Christensen v. Wooley

41 Mo. App. 53, 1890 Mo. App. LEXIS 253
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 29, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 41 Mo. App. 53 (Christensen v. Wooley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christensen v. Wooley, 41 Mo. App. 53, 1890 Mo. App. LEXIS 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1890).

Opinions

Biggs, J.

This is an action to recover the sum of two hundred and twenty-five dollars, which the plaintiff alleged had been received by the defendants as his agents, and they had refused to pay to him on demand. The defendants denied the indebtedness, and averred that they were real-estate agents, and that the money retained by them was the amount of their commissions on a sale of plaintiff’s property to one O. R. Symmes; that they had been employed by the plaintiff to sell certain real estate, and that, through their efforts, a valid contract for the sale thereof,- upon the terms agreed on, was made with Symmes; that Symmes paid in cash five hundred dollars, but afterwards refused to complete the sale on account of alleged defects in the [55]*55plaintiff’s title; that the plaintiff declined to enforce the specific performance of the contract with Symmes, and, prior to the bringing of this suit, sold the real estate to other parties ; that, under the contract with the plaintiff, the defendants’ commissions on the sale amounted to two hundred and twenty-five dollars, and that the defendants retained (as they lawfully might do) that amount of the cash paid by Symmes, and the remainder, to-wit, two hundred and seventy-five dollars, they paid to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s replication put in issue the averments of the answer, and, upon the issues as thus made up, the cause was submitted to the court sitting as a jury. The finding and judgment were for the defendants, and the plaintiff has brought the case to this court for review.

The plaintiff only complains of the instructions given and refused. It will not be necessary for us to set out the instructions in this opinion, as our discussion of the propositions hereinafter stated will dispose of all legal questions necessary, to a complete determination of the action.

We will treat of two questions only in this opinion: First. Did the defendants in the sale of the property bind the purchaser to a contract, which the plaintiff could have enforced, if his title to the property had been unobjectionable? Second. If there was such a contract, what effect did the refusal of Symmes to comply with it have upon the defendants’ right to commissions ?

I. The plaintiff’s counsel insist that, while the defendants bound their client by a valid contract, they failed to secure from Symmes a sufficient written memorandum of the contract so as to enable the plaintiff to specifically enforce it; that, therefore, the five hundred dollars paid on the purchase by Symmes must be regarded as a forfeit or option, and that, when Symmes failed to complete the purchase, this money became the absolute [56]*56property of the plaintiff. Whether this position can, be 'sustained as a legal proposition or not, we need not stop to inquire, because the statement is not borne out by the facts. We are of the opinion that the defendants did secure from Symmes a valid contract, and that consequently they were entitled to full commissions.

In every contract for the sale of land, or any interest therein, there must be a memorandum in writing, signed by' the party sought to be charged; and the writing must show within itself, or by reference to some other paper or papers, all the material conditions of the contract. The contract may be made up of several papers signed by the different parties to it respectively, and, if necessary to satisfy the statute, and bind the parties, the various papers will be read as constituting one contract, provided that the paper, signed by the party attempted to be held, makes reference to the other papers so as to enable the court to gather from the papers, when read as a whole, the terms of the contract. O'Donnell v. Leeman, 43 Me. 160; Benjamin on Sales, sec. 222; Waterman, Spec. Perf., sec. 232, p. 311; Browne on the Statute of Frauds [4 Ed.] sec. 346 b. But, if it be necessary to introduce extrinsic evidence for the purpose of connecting the papers, then they cannot be read together. If the reference made to other documents in the signed paper is ambiguous, parol evidence may be admissible to explain the ambiguity or to identify the documents referred to. Benjamin on Sales, supra.

Now let us apply the foregoing legal principles to the facts in this case. It is admitted that the plaintiff put his property into the defendants’ hands for sale, and that the attempted sale to Symmes was in compliance with the terms agreed on between them. It is also conceded that Symmes bargained for the land for himself, J. B. Montgomery and C. M. Condon, although the negotiations were conducted in Symmes’ name. At the time of the purchase Symmes paid to the defendants [57]*57on account thereof the sum of five hundred dollars, and the defendants executed and delivered to him the following receipt:

“$500.00. Springfield, Mo., March 18, .1887.
“Received of O. R. Symmes five hundred dollars, part purchase money for sixteen acres of land known as the Murray tract, adjoining the city limits on the south and east of I). C. Kennedy’s land. Sold him on the following terms: Price, eight thousand dollars for the entire tract, two thousand dollars’ cash when abstract and deed is furnished, of which the five hundred dollars is a part. The balance of purchase to be paid : Two thousand dollars in six months, two thousand dollars in twelve months, two thousand dollars in eighteen months from date of transfer. All unpaid balance to bear, interest at the rate of ten per cent, and secured by deed of trust on the land.
“ [ Signed.] Wooley, Porter & Hubbell.”

This receipt was the only written evidence of the sale at the time the trade was made, and it is not claimed by the defendants that the receipt within itself would bind Symmes ; but they do claim that the subsequent letters of Symmes and Montgomery, when read in connection with the receipt, were sufficient to take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds.

Symmes lived in Oswego, Kansas,, and he left Springfield before the abstract of title to the land was completed. The defendants on the night of the eighteenth of March mailed the abstract to him at Oswego, and on the following day it was returned by Montgomery to their Springfield agent, and he also addressed to the defendants the following letter :

“Oswego, Kansas, March 19, 1887.
“I return the abstract to O. B. Sperry. You ought to get an attorney to pass upon your papers, or do it yourself. The one sent and' returned is absolutely the [58]*58worst thing I ever saw, and I am surprised at your sending it out in shape it is in. I have directed Mr. Sperry to see you, and, if the abstract of title is as represented, I cannot take the property. You can see for yourselves the inconsistency of the title. Yours,
“ J.' B. Montgomery.”

After this there was a great deal of correspondence between the defendants and Symmes and Montgomery concerning the purchase. We deem it unnecessary to incumber this opinion with-the entire correspondence, and we will only embody herein extracts referring to the receipt signed by the defendants. Under date of March 19, Symmes wrote from Oswego to the defendants as follows :

“ Dear Sirs: — Make us a warranty deed, and in drawing up notes can’t you make them payable on or before, and instead of taking a trust deed let us sign the notes and have the following names thereon, viz.

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Bluebook (online)
41 Mo. App. 53, 1890 Mo. App. LEXIS 253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christensen-v-wooley-moctapp-1890.