1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Christina Espinoza, No. CV-25-04286-PHX-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Fry's Food Stores, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 The Court now considers Defendant Fry’s Food Stores’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16 12) and Plaintiff Christina Espinoza’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 17 (Doc. 22). The Motions are fully briefed. The Court rules as follows. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff worked at Fry’s Food Stores and alleges that she was discriminated against 20 beginning in December 2022. (Doc. 1 at 4.) However, the Complaint only details allegedly 21 discriminatory behavior beginning in February 2023—when Plaintiff submitted a formal 22 complaint regarding her store manager and assistant manager. (Id. at 5.) After she 23 submitted her complaint, Plaintiff received “over 40 disciplinary actions, investigation 24 suspensions, and councils.” (Id.) Plaintiff goes on to briefly describe some of the alleged 25 disciplinary actions including attendance disciplinary actions and work suspensions. (Id.) 26 Plaintiff was terminated in July 2025. (Id.) Plaintiff thus asserts claims under Title VII of 27 the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Americans 28 1 with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. (the “ADA”).1 2 Plaintiff also filed two motions to amend her Complaint. (See Docs. 18, 22.) The 3 Court only considers the second Motion. Plaintiff also filed a Proposed Second Amended 4 Complaint (“PSAC”). (Doc. 23.) 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A. Motions for Leave to Amend 7 To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion for failure 8 to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) 9 requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 10 relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 11 which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) 12 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets 13 forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 14 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 15 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 17 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 18 or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 19 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a 20 cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual 21 matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” 22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal 23 “probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 24 unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 25 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’” 26 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 27 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations
28 1 The Complaint mentions a “Payroll Defensity” claim. (Doc. 1 at 4.) The Court is not aware of any such claim and thus does not specifically consider this claim. 1 are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins 2 v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 3 factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 4 of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 5 v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence 6 outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States 7 v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider 8 materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in 9 the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into 10 a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908. 11 B. Motions for Leave to Amend 12 Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 15(a)(2). “There is a strong policy in favor of allowing amendment after considering four 14 factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of 15 amendment.” Frisvold v. Pentair Filtration Sols. LLC, No. C17-136RSL, 2017 WL 16 3236972, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 2017) (citation modified). “[I]f the proposed 17 amendment would be futile (i.e., it would be immediately subject to dismissal if challenged 18 under Rule 12(b)(6)), there is no reason to put defendants through the unnecessary expense 19 and delay of responding to the amendment.” Id. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. ADA Claim 22 The nature of Plaintiff’s ADA claim is unclear. As a general matter, to state a prima 23 facie case of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled; (2) she 24 was qualified for the position; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because 25 of his disability. Fleming v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., 151 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1052 (D. Ariz. 26 2015). Plaintiff fails to establish each of these elements. Critically, Plaintiff fails to allege 27 that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Plaintiff also fails to even allege 28 that any adverse employment action was taken against her because of her disability. 1 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA claim without prejudice. 2 B. Title VII Claim 3 Similarly, the exact nature of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is unclear. As a general 4 matter, “[t]o establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must offer proof: 5 (1) that the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) that the plaintiff 6 performed his or her job satisfactorily; (3) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse 7 employment action; and (4) that the plaintiff's employer treated the plaintiff differently 8 than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class as the 9 plaintiff.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff 10 fails to establish any of these elements.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Christina Espinoza, No. CV-25-04286-PHX-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Fry's Food Stores, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 The Court now considers Defendant Fry’s Food Stores’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16 12) and Plaintiff Christina Espinoza’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 17 (Doc. 22). The Motions are fully briefed. The Court rules as follows. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff worked at Fry’s Food Stores and alleges that she was discriminated against 20 beginning in December 2022. (Doc. 1 at 4.) However, the Complaint only details allegedly 21 discriminatory behavior beginning in February 2023—when Plaintiff submitted a formal 22 complaint regarding her store manager and assistant manager. (Id. at 5.) After she 23 submitted her complaint, Plaintiff received “over 40 disciplinary actions, investigation 24 suspensions, and councils.” (Id.) Plaintiff goes on to briefly describe some of the alleged 25 disciplinary actions including attendance disciplinary actions and work suspensions. (Id.) 26 Plaintiff was terminated in July 2025. (Id.) Plaintiff thus asserts claims under Title VII of 27 the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Americans 28 1 with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. (the “ADA”).1 2 Plaintiff also filed two motions to amend her Complaint. (See Docs. 18, 22.) The 3 Court only considers the second Motion. Plaintiff also filed a Proposed Second Amended 4 Complaint (“PSAC”). (Doc. 23.) 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A. Motions for Leave to Amend 7 To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion for failure 8 to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) 9 requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 10 relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 11 which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) 12 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets 13 forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 14 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 15 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 17 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 18 or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 19 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a 20 cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual 21 matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” 22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal 23 “probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 24 unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 25 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’” 26 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 27 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations
28 1 The Complaint mentions a “Payroll Defensity” claim. (Doc. 1 at 4.) The Court is not aware of any such claim and thus does not specifically consider this claim. 1 are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins 2 v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 3 factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 4 of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 5 v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence 6 outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States 7 v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider 8 materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in 9 the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into 10 a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908. 11 B. Motions for Leave to Amend 12 Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 15(a)(2). “There is a strong policy in favor of allowing amendment after considering four 14 factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of 15 amendment.” Frisvold v. Pentair Filtration Sols. LLC, No. C17-136RSL, 2017 WL 16 3236972, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 2017) (citation modified). “[I]f the proposed 17 amendment would be futile (i.e., it would be immediately subject to dismissal if challenged 18 under Rule 12(b)(6)), there is no reason to put defendants through the unnecessary expense 19 and delay of responding to the amendment.” Id. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. ADA Claim 22 The nature of Plaintiff’s ADA claim is unclear. As a general matter, to state a prima 23 facie case of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled; (2) she 24 was qualified for the position; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because 25 of his disability. Fleming v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., 151 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1052 (D. Ariz. 26 2015). Plaintiff fails to establish each of these elements. Critically, Plaintiff fails to allege 27 that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Plaintiff also fails to even allege 28 that any adverse employment action was taken against her because of her disability. 1 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA claim without prejudice. 2 B. Title VII Claim 3 Similarly, the exact nature of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is unclear. As a general 4 matter, “[t]o establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must offer proof: 5 (1) that the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) that the plaintiff 6 performed his or her job satisfactorily; (3) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse 7 employment action; and (4) that the plaintiff's employer treated the plaintiff differently 8 than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class as the 9 plaintiff.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff 10 fails to establish any of these elements. Critically, Plaintiff does not allege that she belongs 11 to a class of people protected by Title VII. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to even allege that 12 any of the disciplinary actions taken in this case were discriminatory. Accordingly, the 13 Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII claim without prejudice. 14 C. Leave to Amend 15 The PSAC fails to remedy the mentioned defects. The PSAC includes more factual 16 allegations, however, these allegations proceed in a confusing and disjointed manner. 17 Nonetheless, the PSAC does not clearly allege that Plaintiff was discriminated against on 18 the basis of her disability—“Major Depressive Disorder, Anxiety”—or was discriminated 19 against on the basis of any protected class under Title VII. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion 20 for Leave to Amend is otherwise moot because the Court gives Plaintiff leave to amend 21 here ADA and Title VII claims. 22 Plaintiff’s amended complaint must address the deficiencies identified above and 23 should follow the form detailed in Rule 7.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Within 24 thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order, Plaintiff may submit a First Amended 25 Complaint. Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First 26 Amended Complaint.” The First Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its 27 entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. 28 The Court draws attention to the District of Arizona’s Federal Court Advice Only 1 || Clinic, Federal Court Advice Only Clinic - Phoenix | District of Arizona | United States 2|| District Court (uscourts.gov). The Court also notes the E-Pro Se program which assists || litigants with creating a Complaint form, Welcome - eProSe (uscourts.gov). Lastly, the 4|| Court advises Plaintiff that certain resources for self-represented parties, including a 5|| handbook and the Local Rules, are available on the ourt’s website, www.azd.uscourts.gov, by following the link “Self-Represented Litigants.” IV. CONCLUSION 8 Accordingly, 9 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12). 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Plaintiff's Motions to File || Amended Complaints (Docs. 18, 22). 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. 1) with 13 || leave to file a First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not file a First Amended 15} Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, the Clerk of Court shall dismiss this action without further order from the Court. 17 Dated this 8th day of June, 2026. 18 19 20 “Ss > fonorable Susan M. Brnovich = 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28
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