Christia Adam Fortney, V. Lance Sayre

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: November 25, 2024
• Docket: 85840-8
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CHRISTIAN LANCE SAYRE, No. 85840-8-I

Appellant, DIVISION ONE

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ADAM FORTNEY, Snohomish County Sheriff, SCOTT ROBERTSON, Jail Bureau Chief,

Respondents.

FELDMAN, J. — Christian Lance Sayre appeals the superior court’s denial of

his habeas corpus petition, challenging the court’s determination that it had no

discretion to set bail following service of a governor’s extradition warrant. Both

parties agree we review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Because

Washington does not authorize the granting of bail to individuals held after

issuance of a governor’s extradition warrant, we affirm.

Sayre was arrested and charged with several sex offenses in Snohomish

County in January 2022. He was released on bail. Later that month, he was

indicted for six sex crimes in Oregon. Governor Jay Inslee issued a governor’s

extradition warrant, authorizing Washington law enforcement to take Sayre into

custody and deliver him to Oregon, provided that he not be delivered “until full

completion of any and all criminal charges pending against him in the State of No. 85840-8-I

Washington.” Sayre was arrested pursuant to the governor’s warrant, and the

superior court ordered him held with no bail. While awaiting trial on his Washington

charges, Sayre filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which he then amended,

arguing that his detention without bail was unlawful. Following a hearing, the

superior court denied the petition. Relevant here, the court held:

To the extent any of the petitioner’s claims are cognizable, they are without merit, as this State does not authorize granting bail to petitioners held pursuant to a Governor’s Warrant. Pritchett, 12 Wn. App. at 674-75

The court added: “the court believes that it does not have any discretion on this

matter.” Id. This timely appeal followed.

Sayre asserts that the trial court had—and failed to exercise—discretion to

set bail under Washington law. Such an error is sufficient to constitute an abuse

of discretion. Mainline Rock & Ballast, Inc. v. Barnes, Inc., 8 Wn. App. 2d 621,

623, 439 P.3d 676 (2019) (trial court abused its discretion where it “misread the

law and failed to exercise its discretion under the statute”). But as the superior

court correctly noted, Sayre’s argument is contrary to controlling precedent. Like

numerous other states, Washington has enacted a version of the Uniform Criminal

Extradition Act (UCEA), codified in RCW 10.88, to establish the procedures by

which it will facilitate interstate extradition. Under RCW 10.88.220, the governor

of a requesting state may demand extradition by furnishing required

documentation. After reviewing the documentation, if the governor of the receiving

state “decides that the demand should be complied with, he or she shall sign a

warrant of arrest.” RCW 10.88.260. But where, as here, a criminal proceeding

has been instituted against such person under the laws of this state, the governor

“may surrender him or her on demand of the executive authority of another state -2- No. 85840-8-I

or hold him or her until he or she has been tried and discharged or convicted and

punished in this state.” RCW 10.88.380; see State v. Roberson, 78 Wn. App. 600,

606, 897 P.2d 443 (1995) (“Under RCW 10.88.380, the Governor may choose to

surrender a person to another state or hold the person until tried and, if convicted,

until punished.”).

Most states that have adopted the UCEA do not authorize admitting a person

to bail after service of a governor’s extradition warrant. See People v. Superior Court

(Ruiz), 187 Cal. App. 3d 686, 689 (1986) (UCEA adopted by California “does not

provide for bail, and the majority of American jurisdictions deny bail in extradition

procedures, albeit by judicial decision rather than by statute”). As the superior court

here correctly stated, State v. Pritchett, 12 Wn. App. 673, 675, 530 P.2d 1348 (1975),

squarely addresses this issue. The trial court there granted bail to Pritchett after he

had been arrested on a governor’s extradition warrant. The State argued that the

trial court lacked authority to do so, and Division Three of this court agreed, noting:

It has been the law of this state since In re Foye, 21 Wash. 250, 57 P. 825 (1899), and reaffirmed in State ex re. Rheinstrom v. Ronald, 106 Wash. 189, 179 P. 843 (1919) that:

“neither the Constitution of the United States nor the law of Congress pertaining to the subject of extradition, nor any law of this state, authorizes the giving of bail in . . . extradition cases.”

Pritchett, 12 Wn. App. at 675 (quoting Rheinstrom, 106 Wash. at 190). Division

Three then directed the trial court to “vacate its order admitting the defendant to

bail and to retake him into custody pending his delivery to the demanding state.”

Id. Consistent with Pritchett, a leading treatise in Washington similarly states,

“After the fugitive is arrested on a governor’s warrant, he is not entitled to bail.”

Extradition in general—Governor’s warrant and no bail, 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, -3- No. 85840-8-I

WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5209, at 523 (3d ed.

2004).

Applying these settled legal principles, the superior court here did not abuse

its discretion in ruling that Sayre—like Pritchett—was not entitled to bail because

he was held pursuant to a governor’s warrant. Also like Pritchett, Sayre relies on

the minority view among other states adopting versions of the UCEA, which allows

bail to be set upon a governor’s warrant. Responding to the same argument in

Pritchett, Division Three stated: “It is true that there is a minority authority which

allows bail to be set upon a governor’s warrant of extradition. . . . However, that is

not the law of this state.” Pritchett, 12 Wn. App. at 675. Here too, the cases cited

by Sayre are “not the law of this state.” And contrary to Sayre’s argument that

“Pritchett is easily distinguished on its facts,” the court there squarely addressed

the dispositive issue in this appeal and its holding is consistent with both the

majority view in other states and Washington Practice.

Because Washington law does not authorize the granting of bail to

individuals held after issuance of a governor’s extradition warrant, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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