Christian Borda v. Michael Chase

630 F. App'x 889
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 26, 2015
Docket15-11133
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 630 F. App'x 889 (Christian Borda v. Michael Chase) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christian Borda v. Michael Chase, 630 F. App'x 889 (11th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Christian Borda, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his Bivens action. 1 The district court held that Borda’s suit was barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Borda argues on appeal that the facts supporting his suit became apparent only during cross-examination of DEA agent Michael Chase, which took place within the limitations period. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I.

We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal courts must screen prisoners’ civil complaints against the government or its officers, dismissing any suits that are frivolous, malicious, or that fail to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Expiration of the applicable statute of limitations warrants dismissal of a claim as frivolous. Clark v. Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n. 2 (11th Cir.1990).

Bivens actions are subject to the same statute of limitations that governs actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir.1996). Section 1983 actions are in turn subject to the relevant state’s personal injury limitations period. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Florida’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is four years. Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1283. Borda’s Bivens claim is therefore subject to that four-year clock.

That clock began to run when his cause of action accrued. Federal law determines when a federal claim accrues. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir.1996). Accrual occurs when “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Id. at 561-62 (quotation omitted). In other words, the statute of limitations starts to run when a plaintiff knows or should know that he was injured and who inflicted that injury. Id. at 562. We must first identify the injury alleged, and then determine when Borda could have sued for it. Id.

II.

In December 2014, Borda filed a Bivens action against Chase and other government agents. Borda alleged that (1) Chase unreasonably seized his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) Chase violated his Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights by knowingly making false statements in an affidavit supporting Borda’s extradition from Colombia on drug trafficking charges. Borda claimed that the falsity of Chase’s statements became apparent to him only during a Brady hearing 2 on December 12, 2011, when Chase was cross-examined about an alleged inconsistency between his field notes and the extradition affidavit.

The alleged inconsistency was as follows. In ¶ 10 of the extradition affidavit, dated January 14, 2009, Chase stated that (1) Borda met his co-cqnspirators at a restaurant in Mexico to discuss smuggling co *891 caine into Mexico and the United States; (2) this meeting was observed by DEA agents; and (3) Borda agreed to arrange half of the 1,000-kilogram shipment. During cross-examination at the Brady hearing, Chase testified that the notes on which he based this extradition affidavit did not specifically say that Borda agreed to smuggle drugs into the United States. Instead, Chase’s notes read: “Tony 3 authorized Junior 4 to move dope to Monterray [sic]. 5 Tony told [confidential informant] that he gave trust to Junior and he blew it.” Chase, admitted that his statement in the extradition affidavit interpreted what the informant had told him.

Borda attached to his Bivens complaint a letter from the government to his attorney, dated June 22, 2010. This letter, titled “RE: Questions in regard to extradition affidavit,” answered specific queries from Borda’s attorney regarding the extradition affidavit, including one about ¶ 10.

In screening Borda’s case as required by § 1915A, the magistrate judge recommended that it be dismissed as barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The magistrate judge noted that Borda based his claim on an allegedly false affidavit dated January 14, 2009. The latest Borda could possibly have become aware of the affidavit was June 22, 2010, because the government’s letter to Borda’s counsel proved that Borda was aware of the affidavit’s contents at that time, if not earlier. Yet Borda filed his complaint in December 2014, nearly six years after the affidavit and over four years after the letter.

Borda objected to the magistrate judge’s R & R, arguing he was not actually aware that his constitutional rights were violated until the December 12, 2011 Brady hearing. However, Borda did not dispute the magistrate judge’s finding that he was aware of the letter on June 22, 2010. He also acknowledged that he “was aware of some of the contents of the affidavit,” but claimed he was not aware of ¶ 10’s alleged falsity. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s R & R and dismissed Borda’s complaint. This appeal followed.

III.

Borda misconstrues the test for accrual. Whether he was actually aware of the affidavit’s alleged falsity is only one component of the test. The other is whether the alleged falsity; should have been apparent to a reasonably prudent person in his situation. See Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (“What Brown ignores is the fact that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date ‘the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.’ For the purposes of this case the operative phrase is ‘should be apparent.’ ” (citation omitted)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
630 F. App'x 889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christian-borda-v-michael-chase-ca11-2015.