Christie v. Christie, No. 535359 (Sep. 13, 1996)

1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 5496
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedSeptember 13, 1996
DocketNo. 535359
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 5496 (Christie v. Christie, No. 535359 (Sep. 13, 1996)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christie v. Christie, No. 535359 (Sep. 13, 1996), 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 5496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Both parties appeared and were represented by counsel. All statutory stays having expired, the court has jurisdiction.

Having heard the evidence, the court finds as follows:

The plaintiff and defendant, whose maiden name was Adams, intermarried at East Lyme, Connecticut, on May 8, 1971; that the plaintiff has resided continuously in Connecticut for a period of one year next preceding the date of the filing of this complaint; that there is one minor child issue of the marriage, Jenna Lyn Christie, born December 19, 1987; that there were no other minor children born to the plaintiff since the date of the marriage of the parties; that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and that there is no hope of reconciliation.

The parties have different opinions as to the cause of the breakdown in their marriage. The plaintiff claims that the defendant was very uncommunicative about their problems; that he was frequently away from the home in the evening; that he was working at various jobs with his heavy construction equipment without it producing any significant income; that defendant never wanted children and was not too excited about the birth of their minor child, Jenna; that the defendant had trouble interacting with their child; that he would not baby sit for the child or participate in setting up the child's nursery; that sex with the defendant was infrequent, namely once every three or four months, and that he asked her to leave the marital home.

Defendant claims that the plaintiff was always argumentative when he tried to communicate with her; that she wanted everything her way; that she manipulated Jenna; that they always argued over CT Page 5496-A treatment of Jenna; that plaintiff always contradicted his treatment of Jenna to such an extent that defendant ceased trying and that he was uncomfortable in the home with plaintiff and Jenna.

Defendant admits that he has not had sex with the plaintiff since the summer of 1994 and that the parties have gone their separate ways.

Based on the above, it is clear that the marriage of the parties has irretrievably broken down without any hope for reconciliation. I find that both parties have equally contributed to the breakdown of their marriage by their actions and behavior.

Plaintiff was born January 15, 1949. She suffers from a hereditary kidney disease which requires that she be monitored twice a year. Her kidney does not work at a normal level and she loses blood through her kidney. Other than for her kidney problem, plaintiff seems to be in good health.

Before the marriage, the plaintiff was employed as a secretary at Electric Boat in Groton. After the marriage, plaintiff continued her education by attending the University of New Haven during the evening and before her child was born. She received a bachelor's degree in operations management and a master's degree in business with a minor in computer science. Her employer paid for her tuition.

Plaintiff advanced in her employment and presently is employed as a project coordinator in engineering. She works 45 hours per week and receives an annual salary of $53,078, which includes $4673 for vacation pay. According to her financial affidavit dated June 6, 1996, plaintiff's net weekly income after deducting $112.50 for SSIP deduction and club dues of $2.75, is $605.49.

The defendant, who was born November 17, 1945, is employed at Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) as a staff engineer. In 1995, his annual salary was $71,328.37, Plaintiff's Exhibit K. However, defendant's financial affidavit dated June 6, 1996, indicates defendant grosses $1,061.54 per week, which indicates an annual income of $55,200.08. His net weekly income, after deducting $106.16 for retirement and life insurance payment of $7.67, is $613.46. However, defendant claims he is under withholding on his federal income tax by $70 per week. Therefore, CT Page 5496-B he actually claims his net income should be $543.46 per week.

Defendant appears to be in good health and his continued employment seems good.

Defendant owns jointly with his brother real estate with improvements thereon located and known as 53 Hillside Road, Groton, Connecticut. The property is valued at $59,000 and is subject to an $11,000 mortgage. Defendant and his brother purchased the property from their mother in 1983, who still resides there. Defendant pays part of the mortgage on said property.

During May, 1994, the parties purchased the marital home located at and known as 9 Woodview Drive, Ledyard, Connecticut, for the sum of $209,000. It is presently subject to a first mortgage between $151,000 and $155,000. The parties also jointly own an adjacent tract of land known as 11 Sandy Hollow Road, Ledyard, Connecticut, with a present value of $70,000.

The parties also jointly own a limited partnership interest valued at $14,565.

The plaintiff claims the marital home is in need of repairs totalling $30,000 more or less and wants defendant to pay for said repairs. Notwithstanding her claim, plaintiff on her financial affidavit, claims that the marital home has a present value of $209,000.

The plaintiff is the sole owner of a $10,000 New York Life insurance policy with a cash value of $3,794; a Shearson Lehman account valued at $337; a Shearson Lehman IRA valued at $34,757; a 1983 Datsun valued at $1,300; jewelry valued at $10,000; and a General Dynamics Pension Plan which will pay plaintiff presently $775 per month at age 65 but which will increase as her employment continues.

The defendant is the sole owner of SAIC stock valued at $282,719; an SAIC-CODA, ESOP profit sharing plan valued at $279,407; a Shearson Lehman IRA valued at $32,850; a Smith Barney account valued at $484; a 1995 Taurus with no equity; five New York Life Insurance policies with a total face value of $140,000 and a cash value of $32,742; a Charter Oak FCU valued at $1,800; and a Chelsea Groton Savings account valued at $600. CT Page 5496-C

The plaintiff is also the joint owner with her daughter, Jenna, of a certificate of deposit (CD) valued at $94,419.

The defendant is also the joint owner with his daughter, Jenna, of two Charter Oak Federal Credit Union CDs, one in the sum of $94,419, the other in the sum of $13,423.

The social security number of the minor child is on all three CDs. The interest received on the CD held jointly by the plaintiff and minor child is deposited by the plaintiff in a bank account for the minor child.

The interest income from all three CDs is reported in the minor child's tax returns and not on the tax returns of the parties. See Plaintiff's Exhibits K, L, M and N.

The parties have different positions as to whether the certificates of deposit jointly held with the minor child are completely marital assets. Plaintiffs contends that one half of said of the CDs is the property of the minor child. The defendant argues that the CDs are the property of the parties and not the minor child. The court finds that one half of the CDs are owned by the minor child and one half by the parties.

In addition to the above, there is a residence located at 2 Woodview Drive, Groton, Connecticut, held in irrevocable trust by the plaintiff for the benefit of the minor child, Jenna. Said residence has a value of $159,000 and is subject to a mortgage of $89,000. Further, the defendant contends that the real estate trust, which is irrevocable, is truly a marital asset especially in view of his testimony that claims plaintiff stated to the effect that the minor child would not receive any of the corpus of the trust.

Since the real estate trust is irrevocable, this court has no jurisdiction over it.

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Related

§ 46b-61
Connecticut § 46b-61

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1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 5496, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christie-v-christie-no-535359-sep-13-1996-connsuperct-1996.