Christina Holt Taylor v. Tad Dirk Taylor
This text of Christina Holt Taylor v. Tad Dirk Taylor (Christina Holt Taylor v. Tad Dirk Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-0185-MR
CHRISTINA HOLT TAYLOR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE CATHERINE R. HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 16-CI-01055
TAD DIRK TAYLOR AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES APPELLEES
OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: Christina Holt Taylor (“Christina”), pro se, appeals from an
order of the Warren Family Court increasing her child support obligation. Because
the family court failed to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, we
vacate and remand. Christina and Tad Dirk Taylor (“Tad”) were married in 2000 and had
two children together. They divorced in 2019. The decree of dissolution, which
incorporated the parties’ separation agreement, gave the parties joint custody of the
children, with Tad as the primary residential custodian. Christina was ordered to
pay $150 monthly in child support per the separation agreement, which the parties
acknowledged was a deviation from the child support guidelines.1 She was also
responsible for half the costs of the children’s extracurricular activities and
maintaining secondary health insurance for the children.
Just four months later, Tad moved to modify child support, claiming
Christina had not been paying her half of the expenses under the agreement.
Essentially, he argued Christina had breached the agreement which had led to the
deviation from the child support guidelines, and therefore modification was
necessary and proper. Christina responded there had been no material change in
circumstances since the entry of the decree, that she gave up substantial assets in
exchange for the reduced child support obligation, and that Tad just wanted a “do
over.” Although unclear from the record,2 the family court held at least four
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 403.212. 2 Tad’s brief notes six hearings on the motion to modify child support, three of these occurring in 2020. For whatever reason, the record on appeal starts in 2021.
-2- hearings on the motion to modify child support, resulting in hours of testimony
concerning the parties’ income.
A final evidentiary hearing was held on January 24, 2023. Rebecca
Gibson, contracted attorney for the Warren County Child Support Office
(“WCCSO”), submitted income calculations for the parties. According to their
records, Tad’s present monthly income was $1,786.07. Christina’s current
monthly income was either $3,729.81 or $2,080.00, depending on whether based
on her third quarter 2022 earnings as reported by the Kentucky Department of
Revenue or her pay stubs. Following the hearing, the family court requested the
parties submit completed child support worksheets for her consideration.
On February 9, 2023, the family court entered WCCSO’s tendered
Order Modifying Child Support and attached child support worksheets. Christina
was ordered to pay $544.18 per month in child support and $21,793.75 in
arrearages. This appeal followed.
“The trial court is vested with broad discretion in the establishment,
enforcement, and modification of child support.” Bjelland v. Bjelland, 408 S.W.3d
86, 87 (Ky. App. 2013). “As long as the family court’s discretion comports with
the guidelines, or any deviation is adequately justified in writing, this Court will
not disturb the trial court's ruling . . . .” Ciampa v. Ciampa, 415 S.W.3d 97, 99
(Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted). “Accordingly, this court reviews child support
-3- matters under an abuse of discretion standard, i.e., whether the decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Bjelland, 408 S.W.3d at 87 (citation omitted).
Christina makes four arguments on appeal: (1) the family court erred
in disregarding the parties’ separation agreement; (2) there was no substantial and
material change in circumstances warranting modification of child support; (3) the
family court’s findings concerning the parties’ income were clearly erroneous; and
(4) the family court failed to make findings of fact.
We begin our review with this last argument because it is dispositive.
The family court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of its decision to modify child support was error. CR3 52.01 provides in
relevant part that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment . . . .” A post-
decree motion to modify child support is an “action[] tried upon the facts without a
jury” as contemplated in CR 52.01. See Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453,
455-57 (Ky. 2011). “As such, family courts must make findings of fact and
conclusions of law . . . when hearing modification motions.” Id. at 456-57.
3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-4- Pursuant to KRS 403.213(1), child support may be modified “only
upon a showing of a material change in circumstances that is substantial and
continuing.” The family court’s order contains no findings of fact or legal
conclusions, it simply modifies Christina’s child support obligation and sets forth
her arrearage. This is insufficient under Anderson and CR 52.01. See Anderson,
350 S.W.3d at 458 (“CR 52.01 requires that the judge engage in at least a good
faith effort at fact-finding and that the found facts be included in a written order.”).
A “conclusory order such as the one entered here, setting forth nothing but the final
outcome, is inadequate and will enjoy no presumption of validity on appeal.”
Keifer v. Keifer, 354 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Ky. 2011).
“Where evidentiary proceedings are conducted in post-decree matters,
the purpose of the mandatory findings of fact under CR 52.01 is to provide a clear
record of the basis of the trial court’s decision thereby allowing a reviewing court
to easily understand the trial court’s view of the controversy.” Sallee v. Sallee, 468
S.W.3d 356, 359 (Ky. App. 2015) (citing Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky.
1986)). Here, the basis for the family court’s decision is unclear. In Elkins v.
Elkins, 359 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1962), Judge Palmore made the following eloquent
observation regarding the necessity of findings of fact in post-decree child support
proceedings:
The order from which this appeal is taken neither contains findings of fact nor discloses the basis on which
-5- the trial court’s decision was made. This is unfortunate, for a losing party ought not to be deprived of a proper review by the court’s failure to record its specific rulings of law and fact. By its failure to conform with CR 52.01 a record that leaves us in the dark in this respect inevitably conduces to a substitution of our own judgment for that of the trial court.
Id.
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