which is no joke. I am going to order a joint managing conservatorship. And I am making a finding of domestic violence. This is to reaffirm that she was a victim of domestic violence. A finding of domestic violence rebuts the presumption [that] a joint conservatorship is in the child’s best interest. I believe the presumption has been rebutted. However, based upon some of his actions in regards to his visitation, his possession and access, the difficulties he has had in regards to coordinating his visitation, I believe it is in the child’s best interest to order a joint managing conservatorship [].
Thereafter, the court signed an order appointing Hanson and Nwachukwu as joint managing
conservators of their daughter. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The primary concern in determining conservatorship and possession of and access
to the child is the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code. § 153.002; In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d
338, 342 (Tex. 2000). Generally, Texas encourages “co-parenting.” C.C. v. L.C., No. 02-18-
00425-CV, 2019 WL 2865294, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(noting that “the [F]amily [C]ode embodies the policy of co-parenting with its rebuttable
presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the best interest of the child.”). It is the
public policy of this state to “assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with
parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child” and to “encourage
parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their children after the parents have separated
or dissolved their marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code § 153.001(a)(1), (3). Thus, there is “a rebuttable
presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing conservators is in
the best interest of the child.” Id. § 153.131(b). But this presumption is removed—and the trial
court is prohibited from appointing the parents as joint managing conservators—if the trial court
3 makes “[a] finding of a history of family violence involving the parents of a child.” Id.
§§ 153.004, .131(b); see id. § 153.005(c)(1) (stating that, in appointing sole or joint managing
conservator, the trial court shall consider whether the “party engaged in a history or pattern of
family violence”). 1 Because a family-violence finding reflects that the evidence of physical
abuse is credible, Baker v. Baker, 469 S.W.3d 269, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
no pet.), it not only bars the trial court from appointing the parents as joint managing
conservators but also creates a rebuttable presumption that (1) appointment of the abusive parent
as sole managing conservator is not in the child’s best interest and (2) unsupervised visitation
with the abusive parent is not in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004(b), (e).
The prohibition on appointing the parents as joint managing conservators when the trial court
makes a finding of family violence involving them seems “to be based on the assumption that
two people cannot be expected to cooperate to the extent necessary to co-parent when one of the
parents has abused the other parent or a child.” C.C., 2019 WL 2865294, at *16 (discussing
Subsection 153.131(b) along with related provision in Subsection 154.004(b) that prohibits joint
managing conservatorship when trial court makes family-violence finding).
The parties here do not dispute that the trial court made a finding of family
violence, and the evidence presented at trial supports that finding. 2 Because of this finding, the
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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00281-CV
Christine Hanson, Appellant
v.
Johny Jideofor Nwachukwu, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 21-2178-FC4, THE HONORABLE JOHN B. MCMASTER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Christine Hanson appeals the trial court’s final order appointing Hanson and
Johny Jideofor Nwachukwu as joint managing conservators of their daughter. In one issue,
Hanson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing her and Nwachukwu as
joint managing conservators after finding that Nwachukwu committed family violence against
Hanson. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004(b) (providing that court may not appoint joint managing
conservators if credible evidence is presented of history or pattern of physical abuse by one
parent directed against other parent). We will reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
In November 2023, Hanson filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
seeking to be appointed sole managing conservator of her and Nwachukwu’s three-year-old
daughter. Hanson alleged that Nwachukwu had a history or pattern of committing family violence against her in the previous two-year period. Nwachukwu filed a counter-petition
alleging that it was in their daughter’s best interest that he and Hanson be appointed as her joint
managing conservators. In November 2024, the court conducted a bench trial during which it
heard testimony from two witnesses—Hanson and Nwachukwu. Hanson testified that she was
assaulted by Nwachukwu in June 2021 in Harris County after which she stated she drove to
Williamson County because she was “done with the continuous abuse.” Hanson described an
incident in January 2023 during which Nwachukwu came to her home in Williamson County,
“broke through the master bedroom door,” hit her in the face twice, and left the residence.
Hanson testified that she called the police, and Nwachukwu “ended up getting arrested” and
charged with family violence. When asked whether Nwachukwu had “been physical” with her
before the January 2023 incident, Hanson answered, “countless amount of times, yes,” and that
she “lost count, honestly” of the number of times he had caused physical injury to her. Hanson
described another incident in August 2022 that left “bruising on [her] legs” and “another black
eye and knot on [her] forehead.” Hanson’s testimony described other incidents as well,
including one when Nwachukwu “tickled” her until she urinated on herself and left scratches on
her stomach.
Nwachukwu admitted that he had “pushed” Hanson and caused a scratch on her
eye. When Nwachukwu was shown photographs of injuries to Hanson and asked if he denied
causing them, Nwachukwu stated, “I mean, I’m not denying that,” and agreed that things “got
out of hand.” But Nwachukwu denied that his actions constituted family violence because he
“got the case dismissed.” Regarding the tickling incident, Nwachukwu agreed that Hanson “was
crying” but that he “tickled her in a playful manner, so it wasn’t purposefully.”
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court stated:
2 Okay. I believe that he was violent with her. I believe that he was proactive in addressing that issue, and that he went, and he got counseling and help for it, and that’s 24 classes he took over a year, at an hour and a half, which is no joke. I am going to order a joint managing conservatorship. And I am making a finding of domestic violence. This is to reaffirm that she was a victim of domestic violence. A finding of domestic violence rebuts the presumption [that] a joint conservatorship is in the child’s best interest. I believe the presumption has been rebutted. However, based upon some of his actions in regards to his visitation, his possession and access, the difficulties he has had in regards to coordinating his visitation, I believe it is in the child’s best interest to order a joint managing conservatorship [].
Thereafter, the court signed an order appointing Hanson and Nwachukwu as joint managing
conservators of their daughter. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The primary concern in determining conservatorship and possession of and access
to the child is the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code. § 153.002; In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d
338, 342 (Tex. 2000). Generally, Texas encourages “co-parenting.” C.C. v. L.C., No. 02-18-
00425-CV, 2019 WL 2865294, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(noting that “the [F]amily [C]ode embodies the policy of co-parenting with its rebuttable
presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the best interest of the child.”). It is the
public policy of this state to “assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with
parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child” and to “encourage
parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their children after the parents have separated
or dissolved their marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code § 153.001(a)(1), (3). Thus, there is “a rebuttable
presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing conservators is in
the best interest of the child.” Id. § 153.131(b). But this presumption is removed—and the trial
court is prohibited from appointing the parents as joint managing conservators—if the trial court
3 makes “[a] finding of a history of family violence involving the parents of a child.” Id.
§§ 153.004, .131(b); see id. § 153.005(c)(1) (stating that, in appointing sole or joint managing
conservator, the trial court shall consider whether the “party engaged in a history or pattern of
family violence”). 1 Because a family-violence finding reflects that the evidence of physical
abuse is credible, Baker v. Baker, 469 S.W.3d 269, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
no pet.), it not only bars the trial court from appointing the parents as joint managing
conservators but also creates a rebuttable presumption that (1) appointment of the abusive parent
as sole managing conservator is not in the child’s best interest and (2) unsupervised visitation
with the abusive parent is not in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004(b), (e).
The prohibition on appointing the parents as joint managing conservators when the trial court
makes a finding of family violence involving them seems “to be based on the assumption that
two people cannot be expected to cooperate to the extent necessary to co-parent when one of the
parents has abused the other parent or a child.” C.C., 2019 WL 2865294, at *16 (discussing
Subsection 153.131(b) along with related provision in Subsection 154.004(b) that prohibits joint
managing conservatorship when trial court makes family-violence finding).
The parties here do not dispute that the trial court made a finding of family
violence, and the evidence presented at trial supports that finding. 2 Because of this finding, the
1 Although “family violence” is not defined in Section 153.131, related provisions of the Texas Family Code use the definition provided in Section 71.004, which defines “family violence” to include, as relevant here, “an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, [or] assault” or “is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, [or] assault,” with “defensive measures to protect oneself excluded.” Tex. Fam. Code § 71.004(1). 2 In fact, after trial, Nwachukwu filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that included a proposed finding that “Nwachukwu has a history or pattern of committing family 4 Texas Family Code prohibited the trial court from appointing Hanson and Nwachukwu as their
daughter’s joint managing conservators.
Conservatorship determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re
J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.
1982). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, meaning that it
acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218. Here, the
trial court’s appointment of Hanson and Nwachukwu as joint managing conservators was in
direct contravention of the provision of the Texas Family Code and, consequently, constituted an
abuse of discretion. We sustain Hanson’s sole appellate issue.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court abused its discretion in appointing Hanson and
Nwachukwu as joint managing conservators, we reverse the trial court’s conservatorship
determinations and remand the case for further proceedings.
__________________________________________ Karin Crump, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Theofanis and Crump
Reversed and Remanded
Filed: April 2, 2026
violence during the two years preceding the date of the filing of the suit or during the pendency of the suit.” 5