Christgau v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. of New Jersey

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Christgau v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. of New Jersey

178 A.D. 948

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 15, 1917

StatusPublished

This text of 178 A.D. 948 (Christgau v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. of New Jersey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Christgau v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. of New Jersey, 178 A.D. 948 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1917).

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Opinion

Merrell, J.

(dissenting): I dissent upon the following grounds: (1) The verdict is excessive. (2) There was no timely service of proofs of loss as required by the contract of insurance, and plaintiff offered no sufficient evidence upon which defendant could be said to have waived the service thereof. (3) The trial court erroneously refused to admit in evidence the inventory and appraisal in the proceedings in bankruptcy of the Los Angeles Pure Fruit Company, in connection with plaintiff’s cross-examination, and as bearing upon his evidence on value of the property destroyed. (4) That the trial court erroneously refused to charge the jury that, if the property destroyed was not salable, it had no market value.

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Merrell, J.

(dissenting): I dissent upon the following grounds: (1) The verdict is excessive. (2) There was no timely service of proofs of loss as required by the contract of insurance, and plaintiff offered no sufficient evidence upon which defendant could be said to have waived the service thereof. (3) The trial court erroneously refused to admit in evidence the inventory and appraisal in the proceedings in bankruptcy of the Los Angeles Pure Fruit Company, in connection with plaintiff’s cross-examination, and as bearing upon his evidence on value of the property destroyed. (4) That the trial court erroneously refused to charge the jury that, if the property destroyed was not salable, it had no market value.

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Bluebook (online)

178 A.D. 948, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christgau-v-standard-fire-insurance-co-of-new-jersey-nyappdiv-1917.