Christina Espinoza v. Fry's Food Stores, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04286
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Christina Espinoza, No. CV-25-04286-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Fry's Food Stores, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 The Court will screen the complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)1 16 before it is allowed to be served. Pursuant to that screening, Alicia Kindler, Matt Kale, 17 Claudia Pena, Jimmie L. Brown, and Larissa Castro are dismissed. 18 I. Legal Standard 19 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a complaint is subject to dismissal if it contains 20 claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief 21 may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 22 such relief.” Id. Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading 23 must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 24 to relief.” Id. Although Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands 25 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. 26 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 27 1 Although section 1915 largely concerns prisoner litigation, section 1915(e) applies 28 to all in forma pauperis proceedings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 1 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 2 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 3 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic 4 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff 5 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 6 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 7 states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 8 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 9 The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe pro se filings 10 liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a 11 pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 12 lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 13 Conclusory and vague allegations, however, will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. 14 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A liberal 15 interpretation may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. 16 Id. 17 II. Analysis 18 The complaint asserts claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under 19 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Americans with 20 Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) against Plaintiff’s former employer, Fry’s Food Store, 21 and several of its managers and employees. However, the individual managers and 22 employees are not liable under Title VII or the ADA. Ruggles v. State, 2025 WL 23 1745023, *9 (D. Ariz. 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has long held that Title VII does not 24 provide a separate cause of action against supervisors or co-workers.”) (cleaned up); Pink 25 v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.1998) (“[C]ivil 26 liability for employment discrimination does not extend to individual agents of the 27 employer who committed the violations, even if that agent is a supervisory employee.”); 28 Walsh v. Nevada Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) 1 (“[I]ndividual defendants cannot be held personally liable for violations of the ADA”). 2 Therefore, these defendants are dismissed. 3 As for Fry’s Food Store, the complaint is “sufficient to meet the low threshold for 4 proceeding past the screening stage.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 5 2012).2 6 Plaintiff is indigent and is entitled to have the Court “issue and serve all process” 7 at Plaintiff’s request. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (service 8 of process available “[a]t the plaintiff’s request”); Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 9 756-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (confronting “an inconsistency” between Rule 4 and § 1915 and 10 concluding that “[a]n IFP plaintiff must request that the marshal serve his complaint 11 before the marshal will be responsible for such service”). The Court will not require that 12 a request for service be made via a separate motion. Rather, the Clerk of Court shall send 13 Plaintiff a service packet, and Plaintiff’s prompt return of the service packet will be 14 construed as a request for service to be made by a U.S. Marshal pursuant to Rule 4(c)(3). 15 That request will be honored without the need for another order from the Court. 16 Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that Alicia Kindler, Matt Kale, Claudia Pena, Jimmie L. 18 Brown, and Larissa Castro are dismissed without prejudice. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a 20 service packet including the complaint (Doc. 1), this order, and both summons and 21 request for waiver forms. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not complete and return the 23 service packet to the Clerk of Court within 30 days of the date of filing of this Order (and 24 does not personally obtain a waiver of service or complete service), the action may be 25 dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff completes and returns the service 27 2 “[T]he sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, not a 28 substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a] defendant may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). || packet to the Clerk of Court within 30 days of the date of filing of this Order, the U.S. 2|| Marshal shall send to Defendant Fry’s Food Store a request for waiver pursuant to Rule 3|| 4(d)(1). If Fry’s Food Store does not waive service, the U.S. Marshal shall effectuate 4|| service. The Court may impose expenses incurred in making service on Fry’s Food Store || pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2). 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a defendant who agrees to waive service of 7\| the summons and complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 8 || Marshal, not the Plaintiff. 9 Dated this 3rd day of December, 2025. 10 11 Lom ee” Dominic W. Lanza 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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