Christina Marie Neville v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-02001
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 CHRISTINA MARIE NEVILLE, Case No. 2:23-cv-02001-EJY

5 Plaintiff,

6 v. ORDER

7 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Pending before the Court is the Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 11 ECF No. 22. No response was filed. 12 I. BACKGROUND 13 On August 14, 2024, the Court entered an order granting in part and denying in 14 part Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal and Remand. ECF No. 18. On remand, the Commissioner 15 granted Plaintiff’s application and awarded $89,056.00 in past due benefits. Counsel is requesting 16 an award of attorney’s fees for a total of $23,000.00 under the contingency fee contract with a credit 17 to Plaintiff for the EAJA fees previously paid in the amount of $1,978.00. 18 II. STANDARD 19 Under 46 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), “[w]hen a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant 20 … who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part 21 of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25% of the total of the past- 22 due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 23 In applying Section 406(b), the Court first determines whether a fee agreement has been 24 executed between the plaintiff and her attorney. See, e.g., Garcia v. Astrue, 500 F.Supp. 2d 1239, 25 1242 (C.D. Cal. 2007). If so, the Court must respect “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 26 agreements” in awarding fees. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). Nonetheless, the 27 Court has an “affirmative duty” to ensure the fees provided are “reasonable.” Crawford v. Astrue, 1 is unreasonable, and thus subject to reduction by the court, if the attorney provided substandard 2 representation or engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due 3 benefits, or if the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.” 4 Id. at 1148 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court’s review of the amount of attorney’s 5 fees is meant as “an independent check” to ensure that the agreement will “yield reasonable results 6 in particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. 7 III. ANALYSIS 8 Here, counsel asks the Court to approve the contingency fee of $23,000.00, which is 25% of 9 the total award to Plaintiff. Counsel’s request falls within the terms agreed to by Plaintiff. No 10 evidence suggests counsel provided anything but effective representation or that he engaged in 11 dilatory conduct. The time spent working on this case, as documented by counsel, appears to be 12 proportionate to the time required for a remanded social security case. 13 IV. ORDER 14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 15 406(B) (ECF No. 22) is GRANTED. A fee award in the amount of $23,000.00 for work before the 16 Court is to be paid to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Inc., 12631 East Imperial Highway, 17 Suite C-115, Sante Fe Sprints, California, 90670. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rohlfing firm must refund EAJA fees of $1,978.00. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff owes a debt that qualifies under the Treasury 20 Offset Program (31 U.S.C. § 3716), any payment must be made payable to Plaintiff and delivered to 21 Plaintiff’s counsel. 22 Dated this 9th day of December, 2025.

24 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27