Christie's Cabaret of Glendale LLC v. United National Insurance Company

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Christie’s Cabaret of Glendale LLC, et al., No. CV-19-04444-PHX-MTL

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 United National Insurance Company, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending is United National Insurance Company’s (“United National”) Motion for 16 Reconsideration of this Court’s Order denying summary judgment. (Doc 104.) Per the 17 Court’s request, Christie’s Cabaret has filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 109.) 18 The parties are familiar with the standard of review for motions for reconsideration 19 set forth in LRCiv 7.2(g). Additionally, “[m]otions for reconsideration are 20 disfavored . . . and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their 21 original briefs. Nor is reconsideration to be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has 22 already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 23 (D. Ariz. 2003) (cleaned up). In keeping with that approach, this Order denies the Motion 24 because it relitigates arguments from the summary judgment phase. 25 A few words about United National’s vacancy clause argument are worth sharing. 26 United National disagrees with the Court’s decision to follow the later-decided Arizona 27 Court of Appeals opinion in Glasser v. M&O Agencies, Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 14-0708, 2015 28 WL 9096764 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015), rather than its preferred case, In re Tom || Dubielak v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, No. CV-10-270-TUC-RCC, 2011 WL 13118035 (D. Ariz. Aug. 5, 2011). As the parties are aware, this case involves 3], Arizona state law claims. This matter is here, in federal court, by way of diversity jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the decisions of Arizona state courts, on questions 5 || of state law, should be followed as often as possible. The Court explained extensively in 6 || its summary judgment order why the Arizona Court of Appeals’ approach in Glasser || should be applied here. (Doc. 98 at 7-12.) That reasoning will not be reexplained now. 8 Beyond that, United National quibbles with the language used in the summary 9|| judgment order. It says, “[t]he Court did not analyze whether the property was “under renovation,’ but simply whether Plaintiff's activities—without examining when they 11 }} occurred—might constitute ‘renovation.’” (Doc. 104 at 5.) United National is mistaken. 12}| The Court’s analysis focused on the terms of the policy, the interpretation provided to a 13 || similar policy in Glasser, and the evidence adduced during discovery. The Court concluded 14]| that, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could find that the premises were under 15 || renovation. (See, e.g., Doc. 98 at 12 (“On such evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude || that Christie’s was ‘under construction or renovation’ during the relevant period.” 17 || (emphasis added)).) Perhaps a jury will, perhaps it won’t. Time will tell. 18 Finally, United National’s motion cites and discusses several cases that were not in 19 || its summary judgment briefing. Those cases could have been presented to the Court during 20 || the main briefing phase, at oral argument or, at the latest, by way of a notice of || supplemental authority. They will not be considered now. 22 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that United National’s Motion for Reconsideration 23 || (Doc. 104) is denied. 24 Dated this 14th day of January, 2022. 25 Wicha T. diburke Michael T. Liburdi 28 United States District Judge

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