Christian v. Properties known as Newfound Bay
This text of 103 F. App'x 447 (Christian v. Properties known as Newfound Bay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
Irvin A. Sewer appeals the District Court’s denial of his post-judgment motion [448]*448to vacate the judgment by consent to which he agreed in 1994. In denying Sewer’s motion, the District Court rejected his challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction as unsupported. It also found that Sewer’s motion seeking relief from the Consent Judgment based on a mutual mistake theory was not timely. Sewer appeals. For the reasons noted below, we agree with the District Court and therefore affirm its denial of Sewer’s motion.
I.
The factual history of this case is long and complex.1 Thus we set out only those facts necessary to decide the issues on appeal. This ease involves several tracts of land located in the Island of St. John,2 the ownership and boundaries of which have been sources of this litigation.
In 1980, a probate action was brought in the District Court of the Virgin Islands by the persons claiming ownership of this property as heirs of the previous owners. The Court appointed as administrator Eric Christian, who in December 1987 brought an action to quiet title for each of the disputed parcels. Sewer, representing the heirs of Martin Sewer, intervened as one of the defendants.
In December 1993, the parties agreed to settle by a “Consent Judgment,” which was approved by the District Court in June 1994. The Consent Judgment resolved, among other things, the disputes over title to the two parcels of land, parcels 6p and 6q. Sewer was awarded title to some portions of both parcels. The Consent Judgment indicated that parcels 6p and 6q were four acres and three acres, respectively. Because the location of the parcels was not precisely determined, however, the Court directed the defendants to arrange for the parcels to be surveyed.3
In January 1999, the District Court approved a survey, over Sewer’s objections, that determined the size of parcel 6p to be approximately seven acres (rather than four acres). Newfound Management Corp. v. Sewer, 34 F.Supp.2d 305 (D.Vi. 1999). Further, in June 2001, the Court approved the survey of parcel 6q that sized that parcel as close to seven acres (instead of three acres), and rejected Sewer’s contention that the parties’ mutual mistake about the size of the parcel permitted rescission of the 1994 Consent Judgment. [449]*449Christian v. All Persons Claiming Any Right, 144 F.Supp.2d 420 (D.Vi.2001).
On June 13, 2003, Sewer moved to vacate the Consent Judgment, claiming that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that the parties were mutually mistaken. In August 14, 2003, the District Court denied the motion.4 Sewer appeals.5
II.
A.
Sewer first argues the District Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction when it entered the Consent Judgment in 1994.6 He therefore seeks relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4).7
On appeal, Sewer does not provide any reason why the District Court was without jurisdiction. The record shows that Sewer in his motion argued that the District Court lost its jurisdiction over Virgin Islands’ local matters in 1991 when the V. I.’s territorial courts were vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over all local civil actions. See 4 V.I.Code Ann. § 76(a) (2003). We previously held, however, that the District Court reserved jurisdiction over local civil actions filed prior to October 1, 1991, the effective date of the statute. See Isidor Paiewonsky Associates, Inc. v. Sharp Properties, Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 153 (3d Cir.1993). In this case, the underlying probate action was filed in 1980. The action to quiet title in which Sewer intervened as a defendant and later stipulated to the Consent Judgment was filed in 1987. Thus, we conclude that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction when it entered the Consent Judgment.
B.
Sewer next asserts that the Consent Judgment must be vacated because the parties were mistaken about the sizes of the parcels in dispute. We do not address this issue because we agree with the District Court that this challenge is now time-barred.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) permits relief from a judgment, order, or proceeding by reason of mistake. But Rule 60(b) expressly provides that a motion “shall be made ... not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Here, Sewer’s motion to vacate was filed nine years after the entry of the Consent Judgment and two years after the District Court’s adoption of the survey that conclusively established the location and bound[450]*450aries of the parcels. Therefore, his motion is time-barred.8 See Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 498 (3d Cir.1975).
íjt Si5 ifs
We affirm the District Court’s order denying Sewer’s motion to vacate the Consent Judgment.
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103 F. App'x 447, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christian-v-properties-known-as-newfound-bay-ca3-2004.