RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-0345-MR
CHRISTINA HOLT TAYLOR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE CATHERINE R. HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 16-CI-01055
TAD DIRK TAYLOR APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2024-CA-0554-MR
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE CATHERINE R. HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 16-CI-01055
TAD DIRK TAYLOR APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
JONES, L., JUDGE: Christina Holt Taylor, pro se, brings these two related
appeals from decisions of the Warren Family Court. We affirm.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As we recounted in a previous appeal:
Christina and Tad Dirk Taylor (“Tad”) were married in 2000 and had two children together. They divorced in 2019. The decree of dissolution, which incorporated the parties’ separation agreement, gave the parties joint custody of the children, with Tad as the primary residential custodian. Christina was ordered to pay $150 monthly in child support per the separation agreement, which the parties acknowledged was a deviation from the child support guidelines. She was also responsible for half the costs of the children’s extracurricular activities and maintaining secondary health insurance for the children.
Just four months later, Tad moved to modify child support, claiming Christina had not been paying her half of the expenses under the agreement. Essentially, he argued Christina had breached the agreement which had led to the deviation from the child support guidelines, and therefore modification was necessary and proper. Christina responded there had been no material change in circumstances since the entry of the decree, that she gave up substantial assets in exchange for the reduced child support obligation, and that Tad just wanted a “do over.” Although unclear from the record, the family court held at least four hearings on the motion to modify child
-2- support, resulting in hours of testimony concerning the parties’ income.
...
On February 9, 2023, the family court entered [an] . . . Order Modifying Child Support and attached child support worksheets. Christina was ordered to pay $544.18 per month in child support and $21,793.75 in arrearages.
Taylor v. Taylor, No. 2023-CA-0185-MR, 2024 WL 1221635, at *1 (Ky. App.
Mar. 22, 2024) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Taylor I). Because the family court
had not made findings of fact to explain its decision, we vacated and remanded
with instructions “for the family court to make specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of its determination to modify child support, and
state them separately in a written order or judgment for appropriate review on
appeal.” Id. at *2.
On remand, the family court issued a lengthy decision which contains
extensive findings of fact. The court ordered Christina to pay $596.92 monthly in
child support, retroactive to the date Tad filed the motion to modify, as well as
additional amounts to satisfy the arrearage she had accrued.
Dissatisfied, Christina filed Appeal No. 2024-CA-0554-MR.
The parties’ contentious relationship led them to often seek relief from
the family court on other matters. Pertinent here, in March 2023, the family court
-3- ordered Christina to pay certain extracurricular expenses. Christina challenges that
decision in Appeal No. 2023-CA-0345-MR.
We resolve both appeals in this combined Opinion.
ANALYSIS
Deficient Briefs
We have examined the parties’ briefs. However, we “will discuss
only the arguments and cited authorities we deem most pertinent, the remainder
being without merit, irrelevant, or redundant.” Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29
n.1 (Ky. App. 2021). Our careful examination of the briefs submitted by both
parties shows that they fail to comply substantially with the Kentucky Rules of
Appellate Procedure (RAP).
RAP 32(A)(3) requires the statement of the case section of an
appellant’s opening brief to contain “a summary of the facts and procedural events
relevant and necessary to an understanding of the issues presented by the appeal,
with ample references to the specific location in the record supporting each of the
statements contained in the summary.” RAP 32(A)(4) similarly requires the
argument section of an appellant’s opening brief to contain “ample references to
the specific location in the record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue
of law and which shall contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with
reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for
-4- review and, if so, in what manner.” An appellee’s brief contains similar
requirements for citations to the record. See RAP 32(B)(3)-(4).
Neither of Christina’s opening briefs, nor Tad’s two appellee briefs,
contain a pinpoint citation to the written trial court record. Christina cites to what
purport to be hearings held by the family court, but none of those hearings are in
the record before us, which neither party has sought to supplement.
In addition, Christina has not provided proper preservation statements.
She asserts her arguments are preserved but does not show with specificity when,
or how, she preserved them. A generic assertion of preservation unaccompanied
by a pinpoint citation to the record is insufficient. See, e.g., Curty v. Norton
Healthcare, Inc., 561 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Ky. App. 2018).
The third major deficiency in Christina’s briefs is two defects in the
appendices. First, she does not cite to where in the trial court record the documents
in the appendices may be located. RAP 32(E)(1)(d) requires an index for
appendices to “set forth where each document may be found in the record.”
Second, the appendices appear to contain matters outside the record of which we
may not take judicial notice. For example, one item in the appendix to Christina’s
opening brief in Appeal No. 2024-CA-0554-MR purports to be a June 5, 2018
letter from Tad’s former counsel to Christina’s former counsel regarding potential
settlement terms. Under RAP 32(E)(1)(c), “[e]xcept for matters of which the
-5- appellate court may take judicial notice, materials and documents not included in
the record shall not be introduced or used as exhibits in support of briefs.” Those
two complementary requirements for appendices (showing where the matters may
be found in the record and not including matters not found in the record) are meant
to “prevent the court from having to scour the record . . . ; to ensure the orders are
readily available to the court; and, to ensure only documents and materials
‘included in the record’ – other than items not subject to judicial review – are
provided as exhibits.” Curty, 561 S.W.3d at 378.
The deficiencies in Christina’s briefs are rendered more egregious by
the fact that we have already pointed out similar deficiencies to her. On December
4, 2023, we granted Tad’s motion to strike Christina’s initial brief in Appeal No.
2023-CA-0345-MR, though we gave her leave to file a new brief. Our order
explained that Christina’s brief was deficient because it did not contain citations to
the written record, failed to contain proper preservation statements, and contained
matters outside the record in its appendices.
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RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-0345-MR
CHRISTINA HOLT TAYLOR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE CATHERINE R. HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 16-CI-01055
TAD DIRK TAYLOR APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2024-CA-0554-MR
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE CATHERINE R. HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 16-CI-01055
TAD DIRK TAYLOR APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
JONES, L., JUDGE: Christina Holt Taylor, pro se, brings these two related
appeals from decisions of the Warren Family Court. We affirm.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As we recounted in a previous appeal:
Christina and Tad Dirk Taylor (“Tad”) were married in 2000 and had two children together. They divorced in 2019. The decree of dissolution, which incorporated the parties’ separation agreement, gave the parties joint custody of the children, with Tad as the primary residential custodian. Christina was ordered to pay $150 monthly in child support per the separation agreement, which the parties acknowledged was a deviation from the child support guidelines. She was also responsible for half the costs of the children’s extracurricular activities and maintaining secondary health insurance for the children.
Just four months later, Tad moved to modify child support, claiming Christina had not been paying her half of the expenses under the agreement. Essentially, he argued Christina had breached the agreement which had led to the deviation from the child support guidelines, and therefore modification was necessary and proper. Christina responded there had been no material change in circumstances since the entry of the decree, that she gave up substantial assets in exchange for the reduced child support obligation, and that Tad just wanted a “do over.” Although unclear from the record, the family court held at least four hearings on the motion to modify child
-2- support, resulting in hours of testimony concerning the parties’ income.
...
On February 9, 2023, the family court entered [an] . . . Order Modifying Child Support and attached child support worksheets. Christina was ordered to pay $544.18 per month in child support and $21,793.75 in arrearages.
Taylor v. Taylor, No. 2023-CA-0185-MR, 2024 WL 1221635, at *1 (Ky. App.
Mar. 22, 2024) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Taylor I). Because the family court
had not made findings of fact to explain its decision, we vacated and remanded
with instructions “for the family court to make specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of its determination to modify child support, and
state them separately in a written order or judgment for appropriate review on
appeal.” Id. at *2.
On remand, the family court issued a lengthy decision which contains
extensive findings of fact. The court ordered Christina to pay $596.92 monthly in
child support, retroactive to the date Tad filed the motion to modify, as well as
additional amounts to satisfy the arrearage she had accrued.
Dissatisfied, Christina filed Appeal No. 2024-CA-0554-MR.
The parties’ contentious relationship led them to often seek relief from
the family court on other matters. Pertinent here, in March 2023, the family court
-3- ordered Christina to pay certain extracurricular expenses. Christina challenges that
decision in Appeal No. 2023-CA-0345-MR.
We resolve both appeals in this combined Opinion.
ANALYSIS
Deficient Briefs
We have examined the parties’ briefs. However, we “will discuss
only the arguments and cited authorities we deem most pertinent, the remainder
being without merit, irrelevant, or redundant.” Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29
n.1 (Ky. App. 2021). Our careful examination of the briefs submitted by both
parties shows that they fail to comply substantially with the Kentucky Rules of
Appellate Procedure (RAP).
RAP 32(A)(3) requires the statement of the case section of an
appellant’s opening brief to contain “a summary of the facts and procedural events
relevant and necessary to an understanding of the issues presented by the appeal,
with ample references to the specific location in the record supporting each of the
statements contained in the summary.” RAP 32(A)(4) similarly requires the
argument section of an appellant’s opening brief to contain “ample references to
the specific location in the record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue
of law and which shall contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with
reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for
-4- review and, if so, in what manner.” An appellee’s brief contains similar
requirements for citations to the record. See RAP 32(B)(3)-(4).
Neither of Christina’s opening briefs, nor Tad’s two appellee briefs,
contain a pinpoint citation to the written trial court record. Christina cites to what
purport to be hearings held by the family court, but none of those hearings are in
the record before us, which neither party has sought to supplement.
In addition, Christina has not provided proper preservation statements.
She asserts her arguments are preserved but does not show with specificity when,
or how, she preserved them. A generic assertion of preservation unaccompanied
by a pinpoint citation to the record is insufficient. See, e.g., Curty v. Norton
Healthcare, Inc., 561 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Ky. App. 2018).
The third major deficiency in Christina’s briefs is two defects in the
appendices. First, she does not cite to where in the trial court record the documents
in the appendices may be located. RAP 32(E)(1)(d) requires an index for
appendices to “set forth where each document may be found in the record.”
Second, the appendices appear to contain matters outside the record of which we
may not take judicial notice. For example, one item in the appendix to Christina’s
opening brief in Appeal No. 2024-CA-0554-MR purports to be a June 5, 2018
letter from Tad’s former counsel to Christina’s former counsel regarding potential
settlement terms. Under RAP 32(E)(1)(c), “[e]xcept for matters of which the
-5- appellate court may take judicial notice, materials and documents not included in
the record shall not be introduced or used as exhibits in support of briefs.” Those
two complementary requirements for appendices (showing where the matters may
be found in the record and not including matters not found in the record) are meant
to “prevent the court from having to scour the record . . . ; to ensure the orders are
readily available to the court; and, to ensure only documents and materials
‘included in the record’ – other than items not subject to judicial review – are
provided as exhibits.” Curty, 561 S.W.3d at 378.
The deficiencies in Christina’s briefs are rendered more egregious by
the fact that we have already pointed out similar deficiencies to her. On December
4, 2023, we granted Tad’s motion to strike Christina’s initial brief in Appeal No.
2023-CA-0345-MR, though we gave her leave to file a new brief. Our order
explained that Christina’s brief was deficient because it did not contain citations to
the written record, failed to contain proper preservation statements, and contained
matters outside the record in its appendices.
We recognize that Christina is proceeding pro se. However, that
status does not exempt her from complying with mandatory briefing rules. See,
e.g., Koester v. Koester, 569 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Ky. App. 2019).
The multiple deficiencies in Christina’s briefs are too egregious to
overlook – especially since we already struck a similarly deficient brief. However,
-6- we prefer to resolve appeals on the merits and so we have decided to impose
sanctions less severe than dismissing these appeals.
First, we shall review Christina’s issues only for palpable error due to
her failure to provide adequate preservation statements. Ford v. Commonwealth,
628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021) (“If a party fails to inform the appellate court of
where in the record his issue is preserved, the appellate court can treat that issue as
unpreserved.”). Under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 61.02, “[a]
palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by
. . . an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for
review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error.” An error is palpable only if it is “obvious”
and “so grave that, if uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the
proceedings” – in short, a palpable error is “so egregious that it jumps off the page
. . . and cries out for relief.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky.
2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, we shall not
consider the appendices to Christina’s briefs. See RAP 10(B)(3) (permitting an
appellate court to strike a portion of a noncompliant brief). Finally, though we do
not impose sanctions, we also express our strong disapproval of Tad’s deficient
briefs. It is improper for an attorney to submit briefs lacking pinpoint citations to
the record.
-7- Appeal No. 2023-CA-0345-MR
As previously stated, the limited record before us does not contain the
entirety of the protracted dissolution proceedings. However, it appears undisputed
that the parties’ agreement, which the family court adopted in the dissolution
decree, required Christina to pay half of “any and all extracurricular expenses for
the minor children that are related to school or educational activities.” Christina
was also required to pay half of medical bills incurred on behalf of the children
which were not covered by insurance.
As we construe her brief, Christina challenges the family court’s
holding that she must pay five specific expenses: half of yearbook fees for the
children; a graduation cap and gown; a hoodie memorializing the younger child’s
participation in the state swimming tournament; unspecified swim equipment; and
a portion of the cost of a letterman jacket for the younger child. The gist of
Christina’s argument seems to be that those expenses are not covered by the
parties’ agreement because they were optional. Christina also hazily challenges
the family court requiring her to pay a portion of the children’s counseling costs.
We discern no palpable error in the family court’s conclusion that
expenses for graduation and participation in swim team, a hoodie memorializing
participation in a swim team event, and yearbooks are all “related to school or
educational activities.” The agreement broadly and unambiguously provides that
-8- Christina will pay half of “any and all” expenses related to the children’s school or
educational activities. That language belies Christina’s argument that she is
responsible only for half of expenses which must be incurred to obtain a high
school diploma. See, e.g., Sadler v. Buskirk, 478 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Ky. 2015)
(noting that “judicial review of a property settlement agreement to determine its
meaning is simply a matter of contract interpretation” and when a contract is not
ambiguous, “we look only to the words contained within the four corners of the
agreement to determine the parties’ intentions”); Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc.,
103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003) (holding that a court will interpret an unambiguous
contract, such as a settlement agreement, “by assigning language its ordinary
meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence”). We decline Christina’s
invitation to narrow the facially wide scope of the parties’ agreement regarding
extracurricular expenses.
The letterman jacket is not as obviously, directly related to a school
activity. However, a letterman jacket is an emblem of the wearer having
participated in a school-related extracurricular activity. Thus, there is a link
between the letterman jacket and a school activity. Moreover, the family court
reduced Christina’s obligation for the jacket to $100, the amount she previously
paid towards a similar jacket for the parties’ other child. Given the broad language
of the parties’ agreement, we perceive no manifest injustice.
-9- Christina’s counseling bill argument is based on her insistence that
Tad did not provide sufficient documentation to show the expenses incurred and
the payments he had made towards those expenses, which she asserts were
prerequisites to trigger her obligation to pay her share of those bills. But the record
before us does not contain the billing information at issue. In fact, the record
before us in this appeal begins with the order from which Christina appeals. We
cannot conjure a palpable error from a blank record.
We also note that the family court carefully considered each request
for reimbursement by Tad and disallowed some because they were duplicative or
outside the parties’ agreement. The order at issue contains specific findings
explaining the amounts Christina must pay. The court facially followed the
parties’ agreement. Therefore, Christina has not shown the existence of a manifest
injustice.
Appeal No. 2024-CA-0554-MR
The parties’ settlement agreement, which the family court adopted in
October 2019, required Christina to pay $150 per month in child support – a
deviation from the child support guidelines. In February 2020, Tad filed a motion
to modify Christina’s child support obligation, alleging she had failed to pay her
share of expenses or provide secondary health insurance for the children. After
numerous delays, in February 2023 the family court granted Tad’s motion and
-10- ordered Christina to pay $544.18 per month in child support. In Taylor I, we
vacated that order because it did not contain findings of fact. 2024 WL 1221635,
at *2. We did not address the merits of modifying child support.
On remand, the family court followed our directive by issuing a new
decision, over twenty pages in length, containing extensive findings of fact. The
court ordered Christina to pay $596.92 per month in child support and calculated
her arrearage to be $17,628.47. The court required Christina to pay a total of $650
per month, with $53.08 designated to go to satisfying her arrearage, until the
parties’ youngest child turned 18 and graduated high school. After those events
occurred, the order required Christina to pay $600 per month until her arrearage is
satisfied. On appeal, the gist of Christina’s argument is that there was not a
material change in circumstances sufficient to modify child support.
Christina’s arguments are fatally terse and conclusory. For example,
she argues the findings “do not reflect the testimony nor the evidence presented in
the hearings. Christina’s income is inflated and Tad’s income and potential
income are deflated and ignored.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 11.1 But Christina cites to
nothing specific in the record before us to support those underdeveloped
arguments. As we have held, “a terse, conclusory assertion wholly unaccompanied
1 It is difficult to cite with precision to Christina’s brief because it is unpaginated.
-11- by meaningfully developed argument or citation to authority is insufficient to merit
appellate relief.” Schell, 640 S.W.3d at 32.
The family court explicitly found that there had been a material
change of circumstances which supported modifying the prior child support
decisions. See Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.213(1) (providing that child
support may be modified “only upon a showing of a material change in
circumstances that is substantial and continuing”). The court discussed at length
its calculations of the parties’ respective incomes based on the financial documents
before it, such as tax returns and earnings statements (evidence which is not
contained in the limited record before us). In sum, for purposes of our palpable
error review, the family court rectified the error we found in Taylor I and generally
satisfied the statutory prerequisite for modifying child support. Christina has not
shown the existence of a palpable error.
Moreover, we must reject the argument Christina seems to make that
the parties’ agreement precluded the family court from modifying child support.
An agreement among the parties cannot prevent a family court from modifying
child support upon a finding of a material change in circumstances. See Tilley v.
Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Ky. App. 1997). In fact, if there is a sufficient material
change in circumstances, child support may be modified even if the parties’
incomes have not changed. Id.
-12- Finally, the family court did not err by using the child support
guidelines found in KRS 403.212 to assess Christina’s new child support
obligation, even though the parties’ agreement was a deviation from those
guidelines. Tilley, 947 S.W.2d at 65 (“Furthermore, in reaching its decision, the
trial court is to consider both the changes in finances of both parents as well as the
needs of the child. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to disregard the prior
agreement of the parties as to the amount of child support payable by Millard in
deciding to raise the amount.”) (citation omitted); Nelson v. Ecklar, 588 S.W.3d
872, 876 (Ky. App. 2019) (following Tilley and holding that “this Court declines to
follow the husband’s reasoning that modification of child support pursuant to KRS
403.212 does not apply where parties agree to an amount lower than what would
be required under the guidelines”). We view any remaining contentions of error as
moot or without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Warren Family Court is affirmed in
Appeal Nos. 2023-CA-0345-MR and 2024-CA-0554-MR.
ALL CONCUR.
-13- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christina Holt Taylor, pro se Ashlea Shepherd Porter Scottsville, Kentucky Bowling Green, Kentucky
-14-