Christian v. Buscher

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 13, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-0395
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 250395-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under May 13, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0395 Carla Bender not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

CALVIN CHRISTIAN III, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County MISTY BUSCHER, in Her Official Capacity as Mayor ) No. 25MR15 of Springfield, Illinois; CHARLES “CHUCK” ) REDPATH, in His Official Capacity as City Clerk of ) Springfield, Illinois; and THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ) Defendants ) ) (Charles “Chuck” Redpath, in His Official Capacity as ) Honorable City Clerk of Springfield; and the City of Springfield, ) Adam Giganti, Defendants-Appellees). ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding plaintiff had not established any basis to support the relief requested on appeal.

¶2 Plaintiff, Calvin Christian III, appeals from the circuit court’s judgment dismissing

his complaint against defendants, Misty Buscher, in her official capacity as mayor of Springfield,

Illinois, Charles “Chuck” Redpath, in his official capacity as city clerk of Springfield, and the City

of Springfield (City). On appeal, plaintiff argues this court should reverse the court’s dismissal of

his counts for declaratory relief against Redpath and the City and find Springfield ordinance No.

001-01-25 (eff. Jan. 7, 2025), which appointed Redpath as city clerk, failed to receive the six votes

required for passage and, therefore, was invalid. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 7, 2025, the Springfield City Council (City Council) held a special

meeting, at which it voted on the appointment of then-Alderman Redpath to the position of city

clerk, which had recently become vacant. The 10 elected alderman and the mayor were present at

the meeting. The City Council voted five “yea,” three “nay,” and two “present”; the mayor did not

vote. Redpath voted “yea.” The mayor announced the measure had passed. Ordinance No. 001-

01-25, which appointed Redpath as city clerk, was signed by the mayor, and Redpath was sworn

in as city clerk.

¶5 On January 13, 2025, plaintiff, a citizen proceeding pro se, filed a multicount

complaint against defendants for declaratory and injunctive relief, which he amended on January

22, 2025. One of the counts sought a declaration that ordinance No. 001-01-25 failed to receive

the six votes required for passage and, therefore, was invalid.

¶6 On January 30, 2025, Buscher filed a motion to dismiss the counts alleged against

her in plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735

ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)), which the circuit court granted on February 14, 2025.

¶7 On March 17, 2025, Redpath and the City filed a joint motion to dismiss the counts

alleged against them in plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (id.

§ 2-619.1.).

¶8 On April 10, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add

a count for quo warranto relief.

¶9 On April 11, 2025, Redpath and the City filed a response objecting to plaintiff’s

motion for leave to amend his complaint. In part, they invited the circuit court to resolve the issue

-2- concerning the sufficiency of the vote count because the arguments would be the same regardless

of whether declaratory or quo warranto relief was sought.

¶ 10 Also on April 11, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing. With respect to

plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, Redpath and the City argued, in part, “[A]mending the

complaint to include [a count for quo warranto relief] would not change the facts of the case or

the arguments that would be heard, it’s just a different procedural mechanism to get to the issue

[of the sufficiency of the vote count].” The court ultimately denied the motion for leave to amend

and then granted the joint motion to dismiss.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff, now proceeding with the assistance of counsel, argues this

court should reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of his counts for declaratory relief against

Redpath and the City and find ordinance No. 001-01-25 invalid because it failed to receive the six

votes required for passage. Redpath and the City disagree.

¶ 14 As an initial matter, Redpath and the City invite this court to affirm the circuit

court’s judgment because plaintiff “seeks, in essence, an action for quo warranto,” which, they

contend, he lacks standing to bring. We decline the invitation. Redpath and the City invited the

court to resolve the issue concerning the sufficiency of the vote count regardless of whether

declaratory or quo warranto relief was sought. Under these circumstances, we decline to affirm on

this basis.

¶ 15 Redpath and the City sought, and the circuit court granted, dismissal of plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (id.). “Section 2-619.1 allows a party to combine

a section 2-615 motion to dismiss based upon a plaintiff’s substantially insufficient pleadings with

-3- a section 2-619 motion to dismiss based upon certain defects or defenses.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Madison County v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2022 IL App (4th) 220169,

¶ 42. A dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 is reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 16 In support of his request for a reversal of the circuit court’s dismissal and a finding

that ordinance No. 001-01-25 failed to receive the six required votes for passage, plaintiff’s

primary contention is that the two “present” votes should not have been counted with the members

of the majority who did vote on the question involved. Plaintiff cites Robert’s Rules of Order (12th

ed. 2020), which, he claims, provides that “present” votes should not be counted in such a way.

He also cites the electronic voting record from the special meeting, which indicates the measure

had failed. Additionally, plaintiff, in support of the requested relief, contends Redpath’s vote

should not have been counted because he was prohibited from voting for himself.

¶ 17 In 1982, the supreme court decided Prosser v. Village of Fox Lake, 91 Ill. 2d 389

(1982). In Prosser, the Village of Fox Lake required the “ ‘concurrence of a majority’ ” of its six-

member board to pass ordinances. Id. at 392. The votes on the ordinances at issue were each three

“ ‘aye’ ” and one “ ‘nay.’ ” Id. One member was present but did not vote, and another member was

absent. Id. The ordinances were deemed approved. Id. On review, the supreme court affirmed the

finding that the ordinances passed, concluding the member who was present and failed to vote was

correctly counted with the majority “yea” votes. Id. at 396. The court explained:

“The effect of voting to ‘abstain,’ or to ‘pass,’ or voting ‘present’ or of

refusing to vote when present at a meeting depends on whether ‘the affirmative

vote’ of a majority or ‘the concurrence’ of a majority, of either the quorum or of all

members then holding office, is required for passage. If ‘the affirmative vote’ of a

majority of either standard is required (e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par.

-4- 11-74-6), then nothing less than a majority of ‘yea’ or ‘aye’ votes will result in

passage. An attempt to vote to ‘abstain’ or in any manner other than ‘yea’ or ‘nay,’

or a failure to vote shall be considered to have the effect of a ‘nay’ vote. Where the

‘concurrence’ of a majority is required for passage, the holding in most of the

jurisdictions where the issue has been considered is that a vote of ‘pass,’ ‘present,’

or ‘abstain’ or a failure to vote when present constitutes an acquiescence or

concurrence with the members of the majority who did vote on the question

involved. This is described in The Law of Local Government Operations: ‘It is a

general rule that those members present at a meeting consisting of a quorum must

vote against a proposal in order to defeat it. If members are present and refuse to

vote, they are deemed to have consented to the majority decision.’ (Rhyne, The

Law of Local Government Operations sec. 5.6, at 77 (1980). (See also Annot., 63

A.L.R.3d 1072, 1083 (1975); Froehlich, Effect of Council Members Voting

‘Abstain,’ ‘Pass,’ or ‘Present,’ 59 Ill. Municipal Rev. 15 (June 1980).) This holding

of a majority of jurisdictions developed from the common law rule pertaining to

elections announced in Rex v. Foxcroft (1760), 2 Burr. 1017, 1021, 97 Eng. Rep.

683, 685: ‘Whenever electors are present, and do not vote at all (as they have done

here,) “they virtually acquiesce in the election made by those who do.” ’ ” Id. at

395.

¶ 18 Some five years after Prosser was decided, in 1987, the City was established by a

consent decree approved by the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. See

McNeil v. City of Springfield, Illinois, No. 85-2365 (C. D. Ill. 1987). Section 2-4 of the Consent

Decree addresses vacancies of office and states: “If a vacancy occurs in the office of the *** City

-5- Clerk ***, the City Council, within 60 days thereafter, shall appoint a person to fill the vacancy

for the remainder of the unexpired term.” Id. That section further states: “An alderman shall be

eligible for appointment to fill a vacancy in the Office of *** City Clerk *** and may participate

in the vote taken to fill the vacancy.” Id.

¶ 19 Section 4-8 of the Consent Decree addresses the passage of ordinances and states:

“The passage of all ordinances for whatever purpose *** shall require the

concurrence of a majority of all members then holding office on the City Council,

including the Mayor, unless otherwise expressly provided by the Municipal Code

or any other act or ordinance governing the passage of any ordinance, resolution,

or motion.” Id.

This requirement was further codified in section 31.11 of the 1988 Springfield Code of Ordinances

(Springfield Code, § 31.11 (1988)), which states:

“The passage of all ordinances for whatever purpose *** shall require the

concurrence of a majority of all members then holding office on the city council,

including the mayor, unless otherwise expressly provided by the Municipal Code

or any other act or ordinance governing the passage of any ordinance, resolution,

or motion.”

¶ 20 The City adopted governing rules of order in the 1988 Springfield Code of

Ordinances. Section 31.08 states:

“The rules of order and parliamentary practice comprised in the current

edition of Robert’s Rules of Order shall govern the council in all cases to the extent

not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code or rules of procedure adopted by

the council.” Id. § 31.08.

-6- ¶ 21 Robert’s Rules of Order, a manual of parliamentary procedure, contains guidance

for determining a voting result. See Robert’s Rules of Order § 44 (12th ed. 2020). Section 44:1

addresses situations where the applicable voting standard is a majority vote. Id. § 44:1. It states:

“The word majority means ‘more than half’; and when the term majority vote is

used without qualification—as in the case of the basic requirement—it means more

than half of the votes cast by persons entitled to vote, excluding blanks or

abstentions, at a regular or properly called meeting.” (Emphases in original.) Id.

Section 44:3, in turn, addresses situations where the applicable voting standard is a two-thirds vote.

Id. § 44:3. It states:

“A two-thirds vote—when the term is unqualified—means at least two thirds of the

votes cast by persons entitled to vote, excluding blanks or abstentions, at a regular

or properly called meeting.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

¶ 22 In this case, we conclude plaintiff has not established any basis to support the relief

sought on appeal—a reversal of the circuit court’s dismissal and a finding that ordinance No.

001-01-25 is invalid because it failed to receive the six required votes for passage. First, with

respect to his primary contention that the two “present” votes should not have been counted with

the members of the majority who did vote on the question involved, plaintiff fails to point to

anything showing the general rule set forth by the supreme court in Prosser is inapplicable. While

the City—unlike the Village of Fox Lake in Prosser—adopted Robert’s Rules of Order, the

sections cited by plaintiff in Robert’s Rules of Order, sections 44:1 and 44:3, offer no guidance

where the applicable voting standard is the concurrence of the majority, the standard addressed in

Prosser and maintained by the City. Indeed, County of Kankakee v. Anthony, 304 Ill. App. 3d

1040, 1047 (1999), relied upon by plaintiff, is distinguishable, in that the applicable standard there

-7- was a “simple majority” of an entire county board, not a concurrence of the majority. Plaintiff,

furthermore, fails to provide any legal basis to conclude the electronic voting record from the

special meeting is authoritative on the issue. And second, with respect to his contention that

Redpath’s vote should not have been counted, plaintiff does not explain why, even if that was true,

it would entitle him to the relief sought on appeal—the vote would still be six without Redpath’s

vote. In fact, plaintiff fails to address this point in his reply brief, despite Redpath and the City

raising it in their appellee brief. See In re Linda B., 2017 IL 119392, ¶ 43 (“It is well established

that, on appeal, the party claiming error has the burden of showing any irregularities that would

justify reversal.”).

¶ 23 We, in so concluding, note plaintiff asserts allowing “present” votes to be counted

with the members of the majority who did vote on the question involved creates uncertainty,

misunderstanding, and potential chaos in the legislative process. He invites us, for the first time in

his reply brief, to take judicial notice of a news article, which, he claims, supports his assertion.

He also, for the first time in his reply brief, asserts Prosser has a “convincing dissent,” which, he

suggests, shows it was not “correctly decided.” Plaintiff’s assertions are nonstarters, and we

decline to take judicial notice of the news article. It is not the role of this court to reconsider a

decision from the supreme court, nor is it our role to consider whether an alternative rule should

be implemented to avoid purported negative policy ramifications from following a general rule set

forth by the supreme court. If plaintiff believes the rule from Prosser has negative policy

ramifications, he should advocate for a change to the applicable voting standards and/or governing

rules before the City Council, not this court.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

-8- ¶ 26 Affirmed.

-9-